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ABSTRACT 
Emerging zoonoses have unique consequences for the animal health, public health and trade 
sectors. This study examined the links between policy. zoonoses, and risk in Zambia and 
assessed the feasibility of a World Organisation for Animal Health (OlE) risk analysis in 
informing risk management in this context. 
The research was a qualitative case study drawing on: in-depth interviews with key informants; 
informal interviews; documentary review and observation. Snowball sampling was used to 
select informants directly involved in avian (H5Nl) and human influenza policy development 
and/or livestock trade policy implementation at national level. A chronology of avian and 
human influenza policy development in Zambia over the period 2005-2009 was constructed. 
Policy process and interpretivist policy analysis theories guided analysis. 
In this resource-constrained setting, external international agendas were found to have 
considerable influence on policy. National stakeholders initially framed H5Nl as an imminent 
threat and largely animal health problem. This prioritized the involvement of health and 
agricultural actors in the policy process and excluded those from trade and other key sectors. 
H5Nl was a plausible threat to agriculture, and a potential threat to human health, but 
perceptions of risk presented real economic repercussions for the poultry industry. Despite 
challenges in coordinating the policy response, the policy process had tangible benefits for 
Zambia in terms of pandemic preparedness and for raising the profile of the previously under-
recognised poultry industry. 
This study suggests the weighing of both local policy and ecological configurations in 
assessment of risk and the design of zoonotic disease mitigation policies. While feasible, the 
merits of an OlE risk analysis in informing policy development in this context would be 
enhanced by a careful consideration and inclusion of policy processes. An objective and 
discursive approach to analysis of risk, appropriately communicated to stakeholders, would 
improve collaboration in disease management across sectors. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. Introduction 
This thesis examines national level pandemic preparedness and multi-sectoral risk management 
policy development across the sectors of animal health, public health and trade in Zambia. The 
thesis explores how highly pathogenic avian influenza came to be prioritized on Zambia's 
national agenda and how policy developed. It then examines the potential of risk analysis to 
contribute to multi-sectoral policy making in this resource-constrained country in the context of 
globalisation. The study covered public health, animal health and trade because highly 
pathogenic avian influenza straddles the concerns of these and other sectors at both national and 
international levels. Internationally, H5NI highly pathogenic avian influenza has been on the 
global public health radar since 2003, mainly because of concerns over its pandemic potential. It 
has also been a demonstrated threat to global poultry, has impacted on the livelihoods of poultry 
keeping communities in outbreak areas, and has threatened international trade through concerns 
over trade-related risks of further spread. At national level, highly pathogenic avian influenza 
has similar potential multi-sectoral effects. 
This thesis explores how the risk of avian and human influenza was perceived by decision-
makers and policy relevant stakeholders in Zambia, and how this was addressed in the process 
of developing avian influenza risk management and pandemic preparedness policy. It is from 
this viewpoint, i.e. how risk was perceived and subsequent policy defmed, that the thesis 
explores how the application of animal health risk analysis can best accommodate the policy 
processes of risk management to better inform integrated disease mitigation across the trade-
animal health-public health policy interface of developing countries such as Zambia. The 
study's contribution to knowledge is to provide a deeper understanding of how policy on the 
management of multi-sectoral impacting zoonoses such as highly pathogenic avian influenza, a 
global concern, is actually developed in resource-constrained countries and identify how 
14 
understanding of the policy process may be relevant to the application of risk analysis in such 
contexts. 
1.1. RatiolUlle and approach to the study 
Zambia is a landlocked and largely agrarian nation in Sub-Saharan Africa. The country has a 
total area of 752,614 sq km, and a human population estimated at 12.2 million people as of 
2007, most of who live along the major transport routes in the country. Administratively, the 
country has nine provinces and 72 Districts (CSO 2003). Livestock production in Zambia is 
described as dualistic, with commercial and traditional sectors. The country has a growing 
poultry industry and a development agenda focusing on export led growth. In addition, Zambia 
is signatory to a plethora of multilateral trade agreements. Chapter 3 of this thesis describes this 
local context, outlining the key features of agricUlture, trade agreements and health policy 
priorities that form the backdrop to Zambia's response to highly pathogenic avian influenza. 
This thesis is a policy analysis examining the agenda setting and policy formulation processes 
of multi-sectoral disease risk management at national level in this Southern African state. The 
study identified the actors 1 for whom, and interests for which, avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy was important at national and international levels. It utilised 
multiple methods of data collection, including perspectives of participating decision-makers 
across the sectors of public health, animal health and livestock trade, obtained from semi-
structured formal and informal interviews, attendance of planning meetings, observation and 
review of policy documents, official reports, media articles, and peer reviewed literature. In 
analysing the development of avian and human influenza prevention and control policy in 
Zambia, the study also explored this policy's 'interaction' with livestock trade policy 
implementation. Many authors have argued that global trade has been one of the means through 
which highly pathogenic avian influenza has spread. For instance, Feare (2005) argues that 
Russian and Kazakh outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 2005 occurred along 
1 As individuals, groups or institutions. 
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trade routes between China and Russia, suggesting trade had played an important role in disease 
spread in these countries. Kilpatrick et al. (2006) in their model for predicting the global spread 
of avian influenza state that further spread on the African continent would likely be partly 
through trade and partly through infected migratory wild bird movement. These studies 
demonstrate the importance of considering the role that trade policy implementation played in 
avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development in Zambia. 
In its examination of policy development across animal health, public health and trade, this 
thesis links multi-sectoral risk management policy processes to the analysis of risk. The study 
rationale was that how risk analyses are applied to determine the dangers associated with 
diseases such as highly pathogenic avian influenza has implications for, and affects, the policies 
of the trade, animal health and public health sectors. The limitations of purely scientific 
approaches to risk analysis have been well argued by many authors, including Horlick-Jones 
(1998) on the contextualisation of meaning in the assessment of risk; Scott et al. (1999) in the 
need for more precautionary approaches to the assessment of risk within the dealings of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Stirling and Mayer (2000) in their examination of 
approaches to risk in genetic modification in UK. The purpose of this thesis is not to advocate 
for a purely scientific basis for policy making. Focusing on the particular economic context of 
Zambia, this thesis instead analyses how incorporating an understanding of policy processes in 
the approach to risk analysis could improve its usefulness in informing multi-sectoral risk 
management policy development, since conditions such as highly pathogenic avian influenza 
touch on, and are rarefied by, the interests of animal health, public health, trade and more 
widely. The study examined the potential of one approach to the analysis of risk, the World 
Organisation for Animal Health's (Om2) risk analysis framework, to inform multi-sectoral risk 
management policy development in Zambia. 
2 The World Organisation for Animal Health is an intergovernmental organization that was established in 
1924 (Bruckner 2009). OlE is the French acronym for the organisation's original name; Office 
International des Epizooties. 
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The OlE risk analysis framework has been developed as an • obj ective , tool for providing 
decision-makers with assessment of the risks posed by a particular course of action (Wooldridge 
2000; McDiarmid and Pharo 2(03). While the OlE takes a largely animal health perspective on 
the prevention and control of disease, highly pathogenic avian influenza, as a human pandemic 
candidate, has wider impacts beyond animal health. Shortridge, Peiris and Guan (2003) state 
pointedly in their paper on pandemic influenza that, "Pandemic influenza is a zoonosis" (p. 
70S). In contemporary times, the words 'pandemic' and 'zoonoses' speak to the interests of 
myriad actors. In the case of highly pathogenic avian influenza, as the literature review of this 
thesis will demonstrate; these actors have included the animal health, public health, poultry 
industry, wildlife conservationist, global commerce and international pharmaceutical 
communities. It has even touched on issues of national security in some contexts. This implies a 
need for a radical shift in the way we think about infectious diseases and the threats they 
represent. While, according to Hueston (2003), purely 'scientific' viewpoints perceive 
biological processes such as disease transmission, and the assessment of risk thereof, as 
independent of politics and policy, policy-maker decisions across trade, animal health and 
public health are driven by very different interests, priorities and influences. These, in tum, 
affect how these communities perceive and address 'risk'. These contemporary concerns also 
require a shift in how infectious disease risks are assessed, which, in as far as it is possible, may 
require taking into consideration the multiple perspectives and concerns of policy relevant-
stakeholders in each context. In the context of developing countries, this may include the trade 
community. Key is how policy-makers come to identify problems and perceive risk in relation 
to public health, animal health or trade. 
Furthennore, although policy-maker decisions are driven by specific interests, priorities and 
influences, their decisions are by no means isolated and both either affect, or are affected by 
other policy areas, as exemplified by the literature on the health-trade relationship. For instance, 
Lee, Fustukian, and Buse (2002) explore how health policy has had to 'play catch up' with 
commerce-focused decisions in the globalization phenomenon. Kimball (2006) also examines 
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how commerce-based decisions have led to an increasing incidence of infectious disease spread. 
Others like Stiglz (2009), and MacDonald and Horton (2009), have suggested that policy 
decisions to liberalize trade have actually led to increasing inequalities in many countries, with 
developing countries suffering the most (see also Blouin, Chopra and van der Hoeven 2(09). In 
global infectious disease management, the regimens put in place to prevent and control 
transboundary disease spread in the multilateral trading system have also been argued to 
disadvantage developing countries (see Thomson et al. 2004). 
Given these 'knock on' effects of policy decisions in the global context, it is important to 
determine how the interests of the trade, public health and animal health sectors 'interact' in the 
process of multi-sectoral risk management policy development at national level. Some 
understanding of policy and interest interaction across different sectors may also be important 
for the feasibility of conducting risk analyses for, or mitigation of multi-sector impacting 
diseases such as highly pathogenic avian influenza in developing countries. Therefore issues of 
policy and risk analysis may benefit from being considered holistically. 
1.2. Relevance of the study 
In the 21 sl century, an era in which globalisation, world commerce and rising concerns over the 
emergence and re-emergence of infectious disease threats are the highly contested topics of the 
times, pandemic preparedness presents unique challenges, particularly for developing countries. 
Empirically, however, there have been limited research efforts directed at understanding the 
context in which resource-constrained countries attempt to negotiate these global imperatives 
across public health, animal health and trade. International trade, access to which is now 
facilitated by trade agreements under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) system (WTO 
2(07), is viewed by many developing countries as important. With the promise of access to 
global markets, many developing countries have joined the WTO. For developing countries, 
global commerce and pandemic preparedness present challenges for how to trade in livestock 
and livestock products in order to generate revenue to stoke challenged economies, how to 
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identify, prioritize and manage infectious disease risks across usually overburdened animal 
health and public health systems and how to develop context-appropriate pandemic 
preparedness responses. A serious problem for developing countries is how they are perceived 
in the global setting. In the context of highly pathogenic avian influenza in particular, 
developing countries are viewed as a source of infectious disease risks (Southeast Asia), and 
most in need of protection from them (e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa) both for humans and animals. 
In developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, veterinary infrastructure may be weak, and 
health sectors already overburdened by such problems as malaria, tuberculosis and lflV/AIDS. 
To contextualise the HIV/AIDS problem, Fauci (2001) for example, argues that in 2000, 70% of 
HIV positive people lived in southern Africa, with India and Southeast Asia set to be the next 
epicentres of the pandemic. In addition, it can be argued that novel infectious diseases such as 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and highly pathogenic avian influenza could be 
seen as possible compounding forces, with the potential to exponentially increase the risk of 
morbidity and mortality in these contexts. Highly pathogenic avian influenza, in particular, has 
been presented as a trade-related risk. For the world's poorest countries, the confluence of 
interests surrounding global health and global trade therefore presents unique challenges. It 
remains to be seen what implications these intersecting interests have for the development of 
disease risk management policies and pandemic preparedness. This thesis therefore examines 
how global issues such as highly pathogenic avian influenza and pandemic preparedness are 
addressed on the national agenda, and in the context of international trade. It goes on to 
determine how risk analyses in such contexts can be better informed to develop 'appropriate' 
policy responses to similar challenges. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis has ten chapters and is divided into four sections. The first section (Chapter 1-3) 
presents the introduction, background, and conceptual framework of the thesis. The second 
section (Chapters 4-7) presents the results of the policy analysis. The third section (Chapter 8) 
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draws on key themes identified in the policy analysis to examine the role that understanding of 
the policy process could play in conducting a multi-sectoral zoonotic risk analysis in the 
Zambian context. Finally, the fourth section (Chapter 9) is the discussion and conclusion of this 
thesis. The general content and themes explored in each the chapters are as follows: 
This opening chapter has introduced what this thesis is about, the rationale for the study, and the 
relevance of the research. Chapter 2 examines the literature on public health, animal health and 
trade as it relates to the risk of zoonotic disease emergence and risk management. It describes 
how policy, disease, and risk are linked both at international and national levels. In this chapter, 
globalisation, zoonoses and the human-animal interface are defmed. It discusses how zoonoses 
relate to the human-animal interface, and identifies where zoonoses fall in the spectrum of 
human infectious disease epidemiology. This is then followed by a discussion on influenza and 
pandemic preparedness, and the role that H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza has played in 
the emergence of global interactions in disease control. It also outlines the key epidemiological 
debates around its trade related risk of spread. This chapter then takes a policy and resource-
constrained country perspective on the examination of the global context of animal health, 
public health and trade. It examines the key arguments around the policy nexus of animal 
health-public health and trade and the implications this has for developing countries. The 
chapter then examines the key arguments surrounding avian and pandemic influenza in the 
policy domains of both resource-enabled and resource-constrained economies. It also examines 
the role that trade agreements play in the development agenda of many developing countries. 
Chapter 2 is an overview of the various elements relevant to this study such as how trade is 
linked to disease spread, the animal health-public health relationship, and the trade-health 
relationship. It identifies gaps in existing knowledge and raises several important questions that 
the thesis examines either explicitly or implicitly. 
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework and methodology of the thesis, outlining the aims 
and objectives of the study and the methodological approach adopted. This chapter contains the 
study objectives and key research questions. It describes the links between policy processes and 
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analysis of risk, outlines the research orientation and explains how the research questions 
evolved. It also describes the processes of data collection and analysis. In addition, this chapter 
discusses the challenges faced in conducting this research and concludes by presenting the 
study's ethical considerations. 
Chapter 4 is a contextual overview of Zambia as it relates to health, trade and agriculture. It 
describes the Zambian political context over the period 1964-2004. It briefly explains how an 
economic downturn in the 70s and 80s impacted on the Zambian economy, and explains the role 
that agriculture is meant to play in meeting the country's development agenda. This chapter 
provides overviews of the animal health, public health and trade sectors. It describes the 
Zambian agricultural sector, particularly the livestock sub sector, and the poultry production 
system in existence. It then describes health in terms of Zambia's development agenda and the 
country's position on multilateral trade. The chapter concludes by explaining the implications 
this contextual description has for this study. 
Chapter 5 is an analysis of avian and human influenza prevention and control policy agenda 
setting in Zambia. The analysis is a chronological presentation of policy development from the 
period 2005-2006. It first analyses the evolution of H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza 
from Southeast Asia over the period 1996-2005. It then analyses how Zambia's Fifth National 
Development Plan, with its platform for development, relates to the objectives of country's 
poultry industry. The chapter then goes on to describe how avian and human influenza policy 
agenda was set. This includes how the National Task Force on Avian and Human influenza was 
established, the role that international agencies and national stakeholders played in agenda 
setting, and how other stakeholders came to be involved in the policy process. The chapter 
concludes by presenting the way the avian and human influenza problem was defined across the 
sectors of animal health, public health and trade in Zambia. 
Chapter 6 is an analysis of policy formulation. This chapter identifIes tensions, challenges and 
deficiencies in avian and human influenza prevention and control policy formulation in Zambia 
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for the period 2005-2007. It examines the role of the National Working Group on Avian and 
Human Influenza in Zambia in policy development and how, based on the ways in which the 
highly pathogenic avian influenza problem was framed during the agenda setting process, the 
response shifted from an emergency understanding to that of preparedness and capacity 
building. It also examines the relevance of the 2006 poultry and poUltry product import ban to 
disease control and its implications for multi-sectoral interaction. Furthermore, the chapter 
evaluates the various preparedness activities that were adopted in Zambia, including the 
communication strategy, the surveillance strategy and the creation of Rapid Response Teams. 
Chapter 7 identifies the challenges and opportunities in the policy process as adopted in Zambia, 
including leadership contentions over avian and human influenza preparedness planning. The 
chapter analyses the international influences on the policy process, and the reasons for declining 
interest in avian and human influenza activities among local stakeholders in the period after 
2007. In addition it examines the prioritization of avian and human influenza prevention and 
control in Zambia, in light of the multiple problems that the animal health and public health 
sectors have to deal with. The chapter concludes by identifying what was gained by the policy 
process. These are presented both as preparedness milestones the country achieved and 
unanticipated benefits gained from policy development, such as the integration of the avian 
influenza response into wider disease control objectives. 
Chapter 8 analyses the ways in which understanding policy processes and context could inform 
risk analysis in such a way as to foster better policy coordination in the case of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza prevention and control, livestock trade and the wider issues of multi-
sectoral disease risk management and pandemic preparedness in Zambia. The chapter identifies 
what would aid the process of risk analysis and what might be lost by conducting a risk analysis 
in this way. Drawing on themes identified in the policy analysis and the risk literature, this 
chapter systematically examines the potential role for risk analysis to inform multi-sectoral 
disease risk management policy development in Zambia. The chapter is a conceptual 
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exploration of the feasibility of conducting an OlE type risk analysis in Zambia and develops a 
risk model appropriate to the Zambian context. 
Chapter 9 is the discussion and conclusion of the thesis. It reviews what has been learnt about 
multi-sectoral disease risk management and pandemic preparedness from the Zambian 
perspective, including how it is important to be cognisant of the local context in assessing 
pandemic preparedness and assessing risk. It also examines the challenges to coordinating 
multi-sectoral management of infectious disease risk. The chapter revisits the issue of the trade-
health relationship and provides some reflections on the application of risk analysis. It 
concludes with some general recommendations for pandemic preparedness and some 
recommendations to decision-makers across trade, public health and animal health on how to 
improve multi-sectoral risk management policy development. 
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There is nothing small about globalization. It represents a sweeping transformation of 
all spheres of life in a way that cannot be ignored and must be engaged. 
Loewenson, 2004 p.1147. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Pandemic preparedness in the context of globalization and trade 
2. Introduction 
This chapter describes the contextual factors linking globalisation, zoonoses, commerce and 
pandemic influenza in resource-constrained countries. The first part of this chapter defines 
globalisation, zoonoses and the human-animal interface, and explains the historic relationship 
between commerce and infectious disease spread. Linking this to the multidirectional 
relationship that exists between animal health, public health and trade, the chapter proceeds to 
discuss where zoonoses lie on the spectrum of human infectious disease epidemiology. 
Focusing on zoonotic influenza, the chapter provides an overview of pandemic influenza and a 
chronology of the H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza panzootic, covering the 1996-2004 
period and highlights the key concerns around its global trade-related spread. The first part of 
the chapter concludes by providing an overview of the current status of global pandemic 
preparedness and the international policy debates surrounding it. 
The second part of the chapter takes a resource-constrained country perspective. linking what is 
known about global public health. animal health and trade policy to zoonosis risk management 
and pandemic preparedness. Focusing on the policy tensions that exist at the global-national 
interface, the chapter highlights how perceptions of infectious disease risk and responses to 
infectious diseases have affected the trade and development agendas of resource-constrained 
countries. The chapter then summarises the challenges faced by African countries with regard to 
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pandemic preparedness and risk assessment. Throughout this discussion, the chapter identifies 
some of the questions this study aimed to answer. 
2.1. GlobaUzation, modernisation and infectious disease risk 
In anyone country in the 21 st century, animal health, public health and trade concerns are 
international as well as national. A necessary starting point for the examination of infectious 
disease risk management across animal health, public health and trade, therefore is 
globalization. In his 1998 commentary in the American Journal of Public Health, Navarro 
argues that power and politics are at the centre of globalization and have played a role in 
shaping the process (Navarro 1998). He sets out the key arguments around the process of 
globalisation at the time, at the centre of which was, and perhaps still is, the internationalization 
of commerce, to which, he argues, health policy usually takes a backseat. While this is true for 
many public health issues, commerce is also affected by public health and animal health 
policies, sometimes in quite significant ways. Therefore, the issue here is not to present an 
argument for or against the priority given to commerce in relation to animal health and public 
health. Zeroing in on the global-national policy interface, what is important is to highlight the 
confluence of policy interests occurring in this 'global process' at the centre of which are risks, 
and assessment thereof, of global infectious disease spread within animal and human 
populations, both of which have potential negative economic impacts. 
Globalization as a concept is variably understood. Huynen, Martens and Hilderink (2005), for 
example, describe globalization as a perceived comprehensive, multi-faceted phenomenon that 
is transforming society rapidly. Lee, Fustukian, and Buse (2002), talk about its spatial, cognitive 
and temporal dimensions. Thinking about globalization this way provides a useful means of 
disaggregating the important aspects of policy that relate to the management of risk and vice 
versa. Buse, Mays and Walt (2005) in their introductory text on health policy making present 
five distinct ways in which globalization has been described. When viewed from the perspective 
of Lee et al. (2002), these understandings all involve spatial, cognitive and temporal 
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dimensions. Three of these five are appropriate for the context of this thesis. The first one is 
internationalisation. This is understood to mean the growth in volume, intensity and 
extensiveness of the movement of people, commodities, ideas, money, and infectious agents 
across borders. The second is liberalization. This is understood to mean the removal of barriers 
to trade, allowing for the increase in the flow of commodities and services across borders. As 
demonstrated by scholars such as Kimball (2006), this also allows for the movement of 
infectious agents across borders. The third is super territoriality. This is associated with 
interconnectedness and incorporation of similar ideals that go beyond territorial boundaries. 
This would arguably include issues such as global infectious disease governance, or regional 
free trade areas, for instance. These three understandings of globalisation are therefore germane 
to the consideration of animal health policy, public health policy and trade policy around 
disease risk and disease prevention in developing countries. This is because these various 
understandings easily converge around infectious pathogens and approaches to their control 
both at international and national levels. The other frames of globalization as presented by Buse 
and colleagues are 'McDonaldisation', which is the convergence around Western, and in 
particular, American culture, and universalisation, associated with the current trend of cultural 
homogenization (Buse, Mays and Walt 2(05). 
Global and regional trade present the prospect of involving previously excluded nations in 
world commerce, thus enabling them to supply more prosperous markets and support and 
strengthen their economies. This prospect appeals to decision-makers in developing countries, 
following arguments about the positive benefits of trade liberalisation such as economic growth 
and poverty reduction (Wilkinson and Pickett 2006). It has been argued, however, that a 
liberalized approach to trade, presents novel challenges to public health protection in general 
and disease prevention and control in particular. According to the book 'Risky Trade' by Ann-
Marie Kimball (2006), which examines trade and its role in human infectious disease emergence 
and spread, there has been an absence of coherent disease prevention and control strategies in 
relation to trade across the world. In a paper that overviews emerging animal-human diseases of 
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public health importance, and speaks both for animal and public health, Brown (2004), 
highlights the complexity of modern infectious disease spread, stating that part of the reason for 
the emergence of infectious diseases in recent years, in addition to human population expansion, 
is because globalisation and trade have increased industry, cultural, and microorganism 
interconnectedness. Brown goes on to recommend closer collaboration between the animal 
health and public health communities, as well as an improvement of public and policy maker 
education to address this situation. 
A study by Jones et aI. (2008) examining the pattern of different categories of recent emerging 
infectious disease occurrences, found that human population density was a significant predictor 
of disease emergence. They conclude that their study supports previous hypotheses that disease 
emergence is primarily the result of anthropogenic and demographic shifts, and "is a hidden 
'cost' of human economic development." As an example of this "hidden human economic 
development cost", it is clear that the risk of food borne infections has been increased 
exponentially through the integration and globalization of food treatment chains (Thorns 2(00). 
The perspectives above all share one thing in common, that modern anthropogenic activity, and 
it's pursuit of commerce in particular, is among the key factors responsible for disease 
emergence in contemporary times. This is basically a consequence of economies of scale, 
around which many of the conceptions of globalization revolve. 
Citing a National Academies of Science report, Brown (2004) explains that globalization has 
played a central role in creating the microbial equivalent of 'a perfect storm' and, like Mann 
(1990), who reflects on the global lesson of HIV I AIDS, goes on to state this microbial perfect 
storm will not subside, but be a recurring event. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the risk 
of pandemic scale infectious disease emergence is unlikely to abate, and as a result, the public 
health and animal health communities have to think of emerging infectious diseases, their 
control and the assessment of their risk of occurrence in completely novel ways. With the recent 
examples of global infectious disease spread, such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) negatively affecting both public health and economies, there has been a shift to develop 
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policies to respond to these risks, at national, regional and international levels under a 
'preparedness' agenda. But because the dynamics, and therefore the risks, of disease emergence 
differ from location to location, equally important is the integration, within these policy 
frameworks, of approaches to assessing both the risk's 'local' likelihood and 'impact' to ensure, 
to the extent possible, the appropriateness of policy responses. This is a challenge, for both 
developing and developed countries, given the myriad interests that contribute to this 'perfect 
microbial storm.' 
2.2. Trade, health and disease spread 
One of the contributors to the 'perfect microbial storm' is trade. Trade and its effects on public 
health, through disease spread, is a matter of both historical and contemporary policy 
significance. Historically, disease has spread through traded products and carriage vehicles 
such as ships which served as means of introduction into new geographic areas (Cowen and 
Morales 2(02). Lee and Koivusalo (2005) argue that at several points in history, trade has been 
restricted to protect health, with the primary motivation being to minimize interference in trade 
from health. Bettcher, Yach and Guindon's (2000) review of global trade and health states that 
the link between international trade and the spread of infectious diseases has been recognised 
for centuries, citing as an example the 14th century spread of the 'Black Death' along known 
international trading routes. It was the recognition of the links between disease and trade that 
resulted in the International Sanitary Conferences, the first of which was held in France in 1851 
(Bettcher, Yach and Guindon 2000; Aginam 2002; Hoffman 2010). In recent times, Lang 
(1999), examining the interactions among diets, health and globalization, argues that economic 
interests take precedence over health concerns. Similar arguments have been made concerning 
global health policy (Lee, Fustukian, and Buse 2002), access to medicines (Kerry and Lee 
2(07), food safety (Rowell 2(03) and infectious disease spread (Kimball 2006). A number of 
studies and critical reviews provide empirical evidence that international trade has created 
opportunities for the transmission of pathogens (Aginam 2002; Karesh et aI. 2005; Hodges and 
Kimball 2005; Kimball, Arima and Hodges 2005; Kimball 2006). 
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Examples of the international transmission of diseases include the case of Mookeypox in the 
USA in 2003, related to the trade of prairie dogs that had acquired the infection from the 
African rodents they had been housed with. This led to 71 human cases in six American states 
(Morse 2004; Kahn 2006). For SARS, bat trade was proposed to be one way in which contact 
with susceptible amplifying hosts was made at some point in the wildlife supply chain, leading 
to subsequent market-related human and animal interaction and infection (Fevre et al. 2006). 
Live animal markets in Southeast Asia, in particular, have been implicated in the spread of 
emerging diseases such as avian influenza, with subsequent human exposure (Cowen and 
Morales 2002; Morse 2004; Karesh et al. 2(05). Evidence also exists for countries in Africa. 
African Swine Fever, an animal health problem of transboundary animal disease significance, 
spread rapidly along the Atlantic coast in the dynamic coastal trading networks of West Africa 
during the late 1990s (ALive 2006). 
The literature suggests that trade and economic considerations often trump health concerns, 
making the consideration of the role that trade policy plays in disease spread or control relevant. 
Lee and Koivusalo (2005) posit that, while tensions between trade promotion and health 
protection have existed in the past, these tensions are increasing because of globalisation. Key 
here is the sentiment of public health policy proponents that health concerns most of the time 
take second priority to the interests of global commerce. Lipson's (2001) review of the wro's 
health agenda and the study by Shaffer et al. (2005) on ethics in public health research both 
suggest that trade agreements in particular shape national policies on such issues as food safety 
and health, restricting the capacity of state agencies to regulate these areas. Within this literature 
are examples that speak to the increasing interconnectedness of infectious disease spread 
through trade, an anthropogenic activity. They also highlight the importance of the human-
animal disease interface. 
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2.3. Zoonoses and the human-animal interface 
Myriad factors are at play when one thinks of globalization and its effects on human-animal 
infectious disease transmission, disease management and public health. This includes issues of 
governance, production systems, surveillance capacity, social economic conditions, local 
contexts and national priorities among many others. Therefore, how does one think about 
human-animal disease risk management, as it relates to trade, animal health and public health 
policy considerations in different contexts? 
First the basics: an .animal-sourced human infection is known as a zoonosis. The term was 
coined by German physician Rudolf Virchow in 1855 (Kahn, Kaplan and Steele 2007). In the 
past, zoonosis, as a concept, was divided into zooanthroponosis, an infection humans can 
acquire from animals, and anthropozoonosis, a disease of humans transmissible to other animals 
(Krauss et al. 2003). However, the indiscriminate and reverse sense use of these two terms led 
to an expert committee deciding to abandon them, recommending 'zoonoses' be defined 
holistically as diseases and infections naturally transmitted between vertebrate animals and man 
(HubaIek 2003). More recently, zoonoses are thought of as diseases of 'the human-animal 
interface' (Greger 2007) a term that encompasses a wider socio-economic arid biological scope 
for the examination of human-animal infectious disease management. 
A consideration of the human-animal interface is important. It provides for the examination of 
the public and animal health risks of animal-sourced epidemics, and through policy, their 
relationship with risk enabling anthropogenic activities. These risk enabling activities include 
changes in land use, livestock production, chosen routes for economic growth and trade 
promotion; activities that both foster and enhance zoonosis transmission (Kimball 2006; Greger 
2007). Changes in land use, livestock production, chosen routes for economic growth and 
promotion of commerce, etc are some of the elements that go into what Brown (2004) termed 
the 'perfect microbial storm'. Under livestock intensification, for example, the larger collections 
of animals provide more optimal incubating conditions for the expansion of an emerging 
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zoonotic disease (Brown 2004). With globalization. there now exists a global mechanism 
available for an emerging zoonotic disease's potential spread (Kimball 2006). 
These activities are in part responsible for the significant contribution that animal diseases have 
made to human emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases in recent years. For centuries. a 
key source of human infectious diseases has been animals (Diamond 1997; Weiss 2(01). In a 
list of 1415 known human pathogens. 61.6% were found to be of animal origin (Cleaveland et 
al. 2001; Karesh et al. 2(05). Furthermore. 75% of all emerging diseases that have affected 
humans over the last three decades have resulted from an animal pathogen moving into a human 
host from animals or animal products (WHO, FAO and OlE 2004; Stewart et aL 2005; Greger 
2(07). But the phrase human-animal interface has gained increasing prominence in recent 
public health discourse, particularly in relation to highly pathogenic avian influenza (WHO 
2006; Greger 2(07). This suggests a revisit to the historic disease-exchange paradigm in a 
modem context. 
The simple defmition of zoonoses provided above views human-animal infectious disease as a 
public health and animal health issue. But in the past. according to one meeting report. the two 
communities have tended to deal with zoonoses in isolation from one another (WHOIDFID-
AHP 2(05). one reason being a growing divide between the fields of animal health and public 
health (Rabinowitz, Odofin and Dein 2(08). The paper by Rabinowitz. Odofin and Dein 
considers the role of animals in informing human health. speaking marginally of the role that 
animal health specialists could play in informing their medical colleagues of these risks. The 
joint World Health Organisation (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OlE) report on emerging zoonosis (2004), argues that zoonotic 
diseases are on the increase owing to shortfalls in public health infrastructure and policy, a 
paucity of public health scientific studies to answer questions and build expertise. and a lack of 
integrated human and animal health surveillance. While this may appear to be evidence of an 
absence of coherent policies, in reality, it is an attempt to reinvent a wheel that had been 
dismantled in the early 20th century. Both fields enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship since 
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Virchow pioneered the development of the 'One Medicine,3 ideal in the late 19th century (Kahn, 
Kaplan and Steele 2007). For instance, the identification of typhoid, cholera, tuberculosis, and 
diphtheria in the period 1880-1890 resulted in increased human and veterinary medicine 
research across the United States and Europe, and both fields' interest in the public health study 
of tuberculosis (Baldwin 1943). The development of the BCG vaccine was a human-animal 
health collaboration between Albert Calmette, a French physician, and Jean-Marie Camille 
Guerin, a veterinarian (Kahn, Kaplan and Steele 2007). BCG was developed from 
Mycobacterium bovis, a zoonotic mycobacterium from cattle. It was Theodore Smith, another 
veterinarian, who first identified the biochemical and morphological differences between 
Mycobacterium bovis and Mycobacterium tuberculosis in 1895 (Murray 2004) and Ravenel, 
another veterinarian, was the first to isolate M. bovis from a human being (Baldwin 1943). 
However, according to Cardiff, Ward and Barthold (2008), with the development of the 
combustion engine, that replaced oxen and horses, and the subsequent closure of many schools 
of veterinary medicine in the early 1900s, the concept of 'One Medicine' began to wane and the 
gap between animal health and public health began to grow. 
In an attempt to close this 'gap', a number of fora are now advocating for greater cooperation 
between animal health and public health sectors. The joint WHO and Department for 
International Development Animal Health Programme of the UK (DFID-AHP) meeting in 
September 2005 for example, established that there were gains to be made from the integration 
of animal and human health sector approaches to zoonoses control (WHOIDFID-AHP 2005). 
The current focus on 'One Medicine' has now taken the form of the 'One World, One Health4, 
initiative. Beyond the issue of zoonosis risk management, however, is the growing realisation 
3 Kahn and colleagues quote Yirchow as having stated that 'between animal and human medicine there 
are no dividing lines - nor should there be. The object is different but the experience obtained constitutes 
the basis of all medicine' (Kahn, Kaplan and Steele 2007; p6) 
4 In September 2004, health experts met at The Rockefeller University at a symposium to discuss current 
and potential transmission of diseases among human, domestic animal, and wildlife populations. Using 
case studies of ebola and avian influenza, among others, the symposium came up with the "Manhattan 
Principles" under the "One World, One Health" initiative. The aims of these principles was to establish a 
"holistic approach to preventing epidemic I epizootic disease and for maintaining ecosystem integrity for 
the benefit of humans, their domesticated animals, and the foundational biodiversity" that supports life 
httJ):lIwww.oneworldonehealth.org/ 
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that even perceptions of disease risk have consequences beyond these two communities, as 
exemplified by the SARS outbreak in 2002-2003. SARS did not have the health impact that was 
anticipated, but had a large economic impact due to both health fears and the control measures 
that were instituted (Smith 2006; Brug, Aro and Richardus 2009). 
Thinking about disease control across the animal-human interface may aid the recognition that 
much of the host, zoonotic pathogen, and environment interaction, so called disease ecology, 
occurs outside the 'nonnal' public health and animal health policy sectors' scope of interest 
Quoting McNeil (1975), Weiss, in the introduction of her 2001 Leeuwenhoek lecture, states, 'If 
there is any conceivable way a germ can travel from one species to another, some microbe will 
find it' (Weiss 2001; p 957). This is a key assertion when one thinks about disease ecology and 
zoonosis transmission. This is because a basic tenet of disease ecology is the concept of a niche, 
i.e. the biological and non-biological environmental conditions that determine a microbial 
agent's survival. Since microbes do not exist in a vacuum. the niche factors determining 
microbial survival overlap, to some extent, with the social determinants of human health. The 
social determinants of human health are the conditions of the environment where people live 
and work (Exworthy 2(08). According to the WHO (2010), the state of these conditions is 
determined by power and financial and resource distribution across global, national and local 
levels. The WHO further states that the distribution of money, power and resources are 
influenced by policy choices. Therefore, to a large extent, the biological and non-biological 
determinants of microbial survival are linked to anthropogenic and policy factors. This 
highlights the possible shortcomings of developing policies for multi-sectoral responses solely 
on the basis of the interests of one, or two policy sectors without taking into consideration the 
interests of sectors that could be affected by, or affect, their interventions. In addition, this also 
underscores the fact that the dynamics of disease transmission and therefore their management, 
differ from context to context. The application of animal risk analysis frameworks in the context 
of zoonosis control may also benefit from the understanding of wider policy interaction in its 
approach to assessing risk. 
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2.4. Zoonoses in the spectrum of human infectious disease epidemiology 
How can zoonoses be conceptualized in a way that provides a 'good fit' for the exploration of 
policy and risk? A common approach to the classification of zoonoses is to group them into 
emerging, re-emerging or endemic categories. Emerging zoonosis are diseases that have 
recently been recognised or have occurred previously, but are increasing in incidence or 
geographical range (Fauci 2000; Meslin and Formenty 2004). They may also be a known agent, 
or its close relative, occurring in previously unsusceptible species or exhibiting increased vector 
range (Morse 1995; Brown 2004; WHO FAO OlE 2004). A re-emerging zoonosis is one which, 
in the past may have achieved a low-point, but has again increased in incidence, due to such 
things as changes in the health status or socioeconomic and ecological framewor~ of a 
susceptible population (Morse 1995). An endemic zoonosis is one which often occurs frequently 
and cyclically in a specific geographical locale, an example being highly pathogenic avian 
influenza in parts of Southeast Asia and Africa. This classification provides a useful means of 
classifying epidemic trends. It does, however, fall short of providing a disease prevention and 
control policy relevant lens through which zoonosis can be viewed in their evolution from 
animal pathogens to human pathogens and, if deemed relevant. vice versa. 
A practical method of defming the transmissibility of pathogens from animals to humans, at 
least from the viewpoint of defming prevention and control alternatives, is derived from an 
evolutionary biology perspective. From this viewpoint, zoonoses fall into Stages II to IV of a 
five stage classification proposed by Wolfe et al. (2007) and modified by Lloyd-Smith et aL 
(2009). This classification defmes pathogens along a continuum, with Stage I defining 
exclusively animal infectious agents and Stage V defming exclusively human pathogens, while 
classes II-IV represent 'human-animal interface' pathogens with variable zoonotic potential 
(Wolfe et al. 2007; Lloyd-Smith et al. 2009). Specifically, Stage II pathogens are transmitted 
5 The ecological factors encompass agricultural or economic developments and climate changes while the 
socioeconomic factors include changes in human demographics and behaviour, travel and commerce, 
technology and industry possibly all simultaneously acting as macro determinants of microbial adaptation 
and change (Morse 1995; Morse 2004). 
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from animals to humans to cause infection in an individual with no further person-person 
spread. Stage ill pathogens, once in human populations, cause limited human-to-human 
infections that later fade out while stage IV pathogens originate from, and are maintained in 
animal reservoirs but are capable of sustained human-human transmission (Lloyd-Smith et al. 
2(09)6. The Stages classification thus appears to be the most appropriate approach to consider 
the policy management of diseases at the human-animal interface. Interestingly, this 
classification compares closely to the WHO pandemic phases (figure 2.1), which designates six 
different phases of a global influenza pandemic (WHO 2005a). 
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2.5. Overview of Influenza 
One zoonosis that has taken centre stage in recent public health and animal health discourse is 
highly pathogenic avian influenza. The circulation of influenzas in both human (seasonal 
influenza) and animal populations is commonplace. Influenzas are highly labile, however, and 
their ability to adapt to new hosts by mechanisms of both antigenic drift and antigenic shift 
make them excellent human-animal disease interface pathogens. Antigenic drift is a process of 
Examples of these stages of pathogens are as follows: Stage II pathogens: West Nile Virus and Brucella 
abortus. Stage ill pathogens: Monkeypox and Leishmania in/anturn. Stage IV pathogens: Yersinia pestis 
and pandemic influenza. 
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incremental and continuous genetic change to the virus particle over time. Antigenic shift, on 
the other hand, is a sudden and significant change caused by a new combination of viral proteins 
that results in a novel influenza subtype. Since human and animal influenza viruses are in a 
constant state of circulation and, possibly, interaction, a key concern is reassortment. 
Reassortment is a form of antigenic shift that occurs when infection of a single cell with two 
different influenza viruses results in a new virus particle composed of segments from both 
infecting viruses. The new virus is called a reassortant. When a reassortant contains viral 
segments from both animal and human influenza viruses, it has the potential to progressively 
develop an increased capacity for human-to-human transmission, increasing its human 
pandemic potential. 
In the past, human influenza pandemics have occurred in intervals of 11-42 years, many of 
which have followed the introduction of a novel influenza strain from animal sources (Kawaoka 
et ai. 1989). Shortridge, Peiris and Guan (2003), argue that all influenza pandemics are 
zoonoses. Pandemics, naturally, are of global concern. Because of their cyclic nature, 
unpredictability, disruptive potential and socioeconomic impact, WHO began influenza 
surveillance in 1947 and this remains the WHO's oldest disease control programme (WHO 
2005b). A study by Taubenberger and Morens (2009), reviewing the history of pandemic 
influenza, states that there have been at least 13 influenza pandemics since 1500 AD, and in the 
last 120 years, pandemics occurred in 1889, 1918, 1957, 1968, and 1977. Of these, three 
influenza pandemics are of note. The pandemic with the highest health impact was the 'Spanish 
influenza' of 1918, estimated to have caused anything from 40 to over 100 million deaths 
worldwide, depending on the authority cited. According to the WHO (2006), it was one of the 
deadliest disease events in human history. By comparison, the subsequent 'Asian influenza' 
pandemic in 1957 and 'Hong Kong influenza' pandemic in 1968 had lower public health 
impacts, with an estimated two million deaths for the former and one million deaths for the 
latter (WHO 2006). It is thought that the HINI pandemic strain that caused 'Spanish influenza' 
had circulated in animal populations for some years before it became part of a virus that could 
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efficiently transmit between humans (Weiss 2001; Eurosurveillance 2006). Equally, the 
available evidence suggests that the human pandemics of 1957 and 1968 each arose from 
reassortment between human and avian influenza viruses (Kawaoka et al. 1989; elaas et aL 
1998; Bartlett and Hayden 2(05). The origins of these pandemic strains have added to the 
concern over the potential significance of the current H5Nl poultry panzootic, a strain first 
identified in Scotland in 1956 (Guan et al. 2(07). This thesis focuses on the recently emerged 
strain of zoonotic H5Nl, first identified in China in 1996. 
2.5.1. The emergence and spread of H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenz.a, 1996-2005 
Two detailed molecular epidemiological reviews published by Xu et al. (1999) and Webster et 
al. (2002), state that H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza was fIrSt identified at a goose 
farm in Guangdong Province, southern China in 1996, where it killed around 40% of the flock. 
Subsequently, high H5Nl-related mortalities were reported on three chicken farms in Hong 
Kong, just adjacent to Guangdong Province, between March and early May of 1997 (Shortridge 
et al. 1998). In May of the same year, a child died of viral pneumonia; the first reported case of 
zoonotic HSNI influenza (de Jong et al. 1997). Following the identification of 17 more human 
infections that resulted in five deaths between November and December of 1997 (Shortridge et 
al. 1998), H5Nl became recognised as a zoonosis of possible public health concern. As a result, 
in December 1997, total and rapid depopulation of all poultry in markets and chickens farms in 
Hong Kong was carried out to control the outbreak, a move that both policy and virology 
experts believed had averted a possible human pandemic (Fidler 2004b, WHO 2005b; Webster 
and Hulse 2(05). It has been argued that live poUltry markets were important in the transmission 
of the HSNI virus to other avian species and humans during these outbreaks (Shortridge et al. 
1998). The control measures instituted, i.e. the total culling of all farmed chickens and all 
poultry in markets in Hong Kong, appeared effective, as the responsible genotype of HSNI 
(A/gooseiGuangdong/l/96) has not been reported since the execution of these controls (Sims et 
al. 2(05). However in February 2003, during the SARS epidemic, and after an apparent six year 
quiescence, three more human HSNt infections with two fatalities were identified in China, and 
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according to the WHO, this indicated viral persistence. despite the control measures that had 
been instituted in 1997 (WHO 2005b). An epidemiological review by Sims et al. (2005) states 
that outbreaks had continued to occur in poultry in Hong Kong from 200 1 to early 2002, caused 
by a different H5Nl lineage. While there is some suggestion that the H5Nl problem had been 
subdued in 1997 (WHO 2005b), it was in fact, entrenching itself in the poultry systems of Hong 
Kong, and possibly elsewhere in Southeast Asia, between 1997 and 2003. 
Between December 2003 and February 2004, the fIrst wave of an H5Nl panzootic in poultry 
was reported nearly simultaneously in eight countries in South and Southeast Asia, most of 
which occurred in commercial poultry establishments. This was followed by a second wave of 
spread from July 2004 (Alexander 2007; Paul et al. 2010). The WHO states that the second 
wave was associated with more rural settings (WHO 2005b). The countries initially affected 
were China, Indonesia, Cambodia, Japan, Laos, Korea, Thailand and Vietnam, with a ninth 
country, Malaysia, joining the list in August 2004 (Sims et al. 2(05). The pro-poor advocacy 
NGO, GRAIN, states that the initial outbreaks in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia. Laos and 
Indonesia all occurred in closed, intensive factory farms (GRAIN 2(07). During the fIrst wave, 
millions of poultry either died or were culled in an effort to control the disease (WHO 2004a). 
Human infections were then reported in Hanoi, Vietnam, in January, 2004, a few days prior to a 
report of large H5Nl-related poUltry mortalities in two poultry farms in the south of the country 
(WHO 2005b). Vietnam had initially experienced an HSNI outbreak in 2001 (Sims et al. 2005; 
Sims and Narrod 2(08). In early 2004, during the fIrst wave of the panzootic, the WHO 
declared the outbreak an unprecedented catastrophe for agriculture in Asia and a "global threat 
to human health" (WHO 2004a). 
Coinciding with the second wave of the panzootic, the period between August and October 
2004 saw eight more human fatalities in Thailand and Vietnam (WHO 2005b). The third wave 
began in December 2004, involving new poultry outbreaks in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Malaysia and Laos (WHO 2005c; Sims et al. 2(05). Fresh human cases were 
reported in Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia (WHO 2005c). At this point. after reviewing the 
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unfolding situation, a writing committee of the WHO consultation on human influenza 
established that Vietnam led the human death toll (Beigel et al. 2(05). According to a WHO 
pandemic threat report (WHO 2005a), by 2005, H5Nl had 'succeeded' in crossing the species 
barrier three times; in 1997, 2003, and the period between 2004 and early 2005, which recorded 
the largest occurrence of human H5Nl cases in the period in question. With the report of 
migratory birds being affected with H5Nl in Mongolia and China, particularly at Lake Qinghai 
in China in April 2005, concern grew that this posed a potential risk of southward and westward 
and therefore global spread of the virus in poultry (Chen et al. 2005; Webster and Govorkova 
2006; Alexander 2007; Cattoli et al. 2009). Around 6,345 birds of different species died in the 
weeks following the Qinghai outbreak (WHO 200Se). This is possibly the single most important 
event linking H5Nl to migratory bird spread. This outbreak singularly raised the profile of the 
role of migratory birds in the global spread of H5Nl. 
H5Nt had spread through the diverse market and poultry production systems of Southeast Asia. 
There is much debate around the primary causes and drivers of the H5Nl problem, revolving 
around poUltry production and marketing practices. An important factor in the Asian panzootic 
is that ducks appeared to have played a key role in the maintenance of the virus, primarily as 
silent carriers of H5N t. While outbreaks in poultry were still possible, this suggests that in areas 
where duck production was of less significance, the chances of endemicity could be lower. By 
2005, H5Nl had become endemic in the duck population of poultry, providing a reservoir of the 
virus for other poultry species as asymptomatic shedders of H5Nl influenza (Webster and Hulse 
2005; Sims et al. 2005; Sims and Narrod 2(08). 
2.5.2. The role of trade in H5Nl's emergence and spread 
In the context of globalised trade, human agency in commercial poultry and wildlife trade and 
production has been identified as one means of H5Nl transmission (Normile 2006a; Alexander 
2007; Brooks-Moizer et aL 2(08). Evidence points towards anthropogenic activities such as 
methods of farming, live poultry commerce in wet markets, poUltry supply chains and wild bird 
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trade as the main means of H5Nl dispersal (Karesh et al. 2005; Alexander 2007; Gauthier-
Clerc, Lebarbenchon and Thomas 2007; Cattoli et al. 2009). For Southeast Asia, considerable 
variations in poultry production and distribution systems, both between and within countries 
were noted, however. Southern China, for example, where most of the H5Nl outbreaks were 
identified, also produced most of the country's ducks and sold chickens largely through live bird 
markets, while the north had predominantly commercial broiler and layer production and fewer 
reported outbreaks (Sims et al. 2(05). In Japan, in support of the duck theory of H5Nl 
endemicity, there were almost no live bird markets or commercial duck production, which some 
felt could be one reason for the failure of further disease spread in this country (Sims et al. 
2(05). For Thailand and Vietnam, a risk mapping study identified mixed farming practices 
involving domestic ducks feeding in intensive rice cropping areas as one possible risk factor for 
disease recurrence (Gilbert et al. 2(08). These production systems, rooted in the practices of 
Southeast Asia, therefore contributed to the maintenance and spread of H5Nl influenza in the 
region. By controlling trade and reinforcing veterinary surveillance, Taiwan, Japan and South 
Korea were able to eradicate H5Nl from their environments (Gauthier-Clerc, Lebarbenchon and 
Thomas 2(07). In Thailand, however, trade activities were still responsible for H5Nl spread 
even after the institution of control measures (paul et al. 2010). 
In the period between 2005 and 2006, H5Nl spread first into to southern Russia, then the 
Middle East, Europe, and [mally Africa (Sims and Narrod 2(08). The Russian and Kaza.kh 
H5Nl outbreaks are said to have followed known trade routes between China and Russia, thus 
implicating trade in disease spread in these countries. H5Nl was identified in Crested Hawk-
Eagles (Spizaetus nipalensis) illegally imported from Thailand in Belgium (Van Borm et aL 
2(05) and more recently in Saker Falcons (Falco cherrug) in the Middle East (Marjuki et aL 
2009). Interestingly, infected duck meat from German duck-fattening farms are believed to have 
caused H5Nl cases in three backyard holdings in the Federal State of Brandenburg after 
chickens were possibly exposed to raw offal' from frozen duck purchased from a supermarket 
7 According to the article, the possible exposure occurred due to scavenging 
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chain, thus highlighting a potential food chain related spread (Harder et aI. 2009). In their 
conclusions on this particular epidemiological study, Harder et al. (2009), state that this fmding 
underscores the limitations of syndrome-based surveillance approaches. It also shows that 
H5Nl can spread through frozen carcasses and therefore can 'utilize' marketing supply chains 
for its propagation. 
The first identification of H5Nl in Africa was reported in Nigeria in February 2006 with the 
consensus (supported by genetic sequencing) being that there were at least three separate 
introductions (ALive 2006; Ducatez et al. 2006; Cattoli et al. 2009). There is some 
disagreement as to the method of introduction, however. One school of thought is that the 
introductions were trade-related (BirdLife International 2006; Gauthier-Clerc, Lebarbenchon 
and Thomas 2(07). The other school of thought posits that it was likely introduced through 
migratory bird movement, as suggested for example, by the phylogenetic analysis of H5Nl 
isolates conducted by Cattoli et aI. (2009). One mathematical model projected that both trade 
and migratory bird propagation would be significant for H5Nl transmission Africa, with trade 
being the more prominent route (Kilpatrick et al. 2006). Therefore it is possible that there was 
synergy between the two proposed methods of introduction. After its introduction into Nigeria, 
H5Nl then spread to Egypt, Niger, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire and Djibouti 
(ALive 2006). Poultry trade is suspected to have caused the spread of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza H5Nl to countries adjacent to Nigeria, such as Niger, duck farms in Cameroon, and 
guinea fowl farms in Burkina Faso (Gauthier-Clerc, Lebarbenchon and Thomas 2(07). 
Commercial poultry practices have also been suggested as possible sources of introduction and 
spread of H5Nl in Egypt (BirdLife International 2(07). As of September 2008, 17 African 
countries had experienced outbreaks, although there were signs that the H5Nl pandemic could 
be abating (UNSIC and World Bank 2(08). One concern has been that, given the deficiencies in 
surveillance systems in many African countries, it is possible that the current localisation of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza may not reflect its actual distribution (WHO 2005c; ALive 
2006). Despite the contextual differences highlighted above, for the African continent. the 
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WHO felt that, while Africa's human populace and poultry densities were lower than those in 
South and Southeast Asia, there were enough similarities in production systems that "would 
create multiple opportunities for human exposure, should outbreaks occur" (WHO 2005c). 
This situation led to the unprecedented collaboration of the WHO, Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO), and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OlE). Their objective was 
to control the disease in Southeast Asia and other outbreak areas, minimize the impact on 
livelihoods as well as reduce the risks to public health (Sims et al. 2(05). The roles of these 
agencies was intended to be complementary, with WHO protecting human health, the OlE 
protecting animal health, and the F AO focusing on animal production and livelihoods, although 
one position paper (Webster and Hulse 2(05) and one policy study (Scoones and Forster 2008a) 
argue that as far as pandemic planning for influenza was concerned, these agencies are not 
always in harmony. 
2.5.3. H5Nl influenZll and global pandemic preparedness debates 
As of 11th November 2010, H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza has had 508 confIrmed 
cases and 304 human deaths (WHO 2010a), cost the global poultry industry well over 10 billion 
dollars in losses and continues to persist in poUltry populations of parts of Europe, Southeast 
Asia, Egypt and Nigeria (WHO 2005; GRAIN 2006; Eurosurveillance 2006, Kilpatrick et aI. 
2006; FAO 2010a). The primary public health concern has been H5Nl 's possible candidacy for 
the next human influenza pandemic, which many experts believe is overdue (Conly and 
10hnston 2004; Louie 2005; Kilpatrick et al. 2006; Bartlett 2006). Interestingly, it was the rapid 
spread, public health and economic ramifications of the SARS outbreak in 2003 that appear to 
have alerted the global health community to the possible need for pandemic preparedness 
(Scoones and Forster 2oo8a). In SARS' wake, H5Nl has presented an unprecedented challenge 
to the animal health, public health and trade policy communities, having been identified as a 
threat to the poUltry industry, a pharmaceutical interest, a trade-related epidemic, public health 
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threat and a human pandemic concern (WHO 2006; ALive 2006; Karesh et al. 2006; Ong et al. 
2008; Scoones and Forster 2008a). 
For avian influenza, Osterholm (2005) explains that public health experts and epidemiologists 
do not know if an H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza pandemic (in humans) is actually 
imminent, only that it is plausible. Adding to the complexity is determining how exactly to 
respond to a potential pandemic. Scientifically, in reviewing available surveillance data on past 
human influenza pandemics, Monto et al. (2006), for example, affirm that there was no pattern 
to the epidemiology of occurrence. Nicoll (2005) concurs, stating that there is no standard to the 
manifestation of pandemics, including which segments of the population would be affected the 
most. There is thus no clear precedent that would help definitively predict how the next 
pandemic will 'behave'. 
Despite these uncertainties, a multi-sectoral approach to H5Nl management and pandemic 
preparedness across, policy sectors affected has been advocated at national, regional and 
international levels, presumably to foster an accordant response to HSNl (Ong et al. 2008; UN 
2010). The main thrust of the avian and pandemic influenza response has been the coordination 
of public health and animal health agencies at national and international levels to develop 
preparedness interventions for areas not yet affected, or reinforce control measures in locations 
where the disease has become endemic, based on WHO pandemic preparedness guidelines, OlE 
recommended control measures and FAO devised surveillance strategies (WHO 2005a; Webster 
and Hulse 2(05). However, H5Nl has presented unique challenges for pandemic planning, 
involving the weighing of sector-specific risk against wider ecological and socioeconomic 
interests that challenge the traditional public health and animal health based interventions of the 
pre-SARS era. Post SARS, global infectious disease governances has emerged describing, at 
least in the context of avian and pandemic influenza preparedness, the attempt to balance the 
interests of pharmaceutical, conservationist, transnational business and commercial poultry as 
well as bridge the previously growing divide between public and animal health (Fidler 2004a; 
8 Defined by Fidler (2004b) as society' s structwing of responses to challenges faced. 
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WHOIDFID-AHP 2005; Fidler 2008; Scoones and Forster 2008b; Rabinowitz, Odofm and Oein 
2(08). 
Recently, the Hanoi Declaration (UN 201 0) stressed the importance of multi-sectoral 
collaboration, advocacy and communication to foster better decision-making, in addition to the 
promotion of appropriate assessments of the risks in animals and humans. Furthermore, the 
Hanoi Declaration makes mention that highly pathogenic avian influenza control efforts and 
pandemic preparedness could serve as a means of strengthening and improving the 
responsiveness of human and veterinary health systems, and the alignment of these "sectoral 
policies in ways that encourage socio-economic development.,,9 This suggests a desire for 
policy cohesion and the application of risk analysis to inform disease control priorities, but does 
not provide practical guidance as to how the two can be 'married' in various contexts. 
In the policy domain, many of the concerns over a pandemic begin to sound apocalyptic. The 
often cited available milestone for comparison is the 1918 'Spanish flu' pandemic which one 
health policy scholar suggests killed over 50 million people (Osterholm 2(05). This particular 
pandemic was said to have its origins in Kansas military camps and was spread to Europe by US 
troops during the war in 1918 (Webster 1997; Hollenbeck 2(05). With contemporary concerns 
such as human population growth, increased intensity of production systems and the 
unprecedented nature of globalisation, which many have argued allows for the faster and further 
transmission of infectious disease threats (Kaferstein, Motarjemi and Bettcher 1997; Hampson 
1997; Kimball, Arima and Hodges 2005; Kimball 2006), there is concern that a pandemic in 
modem times could kill millions. Morens and Fauci (2007) on the other hand, hold the view that 
a pandemic now is likely to result in considerably lower deaths than the one that occurred in 
1918. The WHO (2006) estimated that should a pandemic arise from H5Nl highly pathogenic 
avian influenza, it could result in two-seven million deaths at the minimum. Other authors are 
sceptical. Horowitz (2005), for example, dismisses the avian influenza issue, and SARS before 
9 http://www.un-influenza.orglnodel4040 
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it, as elaborate political conspiracies of corporate and phannaceutical interests disguised as 
national security threats and pandemic concerns. There is therefore much politics surrounding 
the issue of avian and pandemic influenza. 
Scoones and Forster (2008a) have mapped the recurring themes in the debates on global 
responses to avian influenza. They suggest four themes characterise the core issues, namely risk 
and uncertainty, economy and livelihood impacts, effects on health and extent of disease, and 
effects on food and farming. Drawing from this, there are six linked debates identifiable in the 
international policy discourse concerning avian and pandemic influenza. The first debate 
involves the scientific uncertainty of the likelihood of the occurrence of a pandemic caused by 
H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza. As mentioned above, authors such as Osterholm 
(2005) have stated that public health experts remain uncertain of its likelihood. The concern 
over a possible pandemic has resulted in calls to focus control on the likely source of this 'risk', 
in this case, Southeast Asia, where most of the impact of H5N1 has been felt. In fact, some 
authors have referred to Southeast Asia as an "influenza epicentre" (see Hampston 1997). Of 
course, a complex interplay of cultural factors and production practices led to the exposure and 
succumbing of humans in this region to highly pathogenic avian influenza (see Webster 1997; 
Osterholm 2(05). These factors have been identified and reviewed in various context specific 
network analyses (e.g. Kerkhove et al. 2009; Soares Magalhaes et al. 2010), highly pathogenic 
avian influenza risk mapping studies (e.g. Gilbert et al. 2(08), risk factor studies (Yupiana et al. 
2010) and risk analysis (e.g. Kasemsuwan et al. 2009). Petrelli and Sturloni (2007) in their 
review of infectious diseases risk management and governance of global risks, argue however 
that although surveillance has focused on H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza, there is still 
a lot of uncertainty about both its evolution as a zoonosis and its effects on public health. 
The second debate involves linkages between poultry production practices, highly pathogenic 
avian influenza epidemiology and disease spread though trade, poultry and poultry product and 
migratory bird movement. According to the epidemiological reviews by Capua and Alexander 
(2004) and Alexander (2007), recent increases in intensive poultry production practices are 
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responsible for the increasing incidence of highly pathogenic influenza in the world. It has been 
stated by van den Berg (2009) that all parts of the world are at risk of H5Nl highly pathogenic 
avian influenza incursions as a result of the globalization of trade. Some authors have taken the 
view that it is migratory birds that will spread H5Nl across the globe (Normile 2006b; Chen et 
al. 2006), while others have claimed that wild birds are only capable of short range spread (e.g. 
Weber and Stilianakis 2(07). 
The third debate concerns the 'One Health' approach response to mitigate the pandemic threat. 
This has involved calls to strengthen veterinary control systems in addition to human pandemic 
preparedness, addressing the pandemic risk at-source but involving other sectors to mitigate the 
risk (FAO 2004; WHO 2005a). A key questi~n here is how do countries incorporate other 
policy sectors in risk mitigation? Presumably, each sector, and indeed each country, would view 
the highly pathogenic avian influenza problem differently. In addition, while the international 
community has recommended 'at-source' controls, the 'standardised' approaches adopted have 
worked in some areas and failed in others (Scoones and Forstkeer 2008b). Yee, Carpenter and 
Cardona (2009) for instance, in their examination of the epidemiology of HSNl, state that 
control measures such as culling, disinfection and stamping out have been successful m 
controlling H5Nl outbreaks in Europe, but have not been as effective in Southeast Asia. 
The fourth debate involves the potential effects of a human pandemic on the global economy. 
This has resulted in highly pathogenic avian influenza risk mitigation responses perceived to 
largely affect only the livelihoods of those in outbreak areas (Scoones and Forster 2008a). The 
brunt of these control efforts has largely been felt by poor farmers. Stirling and Scoones (2009; 
also Scoones and Forster 2008b), for example, estimate that over 2 billion birds were 
slaughtered with the greatest losses suffered by the poor. Nicoll (2005) also argues that the 
effect of HSNl was mostly felt in the social sphere, particularly in Southeast Asia, where 
several countries (e.g. Thailand) had their poultry exports prejudiced and rural livelihoods 
affected by control interventions. This has links to contentions between business and livelihood 
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interests and controversies over the role of intensive vs. backyard farming in disease spread 
(GRAIN 2006a; GRAIN 2(07). 
The fifth debate involves pharmaceutical interests, covering influenza virus sharing and 
concerns that genetic sequence information collected from outbreak areas would be used to 
create vaccines for market that would not be distributed equitably in case of a pandemic (Garrett 
and Fidler 2007; Fidler 2008). The policy response has been Western countries scrambling to 
stockpile antiviral drugs and vaccines for 'high level pandemic preparedness efforts', the 
vaccines of whose production has depended on H5Nl virus strains recovered from 'developing 
countries' (Elbe 2010). In an attempt to globalise this policy response, there have been calls for 
affected countries to either develop pharmaceutical capacity or consider non-pharmaceutical 
interventions. 
Linked to this is the sixth debate, involving the 'securitization' framing of the avian and 
pandemic influenza issue, which, Elbe (2010) argues, contributed to, and has caused difficulty 
in resolving, the controversy over influenza virus sharinglO• In implementing this 'securitization' 
approach, Western countries have spent massively on pandemic preparedness. Burgos and Otte 
(2008) citing Jonas (2008) state that the US and European countries had spent approximately 
US$2.8 billion 'at home' versus US$950 million 'abroad' for disease control 'at-source' by the 
end of 2008. This forms the background against which resource-constrained countries generated 
their avian and pandemic influenza intervention policies guided by the WHO global pandemic 
preparedness plan (WHO 2oo5a; ALive 2006). 
The African response was being coordinated by the WHO African Regional Office (AFRO), the 
African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-mAR) and some regional 
trading blocs including Southern African Development Community (SADC), with funding from 
10 Indonesia decided to cease sharing its HSNt isolates in December 2006. According to Fidler (2008), 
this was in response to an Australian company developing an avian influenza vaccine based on an HSNI 
viral strain that Indonesia bad availed to the WHO. WHO acknowledged that patents on modified HSNI 
viruses had been sought without the consent of the countries that had supplied the original virus samples 
through the Global Influenza Surveillance Network. Elbe (2010) argues that avian influenza had been 
presented as ''pressing global security threat" which resulted in governments taking defensive measures 
such as pharmaceutical intervention. 
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the African Union and the World Bank (WHO-AFRO 2005; ALive 2006; UNSIC and World 
Bank 2(08). This was under the global coordination of United Nations System Influenza 
Coordinator (UNSIC), with the main participants being WHO, OlE and FAO (UNSIC 2006a; 
Scoones and Foster 2008a). These global and regional actors set out a framework to guide the 
development of national avian and human influenza prevention and control responses. Among 
these guidelines was a recommendation for multi-sectoral integration (WHO-AFRO 2005; 
UNSIC 2006b; ALive 2006). By 2007, response plans on the African continent were at different 
stages of development with most aimed at containment of avian influenza in poultry to the 
neglect of pandemic preparedness (Ortu, Mounier-Jack and Coker 2007; Ortu, Mounier-Jack 
and Coker 2(08). These assessments of the extent of preparedness in Africa, however, only 
reviewed policy content, which, arguably, are merely statements of intent. 
2.6. Globalized perspectives on infectious disease management and their implications for 
disease control in resource-constrained countries 
The second part of this chapter examines the policy implications of the main debates around 
public health, animal health and trade, focusing on the converging policy boundaries of the 
multilateral institutions governing these areas of policy. This section examines the extent to 
which these 'global' areas of policy interface each other, and potentially influence infectious 
disease control and commerce in resource-constrained countries. 
With the entry of internationally important infectious diseases such as SARS and highly 
pathogenic avian influenza into the world policy arena, it has been noted by authors such as 
Fidler (2004b; see also Lee and Fidler 2(07) that a radical shift in approaches to infectious 
disease control has occurred, moving from nation-focused to global-focused control 
mechanisms. In this shift is an assumed universal acceptance of what infectious diseases should 
be prioritized on both global and national agendas, the 'risk' they present and how they should 
be controlled. It is important to understand how resource-constrained countries go about 
responding to these 'global' imperatives, given their unique circumstances. The importance of 
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such research is made especially relevant with the issue of zoonotic risk management and 
pandemic preparedness. 
As established thus far, the dominant perspective is that economic considerations, in various 
forms, often trump health concerns. Aginam (2002) however argues that it is not a simple case 
of one set of concerns taking pre-eminence over another. The global health governance 
boundaries, Aginam contends, are being reshaped through the "legally binding" and "soft-law" 
provisos negotiated and adopted within the respective mandates of multilateral institutions such 
as the WHO, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), FAO and OlE. These include international 
health guidelines, trade agreements and approaches to disease control, all grounded in 
'international standards'. 
In an attempt to clarify the trade-health relationship and foster greater coherence between the 
international health and trade communities, a joint WHOIWfO study examining the links 
between trade and health was published in 2002 (WHOIWfO 2(02). This effort did very little 
to alleviate the concerns of public health proponents and has been described as disappointing by 
some analysts (Howse 2004). With the advent of the WTO in 1995 and the completion of the 
revised International Health Regulations (IHR)l1 ten years later, the global health and global 
trade communities fmd themselves at a cross-roads in as far as infectious disease control, 
pandemic preparedness and global trade are concerned. With the revision of the IHRs in 2005, 
an important milestone for global public health was reached, enabling the global public health 
community address the more contemporary problems presented by infectious disease threats. 
Health proponents argue, however, that health compromises continue to be made. Meirianos and 
Peires (2005), for example, maintain that the revised IHRs made trade-offs between national 
sovereignty and global health by attempting to guard against global disease spread with 
minimum interference to trade and travel. 
11 Lee and Koivusalo (2005) state that the IHRs are based on a series of International Sanitary 
Conferences among leading trading nations. that led to the adoption of International Sanitary 
Conventions. The IHRs were fmt established in 1969, focused only on YeUow Fever, Cholera and Plague 
and depended on official notification to the WHO from nations experiencing epidemics (WHO 1983; 
Meirianos and Peires 2(05). One limitation of the 1969 IHRs was a lack of a coordinated mechanism for 
controlling the international spread of disease. 
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In the debate between trade and health. animal health is wedged between the two. Meirianos and 
Peires (2005) have suggested that OlE regulations, what they consider to be the animal health 
counterpart to the IHRs, perhaps require a revisit similar to that undertaken with the IHRs to 
better align them with the present-day threats presented by transboundary diseases. While no 
attempt has been made to revise OlE regulations along lines similar to the IHRs, the 
international animal health community appears to be moving closer to health by adopting a 
global perspective on the control of zoonoses (see Blancou et al. 2(05). Simultaneously, the 
international animal health community also appears to take an active pro-trade stance in their 
address of issues surrounding trade and health protection. The OlE has been setting 
international animal health standards for purposes of facilitating safe trade in livestock and 
livestock products of trade under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement12 of the 
WTO in its Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Bruckner 2009; OIE 2010). Animal health authors 
like Thiermann (2005) posit that countries that are involved in livestock and livestock product 
trade are expected to comply with the SPS Agreement in order to reap the full benefits of 
international trade. Pushing a free trade agenda, Zepeda et al. (2005), like Thiermann, uphold 
the SPS regulation that public health measures to ensure food safety and to control plant or 
animal diseases should be based, as far as is appropriate, on international standards, which 
presumably frees them from having to justify their policies through analysis of risk. The SPS 
Agreement espouses the view that measures to protect public health, animal health and plant 
health should only interfere with trade minimally. It is this view, similarly adopted under the 
revised IHRs, that has been found to be problematic at national level by Meirinanos and Peires 
(2005). Alternatively, this also demonstrates both the increasing interaction of different areas of 
international policy and a fostering of commercial interests within international health and 
agriculture. 
12 The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement provides guidelines to trading countries on acceptable 
measures to be applied in food safety and animal and plant health standards in as far as international trade 
is concerned (WTOIWHO 2002). For trade in livestock and livestock products, the accepted international 
standards are enshrined in the Terrestrial and Aquatic Animal Health Codes of the OlE (OlE 2010). 
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This international policy scenario has significant effects on resomce-constraint countries. 
Thomson et al. (2004) argue that transboundary animal diseases and their unlikely eradication 
. in the foreseeable future pose a significant problem for 'developing countries' by excluding 
them from involvement in global trade under WTO regulations. They further postulate, and 
rightfully so, that even with international guidelines and standards provided to facilitate trade, 
many 'developing countries' have to deal with a range of animal diseases simultaneously, 
making regulation and technical considerations extremely difficult (see also Upton and Otte 
2004). Furthermore, it has been suggested that international standards have been used to restrict 
the direction of trade, on health grounds, from resomce-enabled to resomce-constrained 
countries. For instance, Rweyemamu and Astudillo (2002), state that the global distribution of 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), mirrors the world's economic structure with industrialised 
countries generally being free of the disease while 'developing countries' were endemic, which 
pushes trade in a North-South direction. Of the OlE's fifteen 'List A Diseases,13 considered to 
be transboundary in nature and prioritized as threats to global animal health when it comes to 
trade in livestock products, 12 are endemic to sub-Saharan Africa (Thomson et al. 2004). Other 
authors, such as Stark et al. (2006) and Zepeda et al. (2005) add to the complexity by explaining 
that 'developing countries' have serious problems in their surveillance systems and veterinary 
infrastructure. With these problems, Africa's trading partners automatically assume that 
products exported from the continent are 'infected' and risky (Tambi and Bessin 2006). Hall, 
Ehui and Delgado (2004), taking a development focus, have suggested that WTO SPS measures 
potentially marginalize the world's poor producers the most and could contribute to global 
poverty and disease. Furthermore, Tambi and Bessin (2006), reviewing WTO agreements and 
their effect on livestock production and trade in Africa, assert that there is a lack of transparency 
and equality among negotiating countries that has excluded many resomce-constrained 
countries, with sub-Saharan Africa giving out more concessions on tariff reduction than what it 
received from its trading partners (see also MacDonald and Horton 2009). Stigliz (2009) also 
argues that globalization under the current multilateral trading system has created vast 
13 The OlE no longer maintains "List A" and "List B" diseases and has since combined the list. 
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inequalities between the world's richest and poorest nations, while Chang (2003), in a review of 
the history of free trade, has argued that under globalisation, current approaches to global trade 
deny poorer countries the opportunity to implement policies that fostered the development of 
the world's wealthy countries. These arguments suggest that resource-constrained countries are 
not only purposefully restricted from participating in global trade in reciprocal ways, their 
development opportunities are also restricted by these multilateral systems. 
Invariably, the dominant position is that 'developing countries' pose the greatest risk as sources 
of infectious diseases, as suggested by authors like Hampson (1997); Domenech et al. (2006), 
and Kruk (2008). Domenech et al. (2006) go on to state that the FAO's philosophy is to control 
these diseases at this source. This view that resource-constrained countries pose as the greatest 
sources of infectious disease risks for the rest of the globe also implies that disease control 
efforts would focus on the 'global impacting' disease problems. As demonstrated in the 
discussion on the debates around avian and pandemic influenza, it also implies a fostering of 
particular methods of control that may not be appropriate for different contexts, which could 
then harm local livelihoods or worse, encourage further disease spread (see Scoones 2009). 
Obscured by these global narratives is the fact that for 'developing countries', there is a mix of 
cultural, disease management and stigmatization challenges to embracing these global 
perspectives on trade and infectious disease control. Zinsstag et al. (2007) explain that, 
compared to more industrialised countries where there are mechanisms for farmer compensation 
following livestock culling, this is not usually possible in resource-limited countries because of 
a dependency on livestock for rural livelihoods and difficulties in obtaining replacement stock. 
In addition, it is possible that the diseases and 'risks' prioritized in the global 'West' are not 
necessarily the ones of most significance in these contexts. This is only part of the issue. 
Livestock in many 'developing countries' are not just kept as articles of commerce, but have 
cultural significance as well, what Smith, Sumner and Rosson (200 1) term multifunctionality; 
where they serve such functions as assuring domestic food security, provide access to nutrition 
for the less privileged and play key roles in the maintenance of distinctive rural cultures and 
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ways of life. While not necessarily integrated, it must be understood that both 'traditional' and 
'commercial' production practices co-exist in many of these contexts. Part of the problem with 
this 'global' aversion to infectious disease 'risk' therefore, is there is little effort made to 
understand the context in which resource-constrained countries attempt to negotiate global 
imperatives, be they public health, animal health or trade concerns. In the context of 
globalisation in particular, not much has been done to investigate context-relevant ways of 
addressing these problems. 
A possible consequence of this, as argued by Lo Yuk-ping and Thomas (2010) in their analysis 
of the politics of the securitization of health, is that policy actors in different contexts may be 
pressured to verbalise an infectious disease threat as apriority, but may not treat it as such. 
While this may provide some, albeit minimal, support of the view that supranational influences 
can still be regulated by the nation state by reorienting governmental structures to keep abreast 
with extraneous demands (Rhodes 1997; Hudson and Lowe 2004), international approaches to 
disease control have significant and wide reaching influence on what nations can, or cannot do. 
Global infectious disease control policies have a significant influence on development 
opportunities, particularly in 'developing countries'. Of note is how trade policy such as the 
SPS Agreements14 are viewed to exclude 'developing countries' from participating in global 
trade. More importantly, in these debates, resource-constrained countries are cast as 
simultaneously needing the most protection and posing the greatest risk. For the world's poorest 
countries, the confluence of interests surrounding global health and global trade therefore 
presents unique challenges. In such contexts, the relationship between public health, animal 
health and trade is complex and is possibly made more so when issues such as zoonotic risk 
management and pandemic preparedness are brought into the picture. It remains to be seen what 
implications these multiple perspectives have for disease risk management policy development 
and pandemic preparedness. 
141bere are wider debates concerning the SPS Agreement, for example, Silvergrade (2000) states that the 
SPS Agreement actually leads to a lowering of food safety standards in order to facilitate trade, thus 
actually increasing the risks of global trade. 
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2.7. Trade and the development agenda in resource-constrained countries 
Continuing this literature review on the public health-animal health-trade relationship as it 
concerns the development of infectious risk management policy and pandemic preparedness in 
resource-constrained country contexts, this section highlights some of the key debates around 
livestock trade in resource-constrained country contexts and the role that trade policy is meant 
to play in the development agenda. The argument being made here is that by being denied 
access to the 'world trade table', 'developing countries' have begun to direct their energies 
towards active involvement in regional trade arrangements. This has contextual implications for 
the development of infectious disease risk management policies in resource-constrained 
countries. This includes the creation of regions that are possibly commercially separate from the 
known avian influenza 'hotspots' for instance, which has implicit implications for disease 
control. The question raised here is; given this complex background, how, precisely, should 
issues of infectious disease risk management be approached in resource-constrained country 
contexts? 
Many authors agree that agriCUlture, of which livestock production is a part, holds the key to 
trade and development for many 'developing countries' (see Upton 2002; Kimberley 2006), but 
prior to the existence of the WTO, trade in agricultural goods was excluded from multilateral 
trading rules. The latest round of WTO negotiations started in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. 
The objective of The Doha Development Round was to set conditions under which trade 
between nations of varying economic status could be facilitated. Labonte and Sanger (2006) 
argue that the economic interests of major developed countries set and guided the actual Doha 
work programme. In the summer of 2006, the Doha discussions were suspended. Morrison and 
Sarris (2007), in their review of the WTO rules compatible with development, state that the 
suspension of the Doha Round was largely due to the contentious issues surrounding 
agriculture. 
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Shaffer et 01. (2005) have explained that, although wro membership is voluntary, most 
'developing countries' have joined the wro out of concern that they will miss out on trade 
opportunities. The literature suggests that by participating in the wro, less developed countries 
have been disadvantaged. For instance, Lee, Sridhar and Patel (2009) in their examination of 
global governance in trade and health, state that low and middle-income countries are 
disproportionately underrepresented in wro negotiations, with low-income country delegations 
averaging two staff, while the EU has over 140 staff representing its interests. 
The issue is not only about access to wro negotiations, it also about whether or not it is 
actually cost effective for resource-constrained countries to attempt to meet 'international 
standards' be it in trade, or disease control. While Rweyemamu and Astidullo (2002), for 
example, have attempted to propose ways in which resource-constrained countries in which 
FMD is endemic could benefit from global trade in livestock and livestock products, other 
authors, such as Cumming (20IOa), citing Jansen et 01. (1992) explain how the Zimbabwean 
Government investment in the scaling up of veterinary services and abattoirs to meet European 
Economic Community (EEC)lS import standards in the 90s resulted in a net loss to the country 
because the cost of these renovations exceeded revenues from beef exports. 
To counter the disadvantage that resource-constrained countries have faced under the current 
multilateral trading system, Labonte and Sanger (2006) argue that resource-constrained 
countries have formed alliances of smaller and resource-constrained countries and civil 
organisations that are increasingly demanding that their interests be better represented at the 
wrO. These alliances also constitute regional and economic trading blocs, which Roningen and 
DeRosa (2003) contend, put member countries on the path to free trade and its associated 
benefits, and, politically, are thought to be easier to negotiate since they do not require 
consensus in the wrO. In Africa, a plethora of regional and sub-regional committees has 
emerged, forming a complex network of sometimes overlapping trading blocs (figure 2.2). 
15 This is the forerunner of the current European Union. 
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ACRONYMS 
prlndpal RClgIOnS 
AMU: ArOlb MOIllhrQb union (5 mClmblHS) 
C£MAC: Economic and Monetary communiI)' of central Africa (6) 
COMESA: COmmon Marlcet for £<Istern and southQrn Africa (20) 
ECCAS: Economic community of Central African states (11) 
ECC1WA5: Economic Corrmunity ofVYestl;!rn Afric.;;m States (16) 
SADC: SOuthQrnAfriGn [)QyQlopm.:!nt community ( 14) 
WAEMU: West AfriGn Emnomic and Monetary Union (8) 
GoogrOlphlcalIY limltlKl or subsets of I;Hg~ groups 
EAC: East African community 
IGAD: Int.!r-GoVe-nmental Authority for D2IIelopment 
SACU: SOuthQrnAfriGn CUstoms Union 
Fi9ure 9tcludes (EN-SAD, CEPGEL, IOC .. nd MRU 
Figure 2-2. African regional and sub-regional committees. 
Adapted from The Commission for Africa Report (2005). 
CEMAC 
Within this shift to multilateral and regional trade is a growing interest in livestock trade among 
resource-constrained countries. Delgado et al.' s (1999) joint study by the International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and the FAO project that by 2015, 60% of meat and 52% of 
the world's milk will be produced in 'developing countries' compared to 51% and 36% 
respectively in 1999. This study describes a "Livestock Revolution" driven by increasing 
demands for livestock and livestock products in low-income countries as a result of, among 
other factors, expanding urban populations. These investigators argue that by 2020, livestock 
product trade, particularly trade in meat, milk and eggs, will likely be of increasing importance 
for resource-constrained countries, both in terms of trade between resource-constrained 
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countries and trade with the rest of the world. Recent evidence suggests that indeed there has 
been a general increase in the amount of trade in agricultural produce among resource-
constrained countries. For instance, according to the World Trade Report (WTO 2004) the share 
of intra-developing country agricultural exports increased from 31 % in 1990 to 43% in 2002, 
with most of this increase occurring between 1990 and 1996. It also states that 47.6% of 
developing country imports originated from other 'developing countries', an increase of 10% 
since 1990. Scoones et al. (2010) have argued that domestic and regional trade in livestock is 
actually a reasonable means for development and poverty alleviation in Southern Africa. 
Here again, health commentators assert that the shift to bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements is pushing an economic agenda at the cost of health and, it is argued, 'developing 
countries' are likely to suffer the most (Lee and Koivusalo 2(05). Yet it is not known what the 
policy implications of the current shift to regional and bilateral trade agreements and intra-
continental trade promotion are for zoonotic H5Nl prevention and control, and pandemic 
preparedness. Given the projections on the increasing importance of livestock trade for 
'developing countries', how have current approaches to avian influenza control (whose spread is 
also trade-related) and pandemic preparedness in resource-constrained countries incorporated 
trade? This is an important question to ask as agricultural trade among groups of countries in 
Africa in particular gains greater prominence. 
2.8. The challenges for pandemic preparedness and risk a1llllysis in Africa 
Since it is now apparent that one of H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza's main means of 
spread is through trade, for 'developing countries' in Africa, particularly those as yet unaffected 
by HSNI outbreaks, this potentially introduces a complex mix of health, trade and development 
dimensions to the avian and human influenza issue. Given the interplay of different priorities 
that may exist around pandemic preparedness and trade in Africa, perceptions of risk regarding 
a 'pending' pandemic if not properly contextualised across the global-national policy interface, 
will inevitably be driven by how risk is 'politically' communicated between the various policy 
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actors for whom this 'risk' is perceived to be important. Given the complex background against 
which resource-constrained countries generated their pandemic responses, one major question 
remains; how did individual nations like Zambia develop their responses to avian and pandemic 
influenza? 
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, there are many challenges for avian and pandemic 
influenza preparedness in Africa created by the globalisation of commerce and the 
internationalization of approaches to infectious disease control. First, there is the view that 
resource-constrained countries are both a potential source of risk and in need of the most 
protection from potential infectious disease threats. Second, it is argued that health may be 
compromised by an unbalanced focus on trade. An emerging question is, whose health is being 
compromised and what are the trade-offs made by not engaging in trade? Third, resource-
constrained countries have restricted participation in world trade, but require commerce to stoke 
their economies. If indeed, agricultural trade is as important to this agenda as the literature 
suggests, how have resource-constrained countries approached infectious disease risk 
management in the context of pandemic preparedness? 
The central question in this thesis therefore is how national trade, animal health and public 
health concerns are addressed in the policy processes of multi-sectoral risk management and 
pandemic preparedness in the context of a resource-constrained country in Africa. Indeed, it is 
how to approach the international management of infectious diseases and commerce, influenced 
by the converging policy boundaries of multilateral institutions of animal health, public health 
and trade that may present the greatest challenge to developing risk management and pandemic 
preparedness policies in resource-constrained countries, particularly in Africa. 
Given that the dynamics and risks of disease emergence are different from location to location, 
an examination of the risk's 'local' likelihood and 'impact' are important in identifying the 
appropriate policy responses. Risk analysis is a potential method for highlighting the trade-offs 
between various sectors in the management trade-related infectious disease spread. Risk 
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analysis is meant to aid decision makers prioritize particular risks and responses in a rational 
way. but, for many health policy makers on the African continent, risk analysis is still a novel 
concept. and thus may be difficult to apply if the risk analysis frameworks do not reflect the 
wider social political interests and influences at play. This makes it necessary to explore the 
feasibility of conducting a risk analysis such as the one recommended by the OlE risk analysis 
framework to inform risk management policy in a 'developing country' context. Given the 
various perspectives driving the pandemic response. without properly contextualising the 'risk' 
response. the danger is that conflicting information could be communicated among and between 
stakeholders. and could undennine precautionary action (Brug. Aro and Richardus 2009). The 
importance of exploring the feasibility of conducting a risk analysis in this context therefore is 
to determine how the policy requirements of public health, animal health and trade can best be 
co-opted into avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development in low 
income countries such as Zambia which have identified agricultural trade as a possible driver 
for economic development (Ndulo 2006; GRZ 2006a). 
2.9. Chapter sumnuzry 
In the context of globalization, there is some suggestion in the literature that global policy actors 
assume infectious disease risk is universally understood, and use this as a platform to drive 
collaboration in policy responses across sectors at international and national levels. Much of the 
available literature, understandably. does not fully examine the role that public health, animal 
health and trade play in multi-sectoral risk management and pandemic preparedness at national 
level, particularly in resource-constrained settings. While broad themes can be drawn from 
current knowledge, the discourse on global infectious disease governance and its relationship 
with global trade is still unfolding. This chapter highlighted the tensions that resource-
constrained countries face in the nexus of animal health-public health and trade, including the 
perception that resource-constrained countries are both source and victims of potential 
infectious disease threats. It argued that that this view has created a situation where resource-
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constrained countries have turned to each other for commerce in order to develop their 
economies. Given this scenario, it remains to be seen how resource-constrained countries such 
as Zambia approached infectious disease risk management as it relates to avian and pandemic 
influenza. The next chapter presents the study's conceptual framework, key research questions 
and methods. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Researching risk and policy: Conceptual framework and methodology 
3. Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the several key aspects of global infectious disease risk 
management that form the background against which resource-constrained countries have had to 
develop their pandemic preparedness plans. For developing countries, this background calls for, 
amongst other things, negotiating the co-evolving and interfacing policy boundaries of the 
bodies charged with the international governance of trade, public health and animal health. In 
the process of globalization particular risk framings have been given pre-eminence, as 
exemplified in the narratives surrounding highly pathogenic avian influenza and the global 
pandemic preparedness response reviewed in the previous chapter. These, in turn, have 
influenced the policy decisions taken on risk management and pandemic preparedness in 
various contexts. Given this global-national policy interface, it is important to determine how 
responses to 'global' zoonotic risks and potential risks are constructed in the risk management 
policy processes of resource-constrained countries, and determine the potential for assessments 
of risk to inform the development of context -appropriate policy responses to such concerns. 
The previous chapter raised several questions, of which the following is the most pertinent: 
Given its complex international policy background, how did individual nations like Zambia 
develop their responses to avian and pandemic influenza? For purposes of discussing the 
theoretical basis of this study's approach to policy analysis. these questions are best addressed 
by doing the following: First, identifying how the highly pathogenic avian influenza and 
pandemic influenza problem got onto the government agenda in Zambia. Second, exploring 
how the highly pathogenic avian influenza and pandemic influenza problem was defined across 
the animal health, public health and trade sectors in Zambia. Third. exploring how the highly 
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pathogenic avian influenza and pandemic influenza problem was addressed across the animal 
health, public health and trade sectors in Zambia. Fourth, assessing what was achieved by the 
policy process as adopted in Zambia. Fifth, through an understanding of the risk management 
policy processes of a resource-constrained country (Zambia), determining how risk analysis 
could help address the concerns of animal health, public health and trade concerns in the 
development of multi-sectoral risk management policy. In order to answer these questions, this 
chapter presents the theoretical underpinnings of this research, linking understandings of risk to 
policy processes. The fIrst part of this chapter provides the theoretical background and the 
second part of this chapter presents this thesis' conceptual framework and methods. 
3.1 Linking policy processes to risk assessment: Some theoretical insights from the 
sociology of risk literature 
To now link policy processes and zoonosis risk assessment. the insights offered by the 
sociology of risk literature possibly best explain how risk is socially constructed, assessed and 
managed in contemporary times, and what this may mean both for risk management policy 
processes and the applicability of risk assessments to inform context-appropriate multi-sectoral 
zoonotic risk management in resource-constrained countries. 
Beck (1992) in his seminal book "Risk Society", introduces the theory of reflexive 
modernisation in which the processes of modernization in industrialised societies are posited to 
be the cause of the emergence of unprecedented and indeterminate risks and hazards, including 
those presented by infectious diseases. Here, risk creation, construction and response are 
intrinsically linked to modernisation, and knowledge and science16 are argued to play a 
constitutive and sometimes unexamined role in these processes. Beck's views share 
commonalities with those of Giddens (1998). In Giddens' (see also Lupton 1999) conception of 
reflexive modernization, the increasing dependence on society's 'experts' to determine what is 
and how to respond to 'risk' in societies, has brought with it an increasing concern with 
16 Reflexive modernisation has its roots in the sociology and critique of science and scientifIc knowledge. 
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uncertainty arising from an inability to precisely calculate risk since all that can be done is 
create scenarios of risk which are based on contingent scientific knowledge and is therefore 
subject to change. This has led to concerns over the validity of purely scientific responses to 
risk, especially in their treatment (or lack thereof) of uncertainty (see Stirling and Mayer 2000; 
Millstone 2007; Stirling and Scoones 2009). Both Beck and Giddens therefore propose a more 
reflexive approach to risk in which the underpinnings of scientific assertions are drawn out, their 
situational implications assessed and alternative knowledge bases co-opted, thus taking the risk 
assessment process out of the 'problematized' purely scientific sphere into a more discursive 
treatment of 'risk'. 
Acknowledgement of the need for such a shift lies in the important assertion by risk sociologists 
such as Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), Slovic (1998) and others, that although the dangers are 
real, risk is 'politicized' through several social processes, giving risk a status which is separate 
from the actual dangers presented by various hazards. Slovic (1998) further states that this 
politicization process makes risk assessment a subjective blend "of science and judgment with 
important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors" (see also Horlick-lones 1998; 
Pidgeon 1999; Slavic 1999). The implications of this is that given the particular risk framings 
surrounding avian and pandemic influenza, before a context-relevant and reflexive approach to 
risk analysis can be proposed, it is important to understand what the framing assumptions were, 
how they came about and how they influenced the policy process in each context. 
This brief overview provides this study's theoretical underpinnings, and leads into how this 
thesis intends to marry scientific risk assessment and policy processes. Millstone (2007) in his 
analysis of the science and politics of food-safety, proposes a co-evolutionary, more democratic 
model that adopts both a scientific and a policy development approach to issues of risk 
assessment and risk management (dealt with more closely in Chapter 8). This model takes into 
account framing assumptions, uncertainties and social choices, bringing science and policy-
making closer to the more reflexive treatment of risk proposed by Beck (1992) and Giddens 
(1998). Within this grounding is the importance of risk communication between policy relevant 
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communities. To bring this into sharper focus, this thesis draws on Van Zwanenberg and 
Millstone (2006) for important insights on the importance of dialogue in the definition, analysis 
and the evaluation of risk issues in risk management policy processes. It is from this theoretical 
basis that this study took a predominantly scientific framework for risk analysis and suggested 
ways of 'opening it up' to both risk management challenges and risk management policy 
processes of resource-constrained countries like Zambia. The next section outlines the 
theoretical underpinnings for the examination of policy processes. 
3.2 EXilmining the policy processes: The policy arudysis theoretical framework 
Primarily, the issue of concern for this thesis is the importance of global pandemic 
preparedness, but within this is a complex international trade-health-agriculture debate that 
raises a key question: how pandemic preparedness is actually pursued, achieved and evaluated 
in the context of resource-constrained countries. This section is an overview of the theories 
adopted in the examination of policy processes in this study. The issues examined in this thesis 
involve aspects of risk. This study sought to understand how 'risk' was understood and 
addressed on the national agendas of resource-constrained countries such as Zambia and the role 
that understanding policy processes could play in enhancing the risk analysis process, thereby 
making it appropriate for informing risk management policy development in resource-
constrained countries, given the unique challenges they face in the era of globalisation. 
The study draws on a range of policy theories appropriate to this policy context. The primary 
grounding of the thesis is in social policy, very broadly drawing on meso-level theories 
concerning institutions, policy networks and policy transfer at the global-national interface (see 
Hudson and Lowe 2004). Several approaches to policy analysis have been described within the 
policy literature. In developing the theoretical approach to this study, several theories and 
approaches were reviewed including concepts from agenda setting (Baumgartner and Jones 
2009), implementation research (Hjern and Hull 1982), Advocacy Coalition Frameworks 
(Sabatier 1997; Sabatier 1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999) Policy Network Analysis 
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(Rhodes 1997; Smith 1997), Kingdon's Multiple Streams Model (Kingdon 2(03), and the 
policy triangle (Walt and Gilson 1994). How these concepts were applied is explained under the 
section presenting this thesis' conceptual framework and methods. 
The conceptual separation of the policy process into stages has traditionally been used to permit 
analysis (John 2000; Tantivess and Walt 2(08). In such accounts, the policy process begins 
with agenda setting and problem recognition; goes on to policy formulation, legislation and 
policy introduction; and finally implementation. This 'stages heuristic' implies a natural 
sequence of steps through which public policies proceed, amalgamating into the 'policy 
process'. While John (2000) and other authors have argued that the 'stages heuristic' rarely 
reflects the reality of policymaking, the adoption of this heuristic in this study allowed for the 
examination of avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development in a 
structured manner. This study specifically examined the early parts of the policy processes of 
agenda setting and policy formulation. The defmitions used for agenda setting and policy 
formulation were drawn from the literature. Lester and Stewart (2000) define agenda setting as 
the process by which problems and solutions gain or lose government attention and can extend 
into policy formulation, where objectives and the means of achieving them are decided (John 
2000; Tantivess and Walt 2(08). 
Because the issues being examined in this thesis pertain to the global-national policy interface, 
this study was a national level policy analysis. It adopted the view that the national political 
system is the framework in which actors interact and participate in policy (see Elmore 1997; 
Smith 1997) and sought to understand how decision-makers interacted at this level in the 
development of avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development and 
livestock trade policy implementation in Zambia. The study focused primarily on decision-
makers in animal health, public health and trade to examine the policy processes of avian and 
human influenza policy development. I remained cognisant of the role that business, 
bureaucracy and political elite interests play in shaping the policy process, as demonstrated by 
Barker (1996) in health care policy processes. The theoretical grounding used to understand and 
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explain the policy process complications introduced by external relationships with advisors, 
experts, aid-donors and financial institutions drew on Walt and Gilson's (1994) examination of 
health policy in resource-constrained country contexts and Overseas Development Institute's 
(ODI 2006) examination of the impact of research on the policy processes of resource-
constrained country contexts. Walt and Gilson (1994) also argue that policy actors in resource-
constrained countries usually have large power gaps between them in the policy process. 
Understanding this helped define the nature of relationships among policy actors in animal 
health, public health and trade in the avian and human influenza prevention and control policy 
process and livestock trade policy implementation. For resource-constrained countries in 
particular, Walt and Gilson (1994; see also Walt 1994) also state that actors are influenced by 
contextual factors at both the macro-governmental and micro-institutional level in their roles in 
the policy process. In addition, ODl's (2006) argument that international actors have an 
amplified influence on the policy processes of resource-constrained contexts was useful in 
understanding the role played by international agencies in policy development. The study 
therefore examined the relationships decision-makers in public health, animal health and trade 
had with international bodies such as the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), the poultry industry and other stakeholders and also the 
relationships among the animal health, public health and trade sectors in both avian and human 
influenza prevention and control policy development and livestock trade policy implementation. 
Drawing on the insights derived from the sociology of risk literature on how risk is politicised 
through social processes (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Slovic 1998), it was important to 
understand how 'the avian and human influenza problem' actually got onto the government 
agenda in Zambia. In determining this, the study examined how the avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy problem was defmed, and the risk of avian influenza was 
perceived, across the public health, animal health and trade sectors in Zambia. Birkland (2001) 
and Kingdon (2003) have argued that the defmition of a problem determines whose interests it 
affects. The study sought to understand how the problem definition, and its origins, determined 
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the roles each of the three sectors (animal health, public health and trade) played in avian and 
human influenza prevention and control policy development. It also examined how 'problem 
framing' (see Yanow 2000) restricted access to decision-making in the policy process. In this 
regard, Porter and Hicks (1995; Ho 2002; Toedorovic 2(08) state that policy problems can be 
either widely or narrowly defmed. Their argument is that 'wide problem definitions' are 
inclusive and have the ability to draw a larger group of stakeholders into the policy process, 
while 'narrow problem definitions' limit participation to only the stakeholders whose interest 
this problem defmition speaks to. The study also examined what drove decision-makers' 
perceptions on avian and human influenza 'risk' and what influenced avian and human 
influenza prevention and control policy development in this particular context. This included an 
analysis of the media, the actions of policy proponents17 and what evidence was used to define 
why, how and for whom avian and human influenza prevention and control was important. 
The examination of context was fundamental in this research. The policy analysis literature 
defmes context as the international and national systemic factors that affect policy, including 
politics and socioeconomic conditions (Buse et al. 2005; aDI 2006). Leichter's (1979) 
classification of context as situational, structural, cultural and international was applied in this 
research. The study mainly focused on the situational, structural and international contexts. The 
situational context was the emergence of highly pathogenic avian influenza on the African 
continent and the perceived risk it presented for Zambia's animal health, public health and trade 
sectors. The international context was the global spread of H5Nl avian influenza and its links to 
a possible human influenza pandemic. The structural and cultural context. were conceptualized 
to be the pre-existing structures for networking, and consensus building across government 
institutions, established under Zambia's development platform. Finally, the study used the 
insights gained from the policy analysis and an epistemological position derived from the 
sociology of risk literature, to determine the feasibility of conducting an OlE type risk analysis 
appropriate for this context, and developed a risk model based on the study fmdings. 
17 Defined as individuals or groups who invest their time and resources to push policies onto the agenda 
(Kingdon 2(03) 
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3.3. Overview of the research 
This study had two aims. The first aim was to document and analyse how the avian and human 
influenza prevention and control policy agenda was established in Zambia. It also analysed how 
the avian and human influenza prevention and control policy was formulated across the public 
health, animal health and trade sectors at national level in Zambia. The analysis was based on a 
review of the perceptions of national level decision-makers across these sectors. These 
perceptions were identified from in-depth face-to-face interviews, informal discussions, policy 
documents and observation of several planning meetings as well as a field simulation exercise. 
Based on these policy analysis findings, the second aim was to examine the feasibility of 
conducting a risk analysis to inform multi-sectoral zoonoses risk management in this context, 
based on a review of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OlE) risk analysis framework. 
The approach adopted was first to carry out a policy analysis and then examine the policy and 
risk management interactions within the framework of an established, structured and holistic 
approach to the analysis of infectious disease risk. The OlE risk analysis framework was one 
possible candidate. This framework has been conceptualised to be a 'gold standard' tool to aid 
decision-makers evaluate and compare various policy actions regarding the management of 
disease risk. The framework itself is based on the model developed by Covello and Merkhefor 
(1993), which in turn was based on a review of a multi-disciplinary range of risk assessment 
frameworks. 
North (1995), in his paper on the limitations and principles of risk analysis, contends that risk 
analysis should be directed at assisting decision-making as much as possible, be consistent with 
scientific principles and fall within legal guidelines and "public values" (p.913). Pushing this 
argument further, it is Hueston's (2003) view that risk analysis in particular holds promise as a 
tool to better inform policy-making around the multi-sectoral management of infectious 
diseases, given the inherent complexity of today's animal and public health issues. The common 
ground between North and Hueston's viewpoints is that risk analysis is intended to be a tool to 
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aid the process of decision-making concerning the management of risk. To aid decision-making, 
an OIE risk analysis integrates risk assessment, risk management and risk communication in 
one framework. It is the argument of this thesis that risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication are policy processes that may have characteristics particular to the contexts in 
which they are implemented. This concept is not new. It is the position of Horlick-Jones (1998) 
for example, that the framing of risk assessments involves the interaction of both contextual and 
social influences (see also Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Scott et al. 1999; Siovic 1998; 
Pidgeon 1999). 
While potentially useful as a tool to aid disease risk management policy, for many policy 
makers in resource poor settings on the African continent, OIE risk analysis is still a novelty. In 
addition, though not unique to this context, there are a range of international and national 
interests driving the policy processes in resource-constrained settings. The management of risk 
in such contexts involves balancing sometimes conflicting international and national priorities 
in defIning and communicating risks and developing risk management options. The multi-
sectoral application of this particular framework may be difficult if the wider social political 
interests and influences at play are not taken into account. To explore the possible links between 
policy, disease management and risk, this study examined the feasibility and utility of 
conducting a risk analysis from the OIE in the Zambian context. This was based on the policy 
analysis fmdings. 
3.4. Conceptual framework 
The study examined the implications of avian and human influenza prevention and control 
policy development at natio~al level in Zambia. Given the global signifIcance of the current 
H5Nl panzootic and this pathogen's potential candidacy for a human influenza pandemic, this 
focus was used to investigate how global concerns were addressed, or not addressed, on the 
institutional agendas of the animal health, public health and trade sectors in Zambia. Linked to 
this was the identifIcation of the broader governance issues regarding interests and power 
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among the relevant international agencies and institutions involved in human health, animal 
health and trade. Finally, it allowed for the exploration of the possible links between policy, 
disease management and risk, which provided a basis for proposing a policy and context-
relevant approach to risk analysis to inform multi-sectoral zoonoses risk management in 
Zambia. 
It is Barker's (1996) position that a policy analysis should provide a means of determining how 
decision makers set priorities and take action. This research was a policy analysis aimed at 
developing an understanding of how decision-makers across the public health, animal health 
and trade policy sectors set objectives, priorities and took action in relation to H5Nl risk 
management and pandemic preparedness. From a health policy perspective, it is well accepted 
that part of the process of developing such an understanding of policy decision making requires 
taking into account the social, political and cultural dimensions of context because these 
influence the policy process and policy outcomes (Leichter 1979; Walt and Gilson 1994; Buse, 
Mays and Walt 2(05). From a macro-epidemiological viewpoint, as stated by Shy (1997), the 
politics, economics and culture of a particular context are important determinants of infectious 
disease epidemiology. From an animal disease control perspective as well, Brown (2004) has 
argued that these contextual factors are important determinants of the risk of emerging zoonotic 
diseases. Examples include the emergence of Ebola haemorrhagic fever in humans associated 
with great apes hunted for food in the Congo (Leroy et al. 2004), SARS associated with the 
trade of wildlife in Southeast Asia (Bell, Roberton and Hunter 2004; Karesh et al. 2004) and the 
emergence of H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza as a result of, among others, the poultry 
production practices in Southeast Asia (Slingenbergh et al. 2004). These examples demonstrate 
the anthropogenic nature of emerging zoonoses. They also imply that the management of these 
risks should be context specific. Policy, disease ecology, and risk management systems are 
complex, interacting and often peculiar to each context. To determine the feasibility of, and 
assess the policy implications for, conducting an OlE type risk analysis appropriate for 
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informing multi-sectoral zoonosis risk management in Zambia, a consideration of the cultural, 
political and context specific elements of disease risk was necessary. 
Generally a policy analysis can fall under one of two broad categories. It can be an analysis of 
policy, where the analytical process is largely focused on presenting a descriptive assessment of 
policy; or it can be an analysis for policy, of which the purpose is more prescriptive (Buse, 
Mays and Wait 2(05). The nature of this study was such that it covered both. It was an analysis 
of policy because it sought to understand, describe and explain how avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy was developed across animal health, public health and trade in 
Zambia. It was also an analysis for policy, seeking to assess the feasibility and usefulness of 
conducting an OlE type risk analysis in a manner appropriate for multi-sectoral zoonosis risk 
management in this context. The overall study can be defmed as applied policy research, which 
subdivides analysis of and analysis for policy into contextual and diagnostic categories for the 
former, and evaluative and strategic categories for the latter (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). This 
research examined the contextual factors influencing avian and human influenza prevention and 
control policy development in Zambia. It also evaluated the feasibility of, and assessed the 
policy implications for, conducting a risk analysis appropriate for this particular political-
economic context. 
While Dye (2001) defines 'policy' as what governments do or don't do, the perspective on 
policy adopted in this research is that policy is not limited to government action in any context. 
This research therefore took a broader view of policy to locate policy-relevant actors inside and 
outside of government, adopting the view that, rather than government, it is the national 
political system that provides the framework in which actors interact and participate in policy 
(Elmore 1997; Smith 1997). The policy-relevant actors included international agencies, 
nongovernmental organisations, research institutions and policy consultants. In this research, 
'policy' was considered to be the programmes, projects, activities and documents developed for 
avian and human influenza prevention and control. Decision maker perspectives and 
descriptions of the policy process were used to identify the multiple decisions that led to various 
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courses of action over time (Buse et al. 2(05). It has been argued that policy results from the 
interaction of interests, institutions and ideas (Walt et al. 2008; Dickinson and Buse 2(08). 
Understanding participating decision-maker perspectives and motivations in each sector was 
critical to understanding how interests, institutions and ideas interacted in the development of 
avian and human influenza prevention and control policy in Zambia. The identification of the 
external influences on the policy process as perceived by decision-makers was also important, 
since in many resource poor settings, policy actors are forced to balance the external desires of 
funding agencies and international bodies as well as contend with internal power struggles 
(Walt and Gilson 1994; Walt 1994; ODI2006). 
3.4.1. Evolution of the research question 
This study started out with the objective of very broadly examining the relationship between 
zoonotic 'risk' and risk management policy development across animal health, public health and 
trade sectors, based on perspectives provided by national level policyrnakers. The study 
intended to assess the extent to which the trade, public health and animal health policies 
concerning livestock trade and avian and human influenza prevention and control were coherent 
in Zambia, based on 'measures' for policy coherence developed through a review of policy 
coherence literature (Hoebink 2001; OEeD 2003; Ashoff 2005; Suppan 2005, Fukasalru et al. 
2005; Blouin 2(07). From this, the study intended to conceptually explore how the existing 
level of policy coherence potentially influenced the trade-related risk H5N1 introduction and 
spread in Zambia. 
Policy coherence, however, primarily emphasizes the achievement of congruence in policy 
objectives (see Musken and Heres 2007; Blouin 2(07). By looking mainly at coherence of 
policy objectives across sectors regarding avian and human influenza prevention and control, 
the study risked not examining closely enough the multiple perspectives, influences and 
motivations that are important determinants of policy processes. These multiple perspectives, 
influences and motivations could be important for risk management in general, but would 
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probably not have been examined in any great detail in this research, simply because they did 
not properly fit the policy coherence paradigm. Furthermore, by basing the analysis of the trade-
related risk of a zoonotic incursion of H5Nl solely on the extent of policy coherence, the wider 
policy considerations and influences important for risk and its management would also not be 
examined in any great detail. Therefore, while the examination of policy coherence provided a 
useful conceptual starting point, the processes of initial data collection and analysis revealed the 
focus on policy coherence to be too narrow. 
Another limitation of the original study design was that, by choosing to examine decision-maker 
perspectives, the 'measures' of policy coherence adopted became more convincingly argued as 
policy actors' cognisance or incognisance of differences in understanding (Yanow 2(00), or 
differences in institutional approaches to policy formulation (Ashoff 2(05), which needed to be 
contextualised and explained, rather than 'just' classified into categories of policy coherence or 
incoherence. It was the identification, analysis and presentation of these multiple perspectives 
and processes, at the centre of which were perceptions of risk that seemed more useful to 
explain the challenges in multi-sectoral risk management in a resource poor context. 
It was on this premise that the study took a step back. By refocusing the study to more broadly 
examine agenda setting and policy formulation of avian and human influenza prevention and 
control policy across trade, animal health and public health in Zambia, and incorporating 
insights derived from the sociology of risk literature, the study was better able to describe and 
explain the links between risk, disease management, and policy. This wider policy analysis 
approach made it possible to assess the feasibility and utility of applying one policy appraisal 
tool, the OlE risk analysis framework, and identify the parameters that would make it more 
appropriate for informing multi-sectoral risk management in this context. This approach 
allowed me to examine multi-sectoral zoonosis risk management from both a policy analysis 
perspective and a risk analysis perspective. 
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3.4.2. Study objectives and key research questions 
The shift from a focus on policy coherence to a wider analysis of avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy development resulted in the following objectives and key research 
questions: 
Objectives 
The objectives of the study were to: 
i. Examine avian and human influenza prevention and control agenda setting and 
policy formulation across three sectors - human health, animal health and trade; 
ii. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of the policy response as adopted in Zambia; 
iii. Identify the challenges and benefits of doing an OlE type risk analysis to inform 
zoonotic risk management across these three sectors and more widely; 
iv. Propose a policy relevant model for risk analysis and explore its implications for 
supporting multi-sectoral emerging zoonotic risk management in a resource-
constrained country. 
Key research questions 
For each of these objectives, I developed a series of key research questions that this study 
addressed. These were as follows: 
i. KEY RESEARCH QUESTION ONE: How was the national policy on the control and 
prevention of H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza set and developed across the 
sectors of animal health, public health and trade in Zambia? 
a) Who were the key stakeholders in setting the national agenda and policy 
development in each of three sectors - human health, animal health and trade? 
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b) How was the policy developed? 
c) In each sector, what were the perceptions of risk of H5Nl highly pathogenic 
avian influenza and human pandemic influenza, and how did they influence the 
development of the national policy on avian and human influenza prevention 
and control? 
d) In each sector, other than risk perceptions, what other contextual and 
institutional factors influenced agenda setting and policy formulation? 
ii. KEY RESEARCH QUESTION TWO: What were the strengths and weaknesses of the 
policy response as adopted in Zambia? 
a) What was the evidence-base for the development of the avian and human 
influenza policy in Zambia? 
b) What were the impediments to, and opportunities for, collaboration across three 
sectors for developing a multi-sectoral policy response to the potential (or real) 
risk posed by H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza? 
iii. KEY RESEARCH QUESTION THREE: How feasible is it to conduct an OlE risk 
analysis to inform the development of risk management policies across these three 
sectors in a context of a resource-constrained country like Zambia? 
a) What are the policy considerations relevant to the feasibility of conducting 
an OlE risk analysis in Zambia? 
b) How do these policy considerations compare to the way the OlE risk 
analysis framework is currently conceptualised? 
iv. KEY RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR: What would a policy relevant model for risk 
analysis appropriate for this low income country setting look like? 
a) What is the capacity, as perceived by key stakeholders and documents, in 
each sector to inform risk analysis and multi-sectoral zoonosis risk 
management in Zambia? 
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b) How would the OlE risk analysis framework need to be modified to better 
inform multi-sectoral risk management policy in this context? 
c) What are the policy implications of this approach to risk analysis? 
The next section overviews the methodological approach adopted to answer these research 
questions. 
3.5. Overview of the methodology 
The research was a case study18 of pandemic preparedness and multi-sectoral risk management 
policy development in Zambia. It focused on avian and human influenza prevention and control 
policy development across animal health, public health and trade. This approach was taken to 
develop a detailed contextual analysis of avian and human influenza prevention and control 
policy development across three sectors. The research explored multi-sectoral risk management 
policy development in a resource-constrained context and its implications for the feasibility of 
conducting an OlE type risk analysis in ways appropriate to this context. Social research 
methods informed data collection and analysis. A variety of data sources were used. These 
included in-depth face-to-face interviews, informal discussions, review of policy documents and 
news articles pertinent to the time, and observation. 
3.5.1. Approach to the research questions 
The policy study focused on the policy activities of agenda-setting and policy formulation. The 
study primarily examined key decision-makers' perceptions of policy processes across the 
government institutions of public health, animal health and trade in Zambia. It examined the 
relationships, institutional structures and policy and legal provisos decision-makers considered 
relevant to avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development. An important 
premise of the research was to determine how the policy problem was defmed and addressed by 
decision-makers in the context. This is an approach that has been advocated in implementation 
18 A case study approach that focuses on a single case using a variety of methods of investigation (Yin 
2(00) 
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research (Hjern and Hull 1982), and was found appropriate for meeting the objectives set out for 
this policy study. In this research, perceptions of risk were conceptualised to be important for 
defming policy objectives, defining interventions and determining the nature of stakeholder 
involvement. 
To identify the national and international stakeholders influencing the avian and human 
influenza prevention and control policy process across the human health, animal health and 
trade sectors in Zambia, techniques for conducting a stakeholder analysis were applied, based 
on guidelines provided by Varvasovszky and Brugha (2000). As recommended by these 
authors, the purpose, context, resources and focus of the research were determined beforehand. 
The research focused on policy processes at national level, looking at actors who fall between 
the international (or global or macro-level analysis) and the local (or micro-level analysis). This 
focus is elaborated in the social policy review provided by Hudson and Lowe (2004). The use of 
these techniques provided an entree for identifying the decision-makers most likely to provide 
study-relevant information on how avian and human influenza prevention and control policy 
was developed in Zambia. The approach has been documented in other policy research 
(Varvasovszky and Brugha 2000; Brugha and Varvoasovsky 2000; Roberts et al. 2004; Buse et 
al. 2005; aDI 2006). To enable the initial identification of relevant stakeholders, using snowball 
sampling, I subdivided avian and human influenza prevention and control policy into what I 
understood to be the possible components that were relevant to this research (Varvasovszky and 
Brugha 2(00). These components were as follows: 
• poultry production and marketing 
• food safety 
• avian influenza surveillance and control 
• human influenza surveillance and control 
• pandemic influenza prevention and preparedness 
• trade agreements affecting poUltry and poultry product trade 
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By delineating the policy arena into these components, a starting point was provided to 
consider, a priori, how stakeholders were affected by, or affected, the policy issue in question 
(Varvasovszky and Brugha 2(00). Based on this subdivision, I made a list of relevant 
organisations with an interest in these policy components. The list included the following: 
• The Poultry Association of Zambia 
• The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
• The Ministry of Health 
• The Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry 
• Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
• Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
• The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
• The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAa) 
• The World Organisation for Animal Health (OlE) 
In-depth interviews with decision-makers determined the comprehensiveness of this list, as well 
as the actual relevance of each of these stakeholders to policy development as perceived by 
decision-makers. This stakeholder analysis thus helped to explore each agency and policy 
sector's relevance to the avian and human influenza prevention and control issue and assess 
their interrelations and political resources. In order to properly explain policy actor 
interrelations and political resources, the research drew on the work by Rhodes on policy 
networks (Rhodes 1997; Smith 1997; Hudson and Lowe 2004; Tantivess and Walt 2(08). The 
interview process also allowed for the identification of other policy relevant stakeholders. The 
results of the case study are presented across the three policy analysis empirical chapters 
(Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). 
Research question one 
The research first examined agenda setting (Chapter 5). In addition to exploring how the avian 
and human influenza prevention and control policy agenda was set, the multi-sectoral nature of 
78 
this issue being examined required that I ask how decision-makers across animal health, public 
health and trade sectors defined the highly pathogenic avian and human influenza problem. It 
has been argued by Birkland (2001) and Kingdon (2003) that how a problem is defmed 
determines whose interests it affects, how resources are allocated and how power will be used in 
the policy process. It was from these definitions (i.e. a wide or narrow definition as defined by 
Porter and Hicks [1995]) that the understanding of the avian and human influenza prevention 
and control problem was apportioned across the three sectors to identify the existing tensions in 
decision-making. 
To determine the perceptions of risk, their drivers, influences and resultant response in 
formulating Zambia's policy on control and prevention of avian and human influenza required 
an identification of what I broadly conceptualized as policy influences. These included 'problem 
framings' or problem defmitions, as conceptualised in the policy analysis literature (Yanow 
2000; Birkland 2(01); international and national policy proponents (or policy entrepreneurs as 
defmed by Kingdon 2(03); resource allocations; and forms of evidence (001 2006). It was from 
the confluence of these various policy influences that a trajectory tracing the development of 
perceptions of avian and human influenza risk through the policy process across the animal 
health, public health and trade policy sectors was constructed. 
The research also examined policy formulation (Chapter 6). How avian and human influenza 
risk was perceived across these sectors was important to understand how decision-makers 
defmed policy objectives, interventions and the determined who would be involved in the policy 
process. Risk was conceptualised to be the likelihood of an undesired outcome and uncertainty 
over the time and magnitude of its occurrence (Covello and Merkhofer 1993). The 
conceptualisation of this understanding of risk was related to the different ways each sector 
understood and responded to the problem. How risk was perceived was examined according to 
sector. Risk perception was envisioned to be the significance, including the initial level of 
priority, assigned to avian and pandemic human influenza by stakeholders (Chapter 7). 
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Research question two 
The policy analysis (Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) examined the different understandings 
of the avian and human influenza prevention and control policy problem across animal health, 
public health and trade. It explored how various actors came to be involved in, or excluded 
from. policy development; based on how the avian influenza and pandemic influenza issue was 
framed. It also examined the evidence used to construct Zambia's policy response. The policy 
analysis also examined the tensions, challenges and strengths of the policy approach as adopted 
in Zambia (Chapter 7). 
Research question three 
Based on the policy analysis findings, the research examined the feasibility of conducting a risk 
analysis based on the OlE risk analysis framework in a manner appropriate for informing multi-
sectoral risk management policy in Zambia (Chapter 8). This analysis took into consideration 
the various elements that were important for avian and human influenza prevention and control 
policy development in Zambia. The research examined the OlE risk analysis framework through 
a policy analysis lens, i.e. the analysis was based on the results of the policy study. Drawing on 
the policy study, and the co-evolutionary approach proposed by Millstone (2007), I critiqued 
and closely examined the various stages of the OlE risk analysis framework; hazard 
identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk communication and made 
recommendations for its improvement. It was thus an analysis of the policy process and 
incorporating its context-specific elements in the risk analysis process to better manage avian 
and human influenza risk across sectors in resource-constrained countries. 
Research question four 
Finally, based on the policy study, the study developed and proposed a model of the OlE 
framework and reviewed its policy implications for this context. In aggregate, the research 
explored the interactions between local context, risk assessment and risk management policy. 
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3.6.1dentijiclltion of study participants 
The stakeholder analysis provided a means of identifying initial participants (Roberts et al. 
2004). Decision-makers interviewed in this study were identified using purposive sampling 
(Mays and Pope 1995). Specifically, informants were selected to recruit only those in a position 
to provide accounts that will be the basis for exploration of policy processes. The selection 
criterion for informants was direct involvement in either avian and human influenza prevention 
and control policy development or livestock19 trade policy implementation across the 
government institutions of trade, public health and animal health at national level. Most of the 
interview data was collected over a period of six months, from June to December, 2009. Using 
the snowball sampling technique, several other potential informants outside government were 
identified. Through this approach, several formal, in-depth face-to-face and informal interviews 
were conducted with 22 decision-makers in the institutions of public health, animal health and 
trade in Zambia with an additional 15 informants interviewed to corroborate statements and 
pursue emergent issues. 'Formal interviews' here means consented and recorded interviews in 
which respondents agreed to be cited and responses used in the analysis. 'Informal interviews' 
here means interviews where respondents did not agree to be quoted or recorded and only notes 
were taken. The information derived from informal interviews still helped frame the analysis by 
providing additional information. 
The dates of these interviews are included in Appendix ll. A number of these interviewees were, 
in Patton's (2002) terms, 'key informants' who were interviewed several times over the course 
of the study. These key informants are marked with an asterix in the list of interviews in 
Appendix ll. Several discussions were carried out with these key informants over the data 
collection period. Several more discussions were held with some key informants during data 
analysis. As far as I could gather, no decision-makers from the Trade Ministry were directly 
involved in avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development. Therefore, a 
19 Livestock trade policy implementation was decided upon in order to focus on the component of trade 
policy that is most directly related to zoonotic risk. The previous chapter showed that the trade and health 
relationship has much wider implications than just infectious disease governance. 
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separate purposive sample was taken for the trade sector to discuss livestock trade policy 
implementation in relation to avian and human influenza prevention and control policy 
development and disease control in general. It must be mentioned at this point that many of the 
animal health respondents also played a role in trade policy implementation with regard to 
livestock trade. This is why many of the respondents came from the animal health sector. 
3.7. Data coUectio" and fieldwork 
All data collection was conducted by me. Informants were contacted directly or were recruited 
after discussions with the Permanent Secretaries in the respective government ministries. In the 
case of the Ministry of Health, formal consent had to be obtained from the Permanent Secretary 
before interviews could be conducted (see Appendix VI). In the case of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce, an informal discussion was carried out with the Permanent 
Secretary who then directed me to the personnel in the Ministry working on avian and human 
influenza prevention and control policy development. In the case of the Ministry of Trade, 
potential informants were recommended to me by an acquaintance. Fieldwork involved 
continuous interaction with key decision-makers, and sometimes I spent a few days visiting 
potential respondents and chatting informally before scheduling formal interviews. Some 
interviews were conducted after making telephone appointments or personal visits to the 
Ministry of Trade and Commerce, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, and the Ministry 
of Health. As much as possible, interviews were conducted at the interviewee's workplace, or 
after working hours, depending on what was comfortable and feasible for the interviewee. 
Where face-to-face interviews were not possible, a telephone interview was arranged as an 
alternative. Where a telephone interview was carried out, verbal consent was sought. Two 
interviews were conducted over the telephone. On several occasions, I was unable to get in 
touch with certain respondents. Alternative respondents were identified and interviewed in their 
place. The aims of the study were explained to interviewees, who were then given an 
information sheet to review and asked to sign a consent form prior to commencing the 
interview. Copies of information sheets and consent forms are included in Appendices IV and 
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V. Depending on the consent provided, interviews were either electronically recorded or I took 
comprehensive notes. 
Interviews were based on a pre-designed topic guide developed from the research questions 
(table 3.1). These covered three overlapping a priori issues, which roughly correspond to, first, 
avian and human influenza prevention and control policy agenda setting, second, policy 
formulation, and third, multi-sectoral engagement in policy development. The first category was 
each sector's role in, and position on (including prioritization), avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy development which covered jurisdiction based actions/positions 
on livestock disease control as a general theme. The second category was the identification of 
processes that demonstrated an effort towards building multi-sectoral engagement in avian and 
human influenza prevention and control policy and livestock trade policy, including leadership 
and coordination structures, evidence of active stakeholder engagement and forums for informal 
and formal communication between the animal health, public health and trade sectors. These 
categories formed the topic guide, which was revised as data collection progressed. 
Position and partidpation in avian and human inOuenza prevention and control policy development (agenda 
setting and policy formulation) 
• Avian and human influenza prevention and control policy proponents/influential actors 
• Defmition of the avian and human influenza problem 
• Is avian and human influenza prevention and control a concern in this sector 
• How does/is each sector affect/affected by avian and human influenza prevention and control policy 
• Is there support for avian and human influenza prevention and control policy 
• Perception of AI risk 
• Level of priority accorded to avian and human influenza prevention and control and level of priority accorded to 
agricultural trade 
• Role of the sector in animal and human disease control 
Leadership, coordination and adive stakeholder engagement Interactions 
• Oversight and responsibility allocation 
• Formal and informal discussions around avian and human influenza prevention and control 
• Consensus building. arbitration and linking actors/fora 
• Resources at hand and resource dependency 
• Activities carried out so far on avian and human influenza prevention and control 
• Engagement of stakeholders (poultry industry. national and supranational actors) 
Table 3.1 Topic guide used for interviews 
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Respondents were encouraged to talk at length about the origins of avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy development in Zambia, avian and human influenza problem 
defmitions, perceptions of avian influenza risk and perceptions on the level of priority accorded 
to the avian and human influenza problem. They were asked to identify stakeholders, policy 
proponents, sources of funding and collaborations among the three institutions and more widely, 
and the activities that had been undertaken in relation to avian and human influenza prevention 
and control. As the data collection was undertaken towards the beginning of the HINI 
pandemic, key informants were also asked about how this pandemic had affected the structures 
set up for avian influenza related planning. Respondents were not asked about policy coherence 
directly; although at the time of data collection, it was explained to them policy coherence was 
being explored. Additional data sources included field notes (mostly on informal discussions, 
and my perceptions on formal interviews and review of policy documents), and attendance of 
planning meetings20, policy documents (Appendix m), correspondence, legal provisos and 
media reports. 
3.8. Organisation of the data 
The 'framework' approach (Ritchie and Spencer 1994) was used for data organisation. From the 
textual data derived from interviews and review of policy documents and field notes, I 
systematically identified the a priori and emergent themes using both deductive and inductive 
approaches of qualitative data analysis drawing on techniques from policy research and 
qualitative data analysis methods (Majchrzak 1984; Green 2005; Ritchie and Spencer 1994; 
Gaskell and Bauer 2006). Data was mainly textual, in the form of interview transcripts, field 
notes and policy documents. Taped interviews were first transcribed verbatim to get a feel for 
respondent understanding and how the accounts were framed among stakeholders and within 
policy sectors (Yanow 2000; Ziebland and McPherson 2006). Transcription was done using 
Microsoft Word®. Review of policy documents and field notes detailing my inferences, ideas of 
20 Although I was permitted to sit in on planning meetings, due to issues of confidentiality surrounding 
government documents, no planning meeting minutes could be availed to me for purposes of analysis. 
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emerging themes and possible indexes (numeric identifiers of key themes in the data), were 
used to corroborate each interview transcript. 
The data was sorted using inductive and deductive approaches as outlined in the 'framework' 
approach (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). This approach was used because of its appropriateness 
for applied policy research and its usefulness for organizing textual data fairly quickly to allow 
for analysis. 'Framework' consists of five interconnected stages that allow for the systematic 
sorting of data according to key issues and themes. The stages followed were familiarisation, 
identifying a thematic framework, indexing, charting and mapping and interpretation. In using 
this approach, I listened to taped interviews repeatedly and read and re-read interview 
transcripts and field notes to gain familiarity of the data, corresponding to the familiarisation 
stage of the 'framework' (Ritchie and Spencer 1994; Ziebland and McPherson 2006). 
The first themes I developed were rooted in each sector's role in, and position on, avian and 
human influenza prevention and control development and processes that demonstrate 
leadership, coordination and active stakeholder engagement. During the familiarisation process 
of data analysis, I identified additional themes and sub-themes (table 3.2). From these themes, 
an initial list of numeric indexes was created. Subsequent indexes were based on emergent 
themes. Using Microsoft Word®, I created a 'Summary Matrix' of all my interview data. This 
matrix was constructed to capture the main themes in avian and human influenza agenda setting 
and policy formulation in Zambia. The data was categorised according to agenda setting and 
policy formulation. This was my first overview of the breadth of responses provided to me by 
respondents during interviews. 
After the development of the summary matrix, transcripts and policy documents were revisited 
and additional indexes generated and applied to the data. In the charting phase of 'framework' , I 
gathered all the indexed data in tabular form, and presented it as summaries in a series of 
Microsoft Word® ftles. This was to help compare more closely respondent responses within and 
between sectors under each index. Extracts from interviews were used to support the choice of 
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indexes. These matrix documents were then amalgamated into one large matrix. The result was 
the development of a 'Master Framework Matrix.' An example of the initial themes, subthemes 
and numeric indexes developed from this 'Master Framework Matrix' and applied to textual 
data is presented in table 3.2 below. Within this 'Master Framework Matrix' I cut and pasted 
responses used under each index heading (themes and subthemes) in the separate matrix files, 
across all respondents. Indexes were refined as data analysis progressed. The respondents were 
listed according to sector. The 'Master Framework Matrix' provided an overview of the range 
of responses provided under each theme and subtheme, and allowed for comparison of 
responses across respondents and across sectors (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). 
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Descriptive themes and sub-themes sought in the textual data (for within and between sector comparison) 
Nature of international influences: financial, guidance (agenda setting/policy formulation), material, oversight 
I. Definitions of the avian and human influenza problem and definitions of risk: distant vs. eminent threat to; animal health, human health, economy, world. 
2. Changes in avian and human influenza prioritization over time: priority competition, interest divergence, achievement of preparedness milestones(?) 
3. Perceptions of stakeholders relevance and involvement in the planning process: own, others 
4. Forms of collaboration: surveillance, resources (technical, institutional and informational), other activities 
5. Barriers to collaboration: coordinative, jurisdictional, incentives, priorities, institutional norms and protocols 
6. How trade is affected/affects disease control 
6.1. Affected/not affected, considered/not considered 
6.2. Definitions of trade in disease control: Local, international imports vs exports (cross border and otherwise) 
6.3. Perceptions of risk in informing policy development: in trade/to trade/from trade, in animal health/to animal health and in public/to public health 
'Master framework matrix' loosely based on tbese possible tbemes, and researcb questions (bold faced) using mostly descriptive beadings and cut and pasted responses from 
respondents that fit under each of the foUowing: 
1. Perceptions of risk 
1.1. Cross border trade 
1.1.1. Legal cross border trade 
1.1.2. Illegal cross border trade 
1.2. Production systems 
1.2.1. Commercial sector 
1.2.2. Emergentlbackyard sector 
1.2.3. Backyard sector 
1.3. Internal trade 
1.4. Migratory birds 
1.5. Risk to human health 
1.6. Risk to the economy 
2. Problem definition 
2.1. Animal health problem 
2.2. Human health problem 
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2.3. Zoonosis 
2.4. Imminent disease threat 
2.5. Distant disease 
2.6. Pandemic threat 
2.7. Trade threat 
3. Perceptions of donor support 
3.1. Funding 
3.2. National response plan assessment 
3.3. Capacity building 
3.4. National response plan development 
3.5. Stakeholder inclusion 
4. Perceptions of stakeholder involvement 
4.1. Interest 
4.2. Roles 
4.3. Participation 
4.4. Involvement 
s. Forms of ooUaborationlresource dependencies 
5.1. Forums for collaboration Existing/suggested 
5.2. Perceptions of barriers to effective collaboration 
6. Perceptions of trade and avian and human influenza prevention and control poIicy-deveiopment 
7. Perceptions or priority 
8. Policy adivitles in avian and human influenza prevention and control 
Table 3.2. List of key themes and sub-themes explored in the data. 
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3.9. Data analysis 
Data analysis began during data collection. The process of data analysis involved examining the 
data in the context of the research questions. This involved moving away from the 'framework' 
approach in order to be more inductive in the analytical process. Through an iterative 
comparison of the data and the research questions, the data analysis process also helped to refme 
the research aims and objectives. The approach to the research questions has been outlined 
elsewhere in this chapter. I drew on the constant comparison techniques of grounded theory 
(Green and Thorogood 2009; Gaskell and Bauer 2006) to identify and develop more inductive 
indexes to apply to the textual data. 
The various policy actors' perspectives on avian and human influenza prevention and control 
policy development were the basis of analysis. Data was 'read' from an interpretivist point of 
view (Yanow 2000; Hatch and Cunliffe 2006). Therefore, rather than just consider contrasting 
views of the policy problem as a form of conflict (Majchrzak 1984) they were also interpreted 
as different viewpoints of the same problem (Yanow 2(00) to better explain the inherent 
conflicts. tensions and challenges in policy processes. This approach to analysing the data was 
taken to determine both the explicit and implicit motivations for decision-maker actions, and not 
just the official position (Fischer 2003). The official positions were still relevant and were 
inferred from a review of policy documents. 
The policy analysis fmdings were the basis for the analysis of the feasibility of conducting a risk 
analysis according to the OlE risk analysis framework. The policy study provided the data for 
this analysis, forming a policy analysis 'lens' through which I examined and critiqued the OlE 
risk analysis framework. I drew on the relevant policy themes identified in the policy analysis to 
determine the feasibility and usefulness of conducting an OlE type risk analysis appropriate for 
this context. Each of the stages of the OlE risk analysis framework, as defmed by the OlE, was 
examined. These stages were; hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication. The analysis was grounded in the context-specific elements of managing avian 
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and human influenza risk across sectors identified by the policy study. Drawing on the 
sociology of risk literature and Millstone's (2007) co-evolutionary risk model, the study 
developed and proposed a model of the framework and discussed its policy implications for this 
context. 
3.10. Data presentation 
Preceding the presentation of the results of the policy analysis, Chapter 4 is a contextual 
overview of the Zambian economy as it relates to health, trade and agriculture. It describes the 
Zambian politico-economic context over the period 1964-2004. This chapter provides 
overviews of the animal health, public health and trade sectors. Data presentation was done in 
the form of a chronological description of avian and human influenza prevention and control 
policy development in Zambia. This chronology of avian and human influenza prevention and 
control policy development in Zambia covered the period 2005-2009. Chapter 5 examines avian 
and human influenza prevention and control policy agenda setting over the period 2005-2006. 
Chapter 6 examines policy formulation over the period 2006-2007. Chapter 7 examines the 
period 2007-2009 and also highlights some of the challenges and strengths of the policy process 
as adopted in Zambia. Chapter 8 presents the analysis of the feasibility of conducting an OIE 
risk analysis in a way that is appropriate for informing multi-sectoral risk management in this 
context. 
3.11. Challenges in policy research 
One important challenge in this research was that interviews were held with policy elites, i.e. 
my respondents were holders of strategic positions in the development of avian and human 
influenza prevention and control policy. Other than the difficulty of accessing these actors, was 
the likelihood of only obtaining public accounts of the phenomena under investigation. This was 
overcome by talking to respondents on several occasions throughout the data collection period, 
thus developing a rapport. The elite status of the respondents meant that it was difficult to 
conduct formal interviews with some of them. Informal discussions had to be conducted 
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wherever possible. Another limitation of this study was its use of retrospective accounts of the 
policy process, which is likely to result in recall bias. Confidence in findings was increased by 
the use of multiple methods of data collection and analysis. Statements were verified when there 
was agreement between at least two respondents, and further corroboration was provided by 
reviewing policy documents, news articles21 and in some cases observation. A third limitation 
was that this was a very dynamic area to study, involving the analysis of a policy process that 
was still ongoing and a risk scenario that was changing because of, among other things, 
interventions elsewhere on the continent. By focusing on avian and human influenza prevention 
and control policy development across three sectors, each possessing other agenda priorities to 
deal with, and making comparisons with international policy documents and a very specific 
local risk, all of which may change with time, the study was only able to provide a snapshot of 
factors, processes and relationships within and across sectors that inform multi-sectoral risk 
management. This may limit the generalizability of results. The observations made, however, 
highlight some of the key elements required to make recommendations to decision-makers on 
how multi-sectoral zoonoses risk management in Zambia may be improved, which may 
ultimately improve feasibility. 
To strengthen the validity of fmdings, interview responses were triangulated with the document 
analysis (Mays and Pope 1995; Bose et al. 2005; Pope, Ziebland and Mays 1999). I kept 
detailed field notes for the data collection and analysis process to provide an account of my own 
perspectives as the research developed. This provided a basis for discussing reflexivity in the 
presentation of results (Mays and Pope 1999; Finlay and Gough 2(03). Part of the discussion on 
reflexivity has been covered at various stages in this chapter. The validity of conclusions were 
tested in consultation with my supervisor and some key informants, which provided me with 
feedback on unjustified assumptions and other areas for analysis (Mays and Pope 1995; 
Varvasovszky and Brugha 2(00). Initial results were also discussed with respondents to 
21 Appropriate articles were identified by key word searches using a search engine. and focused on avian 
influenza news articles pertaining to the period under examination. Primarily, articles from Zambian 
tabloids were used to support analysis. 
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improve the validity of findings and reduce error (Mays and Pope 1995; Mays and Pope 1999). 
The use of a 'framework' approach allowed for a clear audit trail of the process of analysis to 
allow for replication (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). 
The divergent subjective perspectives that would inform a risk assessment suggest that it is 
impossible to have a si~gle authoritative and objective evaluation of risk (Bonner 1986; 
Bezembinder 1989; cited by Stirling and Mayer 2(00). My risk model was therefore not 
intended to provide a determination of the risk of avian influenza introduction or emergence in 
Zambia, but highlight the possible policy considerations relevant to conducting a national level 
focused OlE type risk analysis appropriate for this context. This was based on a description of 
Zambia's poultry trading structure, and avian and human influenza prevention and control and 
trade policy interactions. The feasibility study highlighted possible areas where each sector's 
policy actions on avian and human influenza could affect particular aspects the trade-related risk 
management, thereby illuminating possible policy and data gaps. 
3.12. Ethical considerations 
Because this was a study of public policy, it had the potential to be politically sensitive in 
certain respects. I was interviewing policy stakeholders who may be identified by the offices 
they hold or may have had concerns for their jobs or possible sensitivity around access and 
provision of privileged information. All prospective informants were therefore asked for 
consent to be quoted, interviewed, and taped and have their data used in the study results. All 
formal participants were apprised of the progress and results of the study, making certain to 
respect anonymity, if so required. In addition, I was the only person with access to interview 
transcripts. Ethical clearance from the Research Ethics committee was sought and obtained from 
the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Research Ethics Committee in 
Zambia. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Agriculture, Health and Trade context of Zambia 
4. Introduction 
This chapter provides a contextual overview of Zambia as it relates to health, trade and 
agriculture. This description is necessary to illuminate the background in which the sectors of 
animal health, public health and trade interact in avian and human influenza prevention and 
control policy development, general disease risk management and trade policy implementation. 
The chapter begins by providing a general description of the country. It then discusses the 
Zambian political context over the period 1964-2004, explaining how the economic downturn 
the country experienced in the 80s affected its economy, and the role that agriculture is meant to 
play in meeting the country's development objectives. 
The chapter also describes the Zambian agricultural sector, particularly the livestock subsector 
and the poultry production system in existence. It then describes health in terms of Zambia's 
development agenda, which is followed by a description of the country's position on 
multilateral trade. The chapter concludes by bringing together the various elements of the 
Zambia's political economy that are relevant to this research, explaining the implications this 
contextual description has for this study. This chapter is based on reviews of national 
documents, studies and reports and provides a contextual outline of the animal health, public 
health and trade sectors in Zambia. 
4.1.A general overview o/Zambia 
The Republic of Zambia is located in Southern Africa and spans a total area of 752,614 sq km. 
It is among the most modernised countries in the southern African region. It is landlocked, with 
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eight neighbouring states marking its territorial boundaries. These states are Tanzania, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), providing a total boundary length of 5,664 km (see figure 4.1). Taylor (2006), in 
his history of the culture and customs of Zambia, rightly states that there is no geographic or 
ethnographic rationale for Zambia's border. These borders are a result of the European 
demarcation of Africa at the Berlin Conference (the so called 'scramble for Africa') in 1884-
1885 (Taylor 2(06). These artificial boundaries have implications for transboundary disease risk 
management in the country. 
ZAMBIA 
Kilometres 
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TOItays Borders 
Figure 4-1. Map of Zambia showing territorial boundaries and principle roads. 
Source: www.unimaps.com 
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According to the country's Central Statistics Office's Atlas on Social Economic Variables in 
Zambia, the last population census was carried out in 2000, with the next census scheduled for 
2010 (CSO 2(03). Recent estimates of the population size can be found elsewhere. The 
Ministry of Health's multi-sectoral AIDS Response Monitoring and Evaluation Biennial Report 
(2006-2007) for instance, states that in 2007 the country's population was estimated at 12.2 
million, based on a 2.9% annual growth since 2000 (MoH 2(07). Recent UNDP statistics on 
Zambia estimate the average life expectancy at 44.5 years (UNDP 2009). Compared to its 
landmass, the human population in Zambia is not that large. Zambia is among the least populous 
nations in Africa and has a very low population density (Taylor 2006). The distribution of 
people roughly follows an agriculture/mining corridor along which much of the country's rail, 
telecommunication and road network have been built (Taylor 2006). As a result, the nation's 
urban areas lie along major transportation routes in the country, accommodating most of 
Zambia's population, while its rural areas are sparsely populated. Administratively, the country 
is divided into nine provinces and a total of 72 districts (see figure 4.2 for pictorial 
representation of the provinces). Lusaka and the Copperbelt are the most populous provinces 
and lie in the catchment of the Kafue river basin, a large area of central Zambia that extends 
from close to its border with the DRC to the west of Lusaka, the nation's capital. According to 
UNAIDS (2010), only a third of Zambia's population lives in rural areas. This distribution of 
the population also has implications for disease risk management in the country. Specifically, it 
highlights both the populations potentially at highest risk in case of a disease incursion and its 
likely routes of spread. 
95 
PROVINCES OF ZAMBIA 
, 
4OO~!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'!!!!!Iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii~O!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!400§iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii800 KIlometers 
Figure 4-2. Map of Zambia showing the demarcation of provincial boundaries. 
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Source: National Livestock Epidemiology and information Centre - Ministry of Agriculture and 
Co-operatives 
4.2. Overview of the Zambian political economy 1964-2004 
The following section provides an overview of the Zambian political economy. This 
information is important in understanding why economic development is so important for the 
country and what implications this has for disease risk management policy and pandemic 
preparedness. Of note, based on Zambia's history, is how the current drive to diversify the 
economy has turned to focus on agriculture as a primary vehicle for economic growth through 
trade. Since independence from British colonial rule in 1964, the Zambian economy has 
primarily been copper-dependent. After independence, in addition to a nationalisation process, 
the Zambian government instituted a programme of long term national development planning, 
based largely on a socialist model (Crehan 1997). This programme began with the Transitional 
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Development Plan covering the period 1964-66, which was succeeded by the First National 
Development Plan for the period 1966-71. These two plans were successfully implemented and 
before 1973, Zambia was a ~ddle income country. In 1973, multi-party politics were banned 
and Zambia became a one party state. Unfortunately, a number of external shocks coupled with 
the political choices of the ruling government are said to have led to economic decline (Bigsten 
and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000). During the period of the . Second National Development Plan 
(1972-76), there was an increase in oil prices in 1974 (Walters 2010) and a slump in the demand 
of copper in 1975. This was a huge economic blow as copper accounted for nearly 95% of 
Zambia's GDP (Freund 1986; Crehan 1997). This led to economic deterioration. Furthermore, 
the country hosted various high profile liberation movements from South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Angola and Mozambique (Taylor 2006). As a result, its trading routes were interrupted, and 
being a landlocked state, this was a significant drawback for economic development. The 
subsequent Third National Development Plan (1978-1983) was abandoned to manage the 
economic crisis that had ensued after 1975. By the 1980s, Zambia had become one of the most 
indebted countries in the world. According to Zambia's Central Statistics Office, between 1980 
and 1990, Zambia's economic growth was among the poorest in the Southern African region, 
ranking second to Mozambique (CSO 2003). To mediate the economic crisis, the Government 
turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for support in the mid-80s (B igsten and 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000). The IMF insisted that the Government introduce economic 
stabilization programmes, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and reduce its 
dependency on copper (Simatele 2006). After instituting IMF reforms, there was internal 
opposition to their implementation, particularly from the mining sector, and further economic 
hardship for the Zambian people ensued (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000). The incumbent 
president decided to abandon IMF reforms and launched the Fourth National Development Plan 
in 1989 but this was deserted in 1991 after a change of government that put an end to one party 
rule (GRZ 2006a). 
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The new regime took office on a platform of change and embarked on economic reforms based 
on an open market system (CSO 2003). In the 1990s, among the sale of many parastatal 
organisations was the sale of the copper mines, which had registered a declining output and 
profitability since 1973. The OECD (2006) report on Zambia states that the sale of government-
owned copper mines possibly provided room for the copper industry to return to profitability. 
Copper output in Zambia has increased steadily since 2004; a phenomenon attributed to both 
higher copper prices and increased foreign investment (OECD 2006). 
In 1994, the Zambian government introduced SAP reforms aimed at improving public 
administration and expenditure management to meet aid conditions set by the IMF and the 
World Bank. These reforms qualified Zambia to participate in the IMF and World Bank Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (RIPC) Initiative launched in 1996, a debt reduction initiative whose 
objective was to ensure that poor countries only had debts they could manage (GRZ 2006a). 
The reforms introduced by the Zambian government in 1994 contributed to the achievement of 
the HIPC Initiative completion point in April 2005, leading to the cancellation of a $3.6 billion 
debt (OECD 2006). This freed resources that would have otherwise gone to debt servicing, and 
have since been redirected towards national development and poverty alleviation initiatives. 
Although poverty continues to be significant problem, after this debt cancellation, the country's 
economy began to register positive growth, with single-digit inflation, a stable currency, 
decreasing interest rates, and increasing levels of trade (OECD 2006). An Economy Watch 
report on Zambia states that in 2004, the country's GDP was $ 5,371 million, GDP per capita 
was $ 474 and the annual GDP growth rate in the period 1995-2004 was 3%. According to this 
country report, in 2004, the Zambian economy registered significant economic growth, 
translating into an annual real GDP growth of 5% (Economy Watch 2004). 
The Zambian Living Conditions and Monitory Survey for 2004, compiled by the country's 
Central Statistics Office, states that 68% of Zambians are classified as poor and living below the 
poverty line (CSO 2004; GRZ 2006a). According to the United Nations, unemployment and 
underemployment continue to be serious problems even though Zambia is also one of Sub-
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Saharan Africa's most highly urbanized countries. The country's UNDP Human Development 
Index22 rank in 2007 was 164 out of 184 states (UN 2009). The country's GOP structure in 2008 
was as follows: Agriculture 16%, industry 26.6%, and services 57.4%. On the other hand, the 
labour force distribution in 2004 was as follows: agriculture: 85%, industry: 6% and services: 
9% (GRZ 2006a). This shows that, while it contributes the least to GOP, the agricultural sector 
is the largest employer in the country. 
4.3. DonOT dependency in ZIlmbia 
Despite the positive economic indicators highlighted in the preceding section, the African 
Economic Outlook report for 2006, compiled by OECD (2006), states that Zambia is highly 
donor-dependent, with 30% of the Government's budget supported by external aid. A meeting 
report on a UNDP-funded tripartite consultation on harmonization, alignment and aid 
management held in February 2006 in Kigali, Rwanda, states that Zambia's principle instrument 
for determining government priorities is its national development plan. However, it was found 
that donors were not as willing to align assistance to its last transitional national development 
plan (2002-2005) than to its poverty reduction strategy paper, because the national development 
plan was less donor-driven (Government of Rwanda 2006). This is suggestive of an 
environment where aid donors support development objects that are aligned to their interests, 
rather than national priorities. This is, perhaps, a direct consequence of the economic situation 
created by the downturn the country experienced in the 70s and 80s. Speaking generally about 
developing country contexts and aid effectiveness, Thompson (2004) states that where countries 
have been compelled to rely on aid to sustain their ailing economies, around 50-80 cents of 
every dollar they earn has gone to debt repayment. While the debt burden now appears to have 
been eased with the attainment of the HIPC completion point, a national budget that is 30% 
reliant on aid implies that there are strict guidelines on the use and purpose of these external 
funds. It follows, therefore, that Zambia's economic downturn resulted in a cycle of aid 
dependency, which the country has attempted to break with minimal success. The implication 
22 Zambia currently ranks 150 (UNDP 2010). 
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this has for avian and pandemic influenza preparedness is that this aid context perhaps makes it 
difficult to pursue national interests in the face of global concerns. 
4.4. GlobaliZlltion and Zambia: the potential role of agriculture in economic development 
Globalisation and agricultural trade are tied very closely to economic development for many 
low-income countries. Many authors argue that agriculture is a key focus because this is an area 
where least developing countries are viewed to hold a comparative advantage (see Upton 2002; 
Oyejide 2004). One study examining the role of commercial agriculture in poverty alleviation in 
Zambia concluded that agriculture was the only area of the Zambian economy with the 
necessary scope to make up for the decline in mining output (pinder and Wood 2(03). The 
Zambian Government is also in agreement, and holds the agriculture sector as having the 
greatest potential for enhancing economic growth and reducing poverty (GRZ 2004; GRZ 
2006a). This assertion is not without precedent. Agriculture's potential to contribute to 
economic development was demonstrated by Denmark and other countries, where agriculture on 
its own was an important route to economic development and industrialisation (Lissner 1973). 
The Zambian Central Statistics Office's social economic atlas however, states that there was a 
lot of fluctuation in the performance of Zambia's agricultural sector prior to 2000, owing to 
poor investment and a failure to position the sector in a way that takes full advantage of its 
comparative advantage (CSO 2(03). After 2001, it has been the Zambian government's 
objective to harness the potential of the agricultural sector's contribution to economic growth 
under a broader theme of export led development (GRZ 2006a). 
A report on Zambia and the multilateral trading system argues that the advent of multilateral 
trade agreements has presented opportunities for continued growth of trade within Africa and 
between Africa and other developing countries (Ndulo 2(05). Ndulo further states that 
multilateral trade agreements are providing expanding markets and increasing the scope for 
further expansion, with agriculture positioned to play a key role in bringing Africa in general, 
and Zambia in particular, to the world trade table. There is thus evidence that both Zambia's 
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immediate neighbours and those further afield are the primary targets for the country's exports. 
For Zambia, the objective of government is to realise this potential by actively participating in 
regional and multilateral trade agreements such as the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) accord and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) protocol (GRZ 2006a). However, in the global context, expansion of agricultural trade 
in particular has been proffered as the system that adds to health risks (Kimball 2006), among 
them zoonoses that lay at the interface of human and animal health. These issues deserve 
consideration, because they potentially affect agriculture, health and trade. Kimball, Arima and 
Hodges (2005) for example, review how Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and its 
human counterpart, variant Creutzfeld Jacob Disease was spread to many countries in the 
Northern Hemisphere as a result of increased productivity of the beef and animal feed industry 
and promotion of global beef trade. The decision to focus on export led growth in Zambia 
focused on agriculture could lead to increased trade-related risks as has been witnessed in other 
areas. Therefore, the possible risks posed by Zambia's agricultural production policy requires 
further scrutiny, particularly as it relates to risk management and pandemic preparedness. 
4.5. The Zambitln agricultural sector 
The livelihood of the majority of Zambians depends on agriculture and related activities, as 
exemplified by the fact that over 85% of Zambia's population is dependent on agriculture. This 
section describes the efforts that have been made by the Zambian Government to develop the 
agricultural sector. Sinyangwe and Clinch's (2003) examination of the sustainability of 
Zambia's livestock sub-sector describe the country's general agricultural production system as 
dualistic, with 85% depending on traditional communal lands and 15% attributed to the 
commercial sector. These two systems have implications for risk management in Zambia, as 
each presents its own unique challenges. In Zambia it is the traditional production sector that 
carries the highest animal infectious disease burden, and also presents a risk of direct exposure 
of humans to zoonoses and potential zoonoses, particularly those in rural areas. The commercial 
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production sector is less prone to animal disease outbreaks, but is possibly prone to trade-related 
risks similar to those presented by Kimball (2006). 
Prior to the 1990s, Zambia's economic policies were considered to constrain and restrict 
agriculture development. The policies were characterised by government control and 
intervention that curtailed private sector participation. According to the Government's National 
Agricultural Policy (GRZ 2004), the sector was heavily subsidised, criticised for having too 
many official price controls, public sector dominance in agribusiness, centralised delivery of 
support services, and frequent policy and institutional changes. The Government states that a 
lack of inputs, high energy and transport costs, and disease and pest attacks in both crops and 
livestock negatively affected the productivity of the sector, especially among female headed 
households (GRZ 2006a). 
With changes in political landscape in the 19908 and the encouragement of major multilateral 
and bilateral donors, the agricultural sector was also subjected to the policies of the free market 
economy (Sinyangwe and Clinch 2(03). After 1991, several attempts were made at introducing 
reform to the agricultural sector. Among them was a World Bank funded project embarked upon 
by the Zambian government in 1996, called the Agricultural Sector Investment Programme 
(ASIP) (Coche 1998). Its purpose was to co-ordinate agriculture investment and improve both 
institutional and policy frameworks for agricultural reform. The programme was meant to 
contribute to the overall policy of market liberalisation and improve the delivery of agricultural 
services to the farmers. However, two and a half years later, stakeholders and the donor 
community had lost confidence in ASIP due to poor implementation23 (Xinhua News Agency 
1998). The project fmally ended in 2001. 
After 2002, new sector-wide policies were developed and adopted under a broad agenda of 
economic development (GRZ 2006a). The resultant agricultural policy was therefore also 
focused on broad based economic growth through sector-specific socio-economic and political 
23 Xinhua News Agency news article, June 25, 1998 http://www.encyclope<iia.comldocllP2-
18171445.html 
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restructuring (Simatele 2006). The socio-economic activities identified by governinent as 
significant to the agricultural sector included privatisation of the economy to allow for 
efficiency and effectiveness, greater stakeholder participation, involvement in international 
activities (through SADC, COMESA, WTO) to benefit from globalisation, improvement of 
people's living standards, and the sustainable use of natural resources (GRZ 2004). One 
implication of this policy shift was a level of autonomy of commercial livestock establishments 
from Government scrutiny. The evidence of this is enshrined in the National Agricultural Policy 
2004-2015 (GRZ 2004), where the Zambian Government committed to fostering private-sector 
development in agriculture, disengaging from direct intervention and limiting itself to the 
provision of public goods such as rural infrastructure, basic research, disease control and market 
information (OECO 2006). 
4.4.1 The Uves/oek subseetor 
The livestock sub-sector accounts for about 35% of total agricultural production in Zambia and 
is also viewed as economically important (GRZ 2006a). It has been suggested, however, that 
economically, the sector is an underutilised resource, even though the country has abundant 
marginal land unsuitable for crop production and potentially lucrative access to the same 
international markets enjoyed by neighbours such as Botswana (Sinyangwe and Clinch 2003). 
Despite this, the Food and Agricultural Organisation's (FAO) livestock brief on Zambia 
reported that in 2005, the sector contributed about $243 million to Zambia's GOP, which is 
significant (FAO 2005). 
Like the rest of the economy, the livestock sub sector experienced serious social economic and 
policy setbacks, particularly in disease control, especially after 1991. Attempts to develop the 
livestock sector in the 1990s primarily focused on donor-led liberalisation of internal marketing 
structures, reform of institutions delivering livestock services (a withdrawal of government 
services in preference for private service delivery) to livestock keepers and promotion of private 
sector capacity. While Sinyangwe and Clinch (2003) attempt to cast a positive light on these 
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liberalisation reforms, it can be argued that the neglect of animal health as a public good and the 
subsequent withdrawal of Government from direct disease control to make room for private 
sector animal health delivery contributed to the breakdown in disease control systems in the 
country. In cattle for instance, Foot and Mouth Disease, Contagious Bovine Pleuro Pneumonia, 
Trypanosomosis, Theileriosis and other tick borne diseases have decimated much of the 
country's livestock population for close to two decades. Among the zoonoses affecting the 
Zambian livestock sector are bovine tuberculosis (Cook et al. 1996; Pandey et al. 1995; 
Mweene and Hangombe 2006) and brucellosis (Muma et al. 2006). While unrelated to sector 
reforms but speaking of the wider socioeconomic context, HIV and AIDS have also had a 
negative impact on the labour supply in the agricultural sector (GRZ 2006a). 
Only after 2002 were new policies developed and implemented across the various sectors of 
Government under an overarching agenda of economic and social development (GRZ 2006a). 
This policy shift resulted in renewed Government interest and investment in the livestock 
sector. In this shift, the Zambian National Agricultural Policy (2004-2015) has as explicit aims, 
the improvement livestock productive efficiency and the provision of support for the marketing 
of both livestock and livestock products for purposes of contributing to food security and 
individual income (GRZ 2004). To remedy the problems that have plagued the livestock 
subsector, within this policy framework the animal health sector has several core objectives: the 
control of diseases of national economic importance; the facilitation of sustainable community 
intervention/participation in disease and vector control; the strengthening of capacity to deal 
with emerging and current public health issues; ensuring food safety and the promotion of 
private sector participation in disease and vector control programmes (GRZ 2004). 
While these objectives are commendable, Government veterinary service delivery in Zambia is 
running at around 50% capacity, mainly due to inadequate staffing levels. According to one 
official government document (NRP 2008), out of a possible establishment of 115 veterinarians, 
only 59 were in Government service as of 2008. Similarly, there were 97 livestock officers out 
of a possible 187; 21 laboratory technicians out of a possible 51; and 19 assistant laboratory 
104 
technicians out of a possible 31. The only area of specialization that was adequately staffed was 
veterinary assistants, who numbered 395 out of a possible 400. Given this scenario, veterinary 
service delivery remains a major challenge in Zambia. 
Despite these practical resource challenges, the policy change instituted in 2002 appears to have 
yielded some positive results. According to the African Economic Outlook report on Zambia 
(DECO 2006), better animal disease control and processing earned Zambian beef an A grade in 
2005, which made it suitable for export, while a heavy injection of foreign investment to expand 
the production and processing of the dairy sector facilitated the increase in the consumption of 
dairy products. Neven et al. (2006) explain that the dairy sector's transformation has largely 
been due to more focused market liberalization policies, foreign direct investment and the 
integration of Zambia's traditional smallholder livestock sector into a growing formal dairy 
sector through out-grower schemes. This demonstrates the prioritization of the beef and dairy 
industries in Zambia, both for issues of disease control and economic advancement. It is argued 
that for Zambia one drawback is a lack of compliance with Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
barriers that limits the country's expanding agricultural industry from piercing the apparently 
more lucrative EU and US markets (DECO 2006). De facto, this leaves Zambia's neighbours 
and other developing countries as its primary export targets. 
On the other hand, the poultry sector in Zambia is not a major priority for the Zambian 
Government, although poultry production is widespread in the country (see figure 4.3). While 
less trumpeted, but more pertinent for this research, similar production increases, except the 
integration of traditional and commercial poUltry sectors, have been occurring in the poUltry 
industry. 
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Figure 4-3. Poultry distribution in the commercial, emerging and backyard sector in Zambia. 
Source: National Livestock Epidemiology and Information Centre, Ministry of Agriculture and Co-
operatives 2006. 
4.4.2 The poultry production sector in Zambia 
According to the Central Statistics Office's Living Conditions and Monitoring Report for 2004, 
an estimated 64% of 1,372,760 households in the country own poultry. A country report by 
Songolo and Katongo (2001) on Z'lmbia's poultry production sector and Newcastle Disease 
states that, like the rest of Zambia's agricultural sector, the poultry industry is dualistic, having 
both traditional and commercial systems. The traditional or village poultry production system is 
characterised by mainly scavenging chickens that take an average 20-22 weeks to mature. 
Individual fammes keep an average of 10-15 birds, which are largely indigenous poultry 
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species. It is important to note that the traditional poultry sector in Zambia is what is equivalent 
to free range or backyard producers under the Food and Agricultural Organisation's (FAO) 
poultry classification system (FAO 2004). 
The 'commercial' sector, encompassing small scale 'backyard24' producers, emergent producers 
and large scale commercial producers, is based on a layer or broiler supply chain fed by the 
country's six main hatcheries. A Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development report 
(2009) on the poultry production system in Zambia states that the large scale 'commercial' 
sector has production capacities that range from individual families raising between 500-1000 
broilers per batch to emergent producers who rear between 5000-8000 broilers per batch. These 
are all supplied with stock from the large commercial rearing farms, breeders and hatcheries. 
The hatcheries obtain their entire broiler and layer parent stock externally (mainly Europe and 
America). The hatcheries also export an estimated 5% of their hatching eggs to Tanzania, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Angola and the ORC (OVID 2009). The same report states that the 
country has approximately 7834 small scale backyard, 4666 emergent, 2500 commercial broiler 
farmers and 1020 layer producers. These farmers are located in high poultry production areas 
along the major transport routes (figure 4.3). In this system, broilers are raised in an all-in-all-
out production system over a six week period. Both layers and broilers are reared on locally 
procured commercial feed, require regular veterinary pharmaceutical input and are usually 
raised in some kind of dedicated structure. Because this is how the production system is viewed 
in Zambia, in this thesis, the 'commercial' sector encompasses all production systems, including 
'backyard' farmers, supplying, or supplied by imported poultry breeds. The 'traditional' sector, 
on the other hand, refers only to indigenous poultry production. 
Trade liberalisation has had a positive effect on the development of the large scale commercial 
poUltry sector in Zambia. Unlike the cattle production sector, the poUltry production sector has 
shown substantial growth since 1995. A OFID (2002) assessment of agricultural trends in 
24 Backyard producers are in reality medium income families around the country seeking to supplement 
household income through the sale of chickens and eggs. These are largely raised in closed structures 
with some level of restricted access (LSUAC 2(08). 
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Zambia estimated that commercial poultry production increased almost 300% while traditional 
poultry production increased by 50% between 1995 and 2000. Simatele (2006) suggests that the 
introduction of trade liberalization has increased chicken yields significantly compared to pre-
trade liberalisation trends. In 2003, poultry production in Zambia averaged about 16 million 
broilers annually and around 4 million commercial layers for egg production in the commercial 
sector (Sinyangwe and Clinch 2(03). These figures have since increased with official estimates 
at around 30 million broiler birds per year (DVLD 2(07). More recent reports indicate that, in 
general the commercial and small-scale poultry production sector in Zambia is growing 
exponentially. It is however not known how these recent trends in productivity have influenced 
avian influenza risk management and pandemic preparedness in Zambia. 
4.5 Development and health in Zambia 
This section reviews the development agenda as it relates to health in Zambia. The key 
argument here is that the Government in Zambia views development as the primary means 
through which health can be improved and has taken the perspective that the health system 
should aim at keeping the population healthy for the purposes of development. Of immediate 
concern is how the existing health system in Zambia contributes to the management of 
perceived infectious disease risks particularly those that relate to trade and development. 
In an article examining the decline of healthcare in Zambia during its economic downturn, 
Freund (1986) argues that the economic crisis faced by Zambia in the late 70s, particularly after 
the decline in copper earnings, had considerable effects on the health sector including health 
worker emigration, collapse of health facilities, an increased disease burden, and reduced 
expenditure on health. This provides another example in which declining economic conditions 
directly impact on health. The Zambian Government appears cognisant of the interrelationship 
between development and health, with expectations that economic development would improve 
general population health, but at the same time, they appreciate the contribution of good health 
to economic development through increased worker productivity and life expectancy (GRZ 
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2006a). This position is supported in empirical literature. Fidler (2007), in examining the 
prospect of exploiting globalization for the betterment of health, argues that for many countries 
in general, rising costs in health-care are becoming major macroeconomic factors that can affect 
a country's global competitiveness and fiscal policy options. In agreement, the WHO 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001 report states that societies that have heavy 
disease burdens experience a multiplicity of severe impediments to economic progress (WHO 
2(01). These impediments have been felt in Zambia, with high incidences of mortality and 
morbidity because of HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and a rise in maternal mortality in 
recent years, all affecting economic development (DFID 2(08). UNGASS (2010) reports that in 
2007, the HIV prevalence was estimated at 15.2 % in adults aged 15-49 years old. The WHO 
(2010) reports that in 2009 the estimated TB incidence in Zambia was 433 per 100 000 
population, while mortality (excluding HIV) was 27 deaths per 100 000. In addition, health care 
delivery continues to be constrained by lack of human, material and financial resources, with 
declining allocations to the sector (OECD 2006). According to UNDP (2010), current 
expenditure on health in Zambia is 3.6% ofGDP. 
The health indicators in Zambia have been consistently reported as extremely poor with marked 
declines in indicators of health and quality of care between 1992 and 2002 (DFID 2000; GRZ 
2006a). Similar to the animal health sector, a government assessment of the health workforce 
revealed a 50% labour deficit that required urgent attention to improve the working environment 
(GRZ 2006a). This decline has been attributed to the HN and AIDS pandemic; brain drain; 
high poverty levels; inadequate drugs and medical supplies; and the poor state of health 
facilities. Major health inequalities as they relate to access to health care exist. In terms of 
infrastructure, the provinces closer to the major transport routes have better access to health 
services, with 99% of households in urban areas situated within 5 km of a health facility while 
only 50% of rural households are within 5 km of a health centre (GRZ 2006a). It is the intention 
of government to reform the health system with the overall vision "to provide Zambians with 
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equity access to cost effective, quality health care as close to the family as possible." It can be 
argued that social and economic development are important in meeting this objective. 
At the conclusion of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Uruguay Round negotiations, 
Zambia opted to make commitments in a few service sectors that included health (Ndulo 2005). 
Other than highlighting the various health related trade agreements that Zambia is party to, the 
impact of trade on health, and vice versa, in Zambia has not been substantively explored. 
According to a report by Mudenda (2005), Zambia has been proud of being in the forefront of 
signing agreements or protocols, but has not made much effort to determine the impact that 
these may have on the economy. Although this may be the case, it has been argued that Zambia 
may have problems in complying with requirements set out in many of the multilateral trade 
agreements to which it is party. Mabika and London (2007) for example, found that there were 
many areas in the Zambian health services sector that were not consistent with the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The study by Mabikaand London also argues that 
the introduction of user fees for health service access under the IMP SAPs commercialized 
health provision, making health service provision a commercial enterprise as opposed to a basic 
human entitlement (Mabika and London 2(07). With an economy largely dependent on donor 
aid and direct foreign investment, some of these policy tensions are created by concessions 
made by Government under aid conditionalities. It is possible that in pursuit of the global 
agenda for pandemic preparedness, the Zambian Government could make similar concessions 
with long term effects. 
4.6 Zambia and the inte1'1Ultionai trading system 
This section provides an overview of Zambia and the multilateral trading system. This 
information is important in understanding how Zambia has positioned itself in the multilateral 
trade arena to support its export led development agenda. Some of the trade agreements 
mentioned here have possible implications for both public and animal health; especially in as far 
as multi-sectoral risk management and pandemic preparedness are concerned. Zambia joined 
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1982 and has been a member of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 1st January, 1995 (Ndulo 2(05). The WTO Agreements 
provide the framework of multilateral disciplines, rules and obligations within which Zambia 
can participate in international trade, thus providing opportunities for market access and 
integration of the Zambian economy into the international trading system (Ndulo 2(05). The 
power to negotiate and sign international agreements is vested in the President and the adoption 
of an international treaty requires national legislation with an Act of Parliament passed to bring 
Zambian law into conformity with an international treaty. Zambia has attempted to adapt some 
of its national legislation to conform to its WTO obligations. For instance, under the Private 
Sector development Programme (PSD), the Government of Zambia has aimed to improve 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) services in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 
alongside the strengthening of standardization, certification and inspection units of the Zambia 
Bureau of Standards to ensure " ... conformity with international and regional standards and 
technical requirements." (GRZ 2006a p.38). While it has been suggested that WTO agreements 
actually supersede member countries' internal laws and regulations, including those that govern 
public health (Shaffer et ai. 2(05), in theory, Zambian laws take precedence over international 
treaties which include WTO and any regional trade agreements (Ndulo 2(05). 
As a member of the European Union-African Caribbean and Pacific (EU-ACP) group Zambia is 
a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement. This dates back to 1975 when the Lome convention was 
first signed as a non-reciprocal trade arrangement that culminated in June 2000 as the EU-ACP 
Economic Partnership Agreement between 77 ACP countries and the EU in Cotonou, Benin 
(MCTI 2(03). Zambia is also a signatory to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
Agreement between the USA and several African countries. Since the WTO is a multilateral 
institution, the bilateral and regional agreements are expected to be coherent with the WTO 
multilateral regulations and disciplines and Zambia is obliged to bring its national legislation in 
conformity and compliance with the WTO Agreements (Ndulo 2(05). Zambia is also a 
founding member of two African regional trade agreements, the Common Market for Eastern 
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and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
(Roningen and DeRosa 2(03) and is a signatory to the COMESA Agreement and the SADC 
Trade Protocol (Ndulo 2(05). This duo membership has created a challenge for government in 
complying with, and effective implementation of, the different agreements. 
In 2005, Zambia was elected to chair the meetings of the 50 Least Developed Country (LDC) 
members of the wro in 2005 in the Hong Kong ministerial meeting (Bridges Weekly 2(05). 
Since then, trade has been a key policy area with the Government expecting to receive 
substantial co-ordinated support to strengthen its capacity to deal with regional and multilateral 
trade issues and develop an export strategy (OECD 2006). A condition of membership of the 
WTO is that market forces operate more widely after accession, with wro trade policy review 
mechanism monitoring privatization and structural reform in member states (pollock and Price 
2003). But while there has been an apparent drive to promote cross border trade with large 
strides made in the private sector since the 1990s, Abbink, Jayne and Moller (2009) argue that 
Zambia's current market still bears similarities to its state in the 1980s, with donors still urging 
government to open up its borders to regional trade. The aim of the Zambian government has 
been to pursue an export-led trade strategy based on open markets and international competition 
to create opportunities for the country to beneficially integrate into the world economy (Ndulo 
2005; GRZ 2006a). Zambia's major export markets are SADC, EU and COMESA countries. 
These were responsible for 87.7% of the country's total exports in 2004 (Ndulo 2005). Amongst 
the non-tariff barriers that Zambian exports have faced include SPS requirements, technical 
barriers, quotas, and market standards, restrictive rules of origin and complex tariff structures 
and import requirements (Ndulo 2(05). In this regard, while an increased access to lucrative 
international markets such as the EU would be attractive for the country, a report by Mudenda 
(2005) states that EU and US SPS standards are 'dynamic' and have resulted in the rejection of 
Zambian goods at port of entry. However, regional trade is gaining increasing prominence for 
Zambia with preferential markets providing important destinations for the country's exports 
(Ndulo 2005; OECD 2006). With the task of implementing the preferential provisions contained 
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in different agreements, the trade regime in Zambia has been described as complex (Ndulo 
2(05). It is not known how this complex interplay of agendas; Zambia's duo membership of 
COMESA and SADC and its reluctance to open its borders to regional trade; influences 
Zambia's position on multi-sectoral risk management and pandemic preparedness. 
Zambia, like most developing countries, views trade as an important tool for economic growth 
and poverty reduction. As stated earlier in this chapter, the Zambian government is of the view 
that increased agricultural output, with produce aimed at regional markets, can assist in national 
poverty reduction efforts (pinder and Wood 2003; GRZ 2006a). Since the mid-l990s, the 
Government has pursued various trade liberalisation reforms. The key players responsible for 
the design and implementation of trade policy in Zambia are the Ministry of Commerce Trade 
and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning (Ndulo 2(05). 
In a largely agrarian nation like Zambia, public health is linked very closely to animal health. A 
key point is that the economic reform embarked on by the Zambian government has put human 
and animal health on a development platform. As far as avian influenza risk management and 
pandemic preparedness are concerned, important questions arise. What role does trade policy 
play in influencing disease ,risk management policy in an area such as animal health, for 
example. which falls under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, but is still meant to be 
harnessed for its potential contributions to trade exports and economic development? What role 
does the trade sector have in informing health policy, even though it is the health system's role 
to ensure that the productive segments of the Zambian society remain healthy to contribute to 
fostering economic development including participation in trade? While there are internal and 
external limitations to the extent that sectors influence policy making in other policy spheres, 
the policies within these sectors, coupled with extraneous influences such as donor aid and trade 
agreements, still interact in ways that affect each other. When one thinks about zoonoses and 
their management in the confluence of trade policy, animal health policy and public health 
policy, these influences possibly affect risk and disease management in the wider society. 
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Therefore, it was important to detennine how these issues were addressed in multi-sectoral risk 
management in Zambia as it concerned avian and human influenza prevention and control 
policy development and pandemic preparedness. 
4.7 Implications for this study 
Drager and Fidler (2007), speaking particularly about global health governance, suggest that 
fragmented policy competencies in national governance systems may require more cohesion to 
align them with the diplomatic, epidemiological and ethical realities of globalization. Zambia is 
positioning itself to increase its participation in and derive maximum benefit from the 
globalization process. For Zambia, the diplomatic, epidemiological and ethical realities may 
come to bear on its chosen route for economic reform. This position may have implications for 
avian and pandemic influenza prevention and control policy development across the policy 
domains of public health, animal health and trade in this resource-constrained economy. The 
interaction of health, trade and agriculture policy in Zambia is a unique challenge for a policy 
analysis, due to the fact that these are, generally, separate policy sectors with different 
perceptions of areas of priority. With agricultural trade viewed as a primary vehicle for national 
development, health focused primarily on the more pressing areas of HIV I AIDS, malaria and 
infant and maternal mortality and zoonoses a constant looming problem in much of the 
country's livestock populations, a study of the interactions between trade, public health and 
animal health is therefore pertinent. These multiple policy perspectives may also influence the 
feasibility of conducting a risk analysis in this social-economic context. The next chapter is the 
first empirical chapter. It provides an analysis of agenda setting for avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy in Zambia. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Agenda setting for Avian and Human Influenza policy in Zambia 
s. Introduction 
This first empirical chapter provides a chronological analysis of the avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy agenda setting process in Zambia. I begin with the call for 
pandemic preparedness in 2004, and then provide a description of the framework for multi-
sectoral coordination in Zambia that was developed in the period 2002-2006. The process of 
agenda setting, covering the period 2005-2006, is then discussed in three parts; the call for 
pandemic preparedness and agenda setting in Zambia. the setting up of the Task Force on·A vian 
and Human Influenza prevention and control, and finally a description of some of the factors 
that facilitated the entree of additional stakeholders, such as the poultry industry, in the avian 
and human influenza prevention and control agenda setting process in Zambia. 
This chapter sets out to analyse how the national policy on the control and prevention of H5Nl 
highly pathogenic avian influenza was set and developed across the sectors of animal health, 
public health and trade in Zambia, suggesting the relative weight that international, as opposed 
to national, considerations played in determining the agenda. As a result of the confluence of 
these national and international influences, the chapter suggests that a number of different 
policy 'framings' emerged that are evidenced in the ways in which highly pathogenic avian 
influenza was conceptualised across the trade, public health and animal health sectors. By this, I 
mean how the highly pathogenic avian influenza problem was understood by the various actors 
involved in the policy process. 
This discussion is based on accounts provided by individuals directly involved in avian and 
human influenza prevention and control policy development and livestock trade policy 
implementation from the government institutions of animal health (Ministry of Agriculture and 
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Cooperatives), public health (Ministry of Health) and trade (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives and Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry), and the Poultry Association of 
Zambia. The description is supported by a documentary review of relevant policy documents, 
literature and newspaper articles pertinent to the period in question. The chapter concludes with 
a reflection on the ways in which the avian and human influenza problem has been framed in 
Zambia. 
S.l.lnternational call for pandemic preparedness 
On January 27, 2004 the World Health Organisation (WHO), Food and Agricultmal 
Organization (FAO), and the World Organization for Animal Health (OlE) appealed for 
international collaboration and funding to control the Asian H5Nl panzootic, calling "for a 
SARS-like response" to the problem (WHO 2004, Fidler 2004b). Amidst concerns of a possible 
evolving pandemic (Heymann 2006) WHO also made a global appeal for member states to 
develop preparedness plans to respond to this, and other pandemic threats, modelled on WHO 
pandemic preparedness guidelines (WHO 2005a). In addition, the global response to avian 
influenza was to be coordinated by the UN System Influenza Coordinator (UNSIC), with the 
primary fmancial backing of the World Bank (Scoones and Forster 2(08). At nation-state level, 
the response was to be a multi-sectoral endeavour, driven by close collaboration between the 
animal health and public health institutions of WHO member states. 
The WHO, FAO, and the OlE collaborated in controlling the disease in Southeast Asia, and 
minimizing the impact on livelihoods as well as reducing the risks to public health (Sims et aI. 
2(05). The roles of these agencies was intended to be complementary, with WHO protecting 
human health, the OlE protecting animal health, and the F AO focusing on animal production 
and livelihoods, although one position paper (Webster and Hulse 2(05) and one policy study 
(Scoones and Forster 2(08) argue that as far as pandemic planning for influenza was concerned, 
these agencies are not always in harmony. 
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5.1.2. Zambia's Fifth National Development Plan and the poultry industry 
At the time the H5Nl situation in Asia was unfolding, a significant policy shift was occurring in 
Zambia. The ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which had been in power 
since 1991, fielded a new presidential candidate, who was elected to office in 2001. The 
government then espoused the view that the open market system model that the country had 
adopted in 199125, while providing a platform for economic reform, had resulted in policies that 
tended to be sectional and focused only on the short-term, and thus curtailed broader social 
economic development. The Zambian government therefore re-introduced a system of long term 
national development planning in 200226 (GRZ 2006a). The process began with the 
development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the period 2002-2004, which, 
under instruction of the president, was followed by a Transitional National Development Plan 
(TNPD), developed by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning for the period 2002-2005 
and finally the Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 (GRZ 2006a). 
The Fifth National Development Plan (5th NDP) provided the overall policy framework for 
multi-sectoral coordination in Zambia, and utilized implementation and monitoring structures 
that had been developed with the PRSP and TNDP, such as the Sector Advisory Groups. In 
consideration of the policy responses to highly pathogenic avian influenza, one crucial element 
was that the government viewed agriculture as the single most important vehicle for economic 
growth (GRZ 2006a; Ndulo 2006). Accordingly, under the livestock subsector, the primary 
objectives were the control of livestock diseases of epidemic, national economic and trans-
boundary significance (citing cattle diseases such as Foot and Mouth disease and Contagious 
Bovine Pleuro-pneumonia as examples), and the scaling-up of overall productivity and 
25 Zambia became a one-party state in 1972, when all political parties were banned except for the ruling 
party, the United National Independent Party {UNIP).1n 1990, there was opposition to UNIP's monopoly 
and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was formed. The incumbent President, Kenneth 
Kaunda conceded by signing a constitutional amendment making Zambia a multi-party state and the 
country's fIrst multi-party elections were held in 1991. The MMD won in a landslide. In addition to 
winning the presidency, the party also took 125 of the 150 elected seats. 
26 Zambia had implemented three national development plans since its independence in 1964. The last national 
development plan, the Fourth National Development Plan, was commissioned in 1989, but abandoned in 1991 
for an open market system after a change of government (GRZ 2006a). 
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management of marketable livestock and livestock products, with emphasis on the traditional 
sector. The government was predominantly focusing on cattle. Poultry production was of 
interest only because it was viewed as a means to support women and female headed household 
empowerment under a wider gender equality national agenda. This is understandable, as over 
45% of the small-scale chicken producers in the country are women (Sayila 2(08). However, 
the policy position of the livestock sector seemed to grossly underestimate the significance of 
the poultry industry's potential for growth and economic contribution in the 5th NDP period. 
According to one respondent: 
Realistically speaking, this industry (the poUltry industry) has actually grown 
over lOO%. But it gets very little support from the government ..... we can't 
compare ourselves to the Malawian government support, which they are 
rendering to the local industry there, the Mozambican support that is being 
rendered to the local industry there. Botswana is in its infancy but if you look at 
the way the industry is coming up, because government commitment is serious, 
it may surpass Zambia. So we feel compliance on the part of the government is 
what is threatening this industry. 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
In terms of the poultry industry's contribution to economic development, this perceived growth 
of the poultry industry was noteworthy, despite what was regarded as minimal support from the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The concern over 'compliance on the part of government' that was 
'threatening this industry' was the Ministry of Agriculture's facilitation of poultry and poUltry 
product imports, which in the view of the respondent, did not foster the development of local 
industry and thus undermined local industry's contribution to economic growth. When this is 
considered in relation to the government's position as stated in the 5th NDP, it is clear that 
industry felt that it had been undervalued by its representative ministry. 
The health sector's contribution to economic growth in the context of the 5th NDP was framed 
as the maintenance of a healthy and productive population. Of interest is that in the health 
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sector's list of the 27 programmes, objectives and strategies set out for the 5th NDP 
implementation period, was its integrated disease surveillance programme, aimed at improving 
public health surveillance and epidemics control utilizing, among others, an Integrated Disease 
Surveillance and Response (IDSR)27 platform, and the health education and promotion 
programme which aimed to facilitate "effective and efficient health education and promotion 
programmes" through strategies involving the coordination and establishment of collaborative 
systems with various stakeholders and cooperating partners (GRZ 2006a, p.170). On IDSR, one 
respondent said the following: 
When you look at IDSR, IDSR is like a platform on which all these other things, 
new, emerging, old what have you, will sit on. That's why even at WHO level 
they say it, avian and human influenza will sit on IDSR, HINI will sit on the 
IDSR because IDSR is a vehicle. People need to know what they should do 
when the disease is there, how to respond and things like that. So the bottom 
line is IDSR. . .. And when you are investigating a disease outbreak there is 
nothing like, "no, you now have a new way of investigation. " ... what will differ 
will be maybe the mode of infection of that disease, the severity, the 
pathogenicity and things like that ... 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
The IDSR platform was fundamental to the public health response to major disease problems, 
and to avian and human influenza in Zambia. It was as a vehicle providing the health sector with 
a broad framework for surveillance that could be adapted to almost any priority disease. 
including zoonosis such as H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza. In the health sector policy 
framework, IDSR and the health education and promotion programme were important as 
potential facilitators of wider avian and human influenza surveillance and broad based 
27 IDSR uses an assessment protocol developed by WHO Regional Office for Africa. WHO Headquarters 
and CDC, examining the current surveillance. laboratory confrrmation, and epidemic preparedness and 
response activities at all levels of a country's health system. These assessment results are then used by 
Ministries of Health to guide the development of an action plan for the creation of a functional IDSR 
system. through the implementation of health system changes at central, provincial. district, and health 
facility levels. http://www.cdc.gov/idsr/implementation.htm 
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information dissemination. Furthermore, in the 5th NDP, the health sector plan listed several 
coordinative and implementation structures the Ministry of Health had at its disposal. Although 
not listed, the National Epidemics Preparedness, Planning and Management Committee in the 
Ministry of Health was suggested by respondents as one such coordinative structure that played 
a central role in avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development. 
For purposes of trade promotion, the 5th NDP outlined a framework for the strengthening of 
sanitary and phytosanitary service delivery in the Ministry of Agriculture and improve the 
efficiency of local and export trade service provision. The trade sector was meant to 
complement these efforts by promoting export driven growth and improve local 
competitiveness, a position that was embraced by the local poultry industry: 
The Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry I think we have a very cordial 
relationship. We are actually using some of their extensions like Zambia 
Bureau of Standards and also the trade sector especially, they are the ones that 
are being sponsored by the European Union, I think we have had a very healthy 
relationship with them and, you know, we have engaged in serious discussions 
with regards to trade. I think that is where we are getting hope as an industry 
because they seem to understand us better than our own ministry, you see? And 
I don't know maybe it could be because of the Ministry of Commerce and Trade 
has taken it upon itself to try and promote the exports of the Zambian products 
and one among such products are the poultry and pOUltry products. 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
The trade sector strategy involved a sustained commitment to multilateral trade negotiations 
within a private sector development framework, including the strengthening of standards 
infrastructure within the Zambia Bureau of Standards. This is all relevant because at the time the 
HSNI panzootic was spreading out from Southeast Asia, Zambia was gearing itself for export 
led growth, of which, as evidenced above, the poultry industry was a beneficiary. The livestock 
sector was on alert for diseases of national economic importance but mainly in cattle, while the 
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health sector had an established framework for collaboration and disease surveillance that was 
flexible and responsive, allowing for a more focused allocation of resources. 
Meanwhile, the poUltry industry was experiencing exponential growth in Zambia. partly 
attributed to a veterinary ban of poultry product imports from neighbouring cOWltries South 
Africa and Zimbabwe (Xinhua News Agency Article date: April 15, 2004; Sinkondyobwe 
2(05), and the growth in the number of poultry producers in both rural and urban areas of the 
country (Sayila 2(08). The executive from Zambia's poultry producer association discussed 
this growth as an explicit aim of the industry: 
Five years ago (2004), I think the pOUltry industry was at 13 millionfor broilers 
and about 800 thousand for layers. Our aim as an association was to double 
the size of the industry by 2008, which we did by 2007 with a year to spare. So 
currently we have a... country capacity of about 42 million, but we are 
producing about 33 million broilers. So you can see we are way above 100% 
(growth) and we ... are (currently producing) 2.1 million layers. So as an 
industry in the last five years we have grown by that much and I think if you 
quantify that, you find that we are maybe around 130% from what we were five 
years ago. So to us, that is a very phenomenal growth and our contribution to 
GDP has substantially increased ... 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
The genesis of the imperative to expand the poUltry industry was traced to 2004, the year the 
Poultry Association of Zambia set out to double industry output, which resulted in tremendous 
growth in both broiler and layer production, thus increasing the sector's contribution to GDP. 
The explanation for this industry policy shift is that in 2004, there had been a void created in the 
export market by the collapse of the poultry industry in Zimbabwe (Sayila 2(07), in addition to 
the fact that the sector had been benefitting from the promotion of export-led growth, since 
2002 (Mulemba 2009). It appears that the growth of the poultry industry had been in progress 
since 1995, particularly in the small scale sector, which was registering an annual growth rate of 
almost 4.5%, compared to 2.3% for the commercial sector as a whole (Sayila 2(08). Regarding 
121 
the veterinary ban of poultry product imports from South Africa and Zimbabwe, according to 
one respondent28, this was instituted following concerns over reports of Newcastle disease29 
outbreaks in the two countries. This ban clearly had an effect on Zambia's exports relative to 
imports of poultry as shown in figure 5.1. 
2002. 2.Q04 2006 2007 2008 
Figure 5-1. Imports and exports of poultry in Zambia, 2002-08 
(source: Mulemba 2009) 
Due to a shift to chicken production, which was more lucrative, duck production in Zambia had 
registered a decline, with only 15% of poultry producers involved in one form of duck 
production or another, mainly at individual or small scale levels (Sayila 2008). Ducks are a 
significant component of poultry production in Southeast Asia, and played an important role as 
silent shedders of the H5N1 virus (Chapter 2). In contrast, in the Zambian production system, 
ducks are far less important. According to Sayila (2008), only five out of every 100 consumers 
28 Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (3) 
29 This is an acute viral disease of domestic and other pOUltry species. It occurs worldwide, and is 
responsible for variable mortality in poultry flocks . Under the DIE, the virulent form of the disease is 
reportable and once identified in a country, can attract trade sanctions. The virus' zoonotic potential is 
minor; resulting in a transitory conjunctivitis in humans, restricted mainly to laboratory workers and those 
carrying out vaccinations. Thus the zoonotic risk is largely occupational. Prior to the practice of poultry 
vaccination, conjunctivitis used to occur in persons working eviscerating poultry in processing plants. 
There has not been a report of disease in pOUltry producers or poultry product consumers (Kahn, Line and 
Aiello 2008). 
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in Zambia eat duck and duck products. There is thus a limited market for duck products in 
Zambia. He also states consumers in Zambia perceive duck production occurs under insanitary 
conditions, a view that has contributed to people's lack of interest in these products and 
subsequently, their production. 
5.2. Agenda setting: The Tole 0/ intenuztional agencies in Zambia 
What role did international agencies, such as the WHO and FAO, play in setting the avian and 
human influenza prevention and control policy agenda in Zambia? It was the influence of these 
two international agencies, in implementing the global call for pandemic preparedness, which 
played a cardinal role in initially drawing government attention to the potential significance of 
the H5Nl problem. The WHO and FAO guided the development and focus of Zambia's 
response, based on lessons learnt from Southeast Asia and the perceived risk of disease 
incursion presented by H5Nl's continued global spread. In particular, the FAO was central in 
facilitating the development of the pandemic response in the country, with the understanding of 
the decision-makers spoken to, mostly those from animal health, that the WHO was a prominent 
partner. Their role in setting the agenda for avian and human influenza in Zambia began in 
2005. To demonstrate the significance of FAO's involvement, a few quotes from three 
prominent Task Force members suggest it was remembered as the key driver of action: 
I think we started in 2005 and when the initial uh, outbreaks globally were 
quite prominent and FAO was in the forefront in helping us to try and come up 
with the preparedness plan, so to speak. And I remember the first meetings 
were being held actually at FAO and this included mostly personnel from 
Ministry of Agriculture. And Ministry of Health was also present there, WHO 
was also present for those meetings. It's from those initial meetings that the 
need toform a Task Force wasfelt and then it was agreed that we shouldform 
a Task Force with Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health being the key 
line ministries. 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
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[A]ctivities here started way back in 2000 ... October to December 2005, yeah 
under facilitation of FAO. That's when 1 think the Task Force was set up. 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal person, Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
WHO was the driver while FAO facilitated, but there was a general call for 
governments to formulate response plans ... 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
These accounts point to the nature of FAO's initial role in setting the agenda for the avian and 
human influenza prevention and control response in Zambia which was described as threefold; 
it hosted the initial preparedness meetings; it facilitated the formation of the Task Force and it 
was in the forefront of developing Zambia's preparedness plan. By hosting the initial 
preparedness meetings, the F AO also played a role in identifying and bringing together what it 
perceived were the initial stakeholders, namely personnel representing the Ministry of 
Agriculture, specifically the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development, and the 
Ministry of Health. 
It is significant that the first meetings were held at F AO offices in Lusaka, and this was verified 
by both a review of key policy documents such as the National Task Force operational 
guidelines, and narratives provided by all respondents initially involved in avian and human 
influenza policy development. This venue underlined FAD's role in the stakeholder selection 
process, and agenda setting, as the policy process, in effect, began with these initial meetings. 
The reason for bringing these two ministries together was because H5NI was viewed as poultry 
sector problem, requiring a primarily veterinary response. But it had also demonstrated itself to 
be a public health concern in areas where outbreaks had been experienced, as outlined in the 
chronology of avian and human influenza provided in Chapter 2. Therefore, the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, through its veterinary department, were perceived to be 
the key government stakeholders in developing a response for Zambia. The WHO was present 
as well, on the understanding that it was the central international agency behind the global 
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influenza pandemic response, although respondents did not discuss the WHO's initial role at 
length. 
The initial framing of the avian influenza problem as a poUltry or, more generally, an animal 
health problem, was clear. This was the perception of all respondents from the Department of 
Veterinary and Livestock Development and the Ministry of Health, as these examples of typical 
responses suggest: 
[T]he avian influenza basically was viewed as a more of an animal disease 
which then moves into human beings, more interventions were done in the 
animal side and to a larger extent, the chair from the animal side was the one 
who was more pronounced ... the human side was seen more (as) supplementary 
.... because it was seen as one of the offshootsfromfailure to control the disease 
in the animals. 
Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (3) 
[I]n health we thought that .. .in terms of the gravity of the issue it had not yet 
reached us, so we agreed that let them give us about 30% of the resource and 
then the friends from the vet they got the 70% ... 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
In addition to expressing the animal health framing of the avian influenza issue, these extracts 
also demonstrate that this framing resulted in preparedness activities focusing primarily on the 
development of animal health interventions. Consequently, the animal health sector and the 
FAO were more prominent in developing Zambia's avian and human influenza prevention and 
control policy. It is important to note that in Zambia, as elsewhere, the FAO is traditionally 
associated with the Ministry of Agriculture. while the WHO is associated with the Ministry of 
Health and the two agencies are consistent advisors for the two ministries as exemplified in the 
quote below: 
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FAO is nonnally associated with agriculture and WHO is normally associated 
with health so what we do ourselves, is in order to sort of not cross over, as we 
move in all meetings, whether its epidemics, whether it's what we are talking 
about (avian and human influenza), all ofus come with the two partners. 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
The F AO was the main agency leading the agenda setting process in Zambia. It facilitated the 
formation of the National Task Force on avian influenza, and assisted in the process of 
developing a preparedness plan for the country. Given the level of agreement in the framing of 
the problem by the initial stakeholders, it is clear that both the FAO and the WHO, through their 
respective representatives, nurtured the framing of the problem and the beginnings of avian and 
human influenza prevention and control policy development in Zambia. The understanding was 
that avian influenza was both an animal health and a human health problem, although in this 
case, it was framed as largely an animal health issue, giving the F AO centre stage in fostering 
the generation of the policy response. After the initial FAO hosted meetings, where it was 
decided to form a National Task Force on avian and human influenza, subsequent meetings 
were held at the Ministry of Health under the National Epidemics Preparedness, Planning and 
Management Committee, where other stakeholders were identified and engaged. The fmal 
international agency involved in the agenda setting process was USAID. This international 
agency played a supportive role in policy development. Following the process of agenda setting, 
USAID sponsored border awareness meetings, supported the development of the 
communication strategy and conducted a biosecurity awareness campaign among traditional 
farmers and traders through Louisiana State University and a local NGO, Africare. Chapter 7 
will assess the implications of the role of these international agencies in agenda setting in 
Zambia. 
5.2.1. Setting up the National Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza 
This section discusses the national stakeholders in avian and human influenza prevention and 
control policy development and their role in setting the agenda for avian and human influenza 
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prevention and control policy in Zambia. Leading up to the fonnation of the National Task 
Force on Avian and Human Influenza in Zambia, the incumbent Minister of Health played a 
critical role in drawing government attention to the avian influenza issue. She wrote an 
Advocacy Cabinet Memorandum to Cabinet during the time that Zambia was experiencing a 
cholera outbreak, making an appeal to government for resources to support the Ministry of 
Health's efforts to control the cholera epidemic that was occurring at the time and also inform 
government of the avian influenza problem .. that was coming". She thus presented the two items 
as problems on the Ministry of Health's agenda that required government attention. In the words 
of one respondent: 
I remember a Cabinet Memo being written and by that time the Minister of 
Health was Sylvia Masebo. So a Cabinet Memo was written .. .first of all to 
inform government of the magnitude of the cholera (problem at that time) and 
also of the threat of the avian and human influenza which was coming and 
hence the request was to inform government and also to request for resources 
so that the two items could be sorted out at the same time. 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
Three issues are of note. First, this Advocacy Cabinet Memorandum alerted government of the 
'threat' of avian influenza. Second, avian influenza was placed on the same advocacy platform 
as the cholera epidemic that the country was facing at the time. Third by using this platform, 
H5Nl avian influenza had been presented as an imminent threat. To put this in perspective, 
although cholera is endemic in Zambia, the outbreak the country experienced that year (2005) 
was considered by Medecins Sans Frontieres as possibly the largest outbreak in Zambia's 
history30. For avian influenza to occupy the same advocacy platform as a concurrent and serious 
cholera outbreak illustrates that avian influenza was perceived at that time to be a high priority. 
The significance of the Cabinet Memo and the minister's role in raising the profile of avian 
30 See http://www .msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm ?objectid=B3D89276-B274-19E2-
8EBOD6SC2ESD76C2&component=toolkit.article&method=full html 
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influenza was expressed by a National Surveillance Officer in the Ministry of Health who stated 
the following: 
You know the fact that a Cabinet Memo at ministerial level was done and that it 
(avian influenza) continues to be part and parcel of the discussions at the 
National Epidemic meetings, which the national epidemic meeting ... 1 think it 
should be a subset or a committee within the Disaster Management (and 
Mitigation Unit). So Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit under the Vice 
President's Office, we say that is the first step, then the National Epidemic, 1 
think because of the health related component becomes afigure into this, so it's 
up to you to think whether it's a small thing or it's a big thing if it (avian and 
human influenza) can sit at that level. 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
The respondent above intended to emphasize to me that avian and human influenza was a high 
priority agenda item for the health minister and a high priority for the Health Ministry. It was a 
priority frrst, because it had received ministerial attention and response, which led to the 
government being aware of the avian influenza issue. Secondly, it remained a consistent agenda 
item in National Epidemic and Preparedness, Prevention, Control and Management Committee 
meetings (and this was verified by all Ministry of Health respondents and all senior ranking 
respondents from the Ministry of Agriculture). Third, because this was a subcommittee under 
the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit in the Office of the Vice President, it was a body 
of significant influence in its own right. 
Therefore the Cabinet Memorandum served to secure government consent and support for avian 
and human influenza policy development, and by framing the avian influenza problem as an 
imminent threat, created a sense of urgency for government to develop a response to avian 
influenza. Interestingly, the National Task Force on avian influenza operational guidelines 
(GRZ 2006b), state that the Advocacy Cabinet Memorandum was a joint initiative by the 
Ministers of Health and Agriculture. According to Task Force documents, Cabinet responded 
positively to the communication and earmarked resources for avian influenza interventions. 
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The health minister also gave numerous statements in the press concerning the potential threat 
that H5Nl presented to Zambia and the need for the nation and the government to be alert. 
Recognizing that the disease had not yet been reported in Africa, she stated that the Zambian 
Government had decided to take measures to detect and contain any possible spread of the avian 
influenza virus that had affected Asia and Europe (Ngande 2005; Xinhua News Agency Article 
date: October 27, 2(05). The minister stated that the government had established a multi-
sectoral Task Force led by Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture and supported by 
international organizations, thus unveiling the visible stakeholders in avian influenza prevention 
and control policy development in Zambia. According to the minister's statement, the multi-
sectoral Task Force was going to follow a strategic course of action aimed at avian influenza 
prevention and control. 
On 31st October 2005, a 20-person meeting of the multi-sectoral National Task Force on avian 
influenza was convened in Zambia under the facilitation of the FAO of the United Nations 
(GRZ 2006b). The Task Force was established to develop a national response to the rapid 
spread of avian influenza from Asia. According to its official operational guidelines, the Task 
Force "was to be the eyes and ears of what is happening concerning AI around the world as well 
as a forum for discussion and advising government on issues relating to Af' (GRZ 2006b, p.2). 
The Task Force, in addition to a policy formulation function, thus played a monitoring and gate-
keeping role for the government. It became recognised as a sub-committee of the National 
Epidemic and Preparedness, Prevention, Control and Management Committee under the 
Ministry of Health, thus gaining legitimacy, and was to be co-chaired by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Health, with the Ministry of Agriculture 
taking the lead, based on the understanding that avian influenza was an animal health problem 
that presented a "threat to human health" (GRZ 2006b, p.2). The Agriculture and Health 
Ministries were also designated the Task Force secretariat. This was unanimously confirmed by 
all respondents directly involved in the inception of the Task Force. Discussions concerning the 
development of a National Response Plan for Avian and Human Influenza had now shifted from 
129 
FAD offices to the National Epidemic and Preparedness, Prevention, Control and Management 
Committee. The issue framing, choice of leadership and the venue for discussion in relation to 
the policy process are all captured in the statement provided by one Task Force Member from 
the Ministry of Agriculture: 
[Mlost of the meetings at that time were being held under the National 
Epidemics and Preparedness Committee under Ministry of Healtk It was said 
that that committee would be chaired by the Director of Veterinary Services 
considering that was an animal health problem and not yet a human health 
problem. But given the concerns that it was zoonotic, then we decided that we 
were going to co-chair the Task Force. 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
Despite the issue framing, by being designated a subcommittee of the National Epidemic and 
Preparedness, Prevention, Control and Management Committee, the Task Force in essence now 
fell under the purview of the Ministry of Health. This committee has considerable influence as 
an agenda setting, coordination and advocacy structure: 
I would assure you that in the Ministry of Health, the National Epidemic 
Preparedness, Prevention, Control and Management Committee is a highly 
appreciated committee. In as many times as we may not get the full 
representation of all the stakeholders who would have been here, many times 
we have stakeholders who are consistent. When we are talking about WHO, 
UNICEF, this time around, Ministry of Housing and ... what is it? This Housing 
and what have you where city councils fall? Local government and housing. 
These will always be there. When you talk of the University of Zambia, UTH 
(University Teaching Hospital), well maybe that is more of Ministry of Health, 
University of Zambia through school ofVet .... is always there. So in one way or 
the other, the drivers are there. ... I have seen occasions when through the 
National Epidemic Committee meetings if a threat is so obvious the response, 
you would even wonder how things work out to your advantage. So for me I 
have no doubt, even if people might say "no, the coordination is not there, 
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what, what, what, what," let there be a threat, seen tangible threat, you will 
wonder how the various arms of government, which this time around they seem 
to be sleeping will come to work.. 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
The National Epidemic and Preparedness, Prevention, Control and Management Committee was 
heralded as a forum for advocacy and coordination for the Ministry of Health, bringing together 
government and international agencies in the development of responses to 'tangible' threats. It 
is also important to note that this committee was a significant forum for multi-sectoral 
interaction, and had been successfully utilized before as a coordination body, bringing together 
myriad stakeholders and advocating support, even from the donor community, for various 
health related issues. It was poised to play a similar role in response to a potential outbreak of 
avian and human influenza in the country. In providing further insight into the purview and 
purpose of this committee, the Deputy Director of Public Health and Research in the Ministry of 
Health stated the following: 
[A]s a ministry responsible for outbreaks, (we decided to) put (in place) what 
we call the National Epidemics, Preparedness Control (and) Management 
Committee. ... that multi-sectoral committee deals with, specifically 
diseases ... when we have a special one, like the avian influenza, like the swine 
(flu), the pandemic that we are now dealing with, like the rabies, like the 
plague, we normally say, let us now have an ad hoc committee of the main 
committee so we call that one now, a special Task Force ... we get membership 
... from the subcommittees ... like (for) ... avian (influenza), it is now hinging 
between ministries of livestock and also healtk So this is a zoonotic thing, so 
we need animal health and we need human healtk 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
Avian influenza was considered an animal problem with zoonotic potential, requiring a 
significant input of the Ministry of Agriculture, through the Department of Veterinary and 
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Livestock Development. With the F AO and the WHO global strategy emphasizing the 
collaboration of animal health and public health agencies in dealing with H5Nl, the National 
Epidemic and Preparedness, Prevention, Control and Management Committee thus provided a 
ready platform to facilitate this collaboration. The National Epidemic and Preparedness, 
Prevention, Control and Management Committee was thus an advocacy platform for disease 
prevention and control. Through its framing as a zoonosis, avian influenza fell under its 
purview. However, this committee plays more than a coordinative and advocacy function, as the 
Deputy Director of Public Health and Research in the Ministry of Health suggests in the 
following account of how the committee has to deal with stakeholders from a broad range of 
government departments: 
For example, today we had a cholera meeting and in the meeting ... although it 
was being chaired by the minister, three quarters of the agenda items is not our 
issue ... if you talk about poor infrastructure in terms of housing, you are talking 
about the ministry of housing ... if you are talking about communication and 
advocacy and sensitization, its normally broadcasting. We as a Ministry of 
Health are a trigger ministry. Because we know that, whatever happens, it's 
our hospitals that are going to be full. Whatever is going to happen, it is us in 
health. And that's why for us in health, we make sure that although other 
people might take a lion's share, we want to control something, you know and 
that's why you find when you look, the way you have come, you automatically 
think the ministry is too powerful. It's just because we are very very mindful 
that if we don't become "powerful" in inverted commas, it is us again who will 
be having problems. Having problems in terms of drugs, having problems in 
training of CTC;\ the treatment centres themselves, the manpower itself, by 
then it's no longer pre-pandemic, it's no longer .. .it's now a pandemic. 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
From the above it becomes apparent that the National Epidemics and Preparedness, Prevention, 
Control and Management Committee also functions as a means of providing the Ministry of 
31 Cholera Treatment Centre 
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Health with oversight of some of the pre-determinants of health in the country as they relate to 
other policy sectors. Therefore, while officially the coordination of the Task Force was to be 
facilitated by the FAO and the WHO, the Ministry of Health had established oversight over 
avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development through its hosting of the 
National Epidemic and Preparedness, Prevention, Control and Management Committee. It is 
also important to note that by being brought under the auspices of this particular committee, the 
avian influenza issue had achieved priority status on the Ministry of Health's agenda. 
According to the Task Force's official operational guidelines (GRZ 2006b), two working groups 
were to be established under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Ministry of 
Health, to provide information directly to the FAO and the WHO respectively, for purposes of 
supporting and strengthening both global and regional early warning systems. The working 
groups were also intended to feed information to the Task Force. According to key informants 
and policy documents, one working group resulted, the National Avian Influenza Working 
Group, made up of a core assemblage of designated personnel from the Health and Agricultural 
Ministries. 
The 20 original Task Force members were drawn from the Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing, the Zambia Revenue Authority, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Office of the Vice 
President (Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit), the Ministry of Tourism and 
Environment, the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, the District Health Management 
Team (under the Ministry of Health), FAO, WHO and USAID. The members consisted mainly 
of human resource personnel from these ministries. Other than the three international agencies, 
the stakeholders included were perceived as immediately relevant to the preparedness planning 
process. Their inclusion can be justified when one keeps in mind that the prevailing mindset at 
the time was that an H5Nl outbreak was just around the comer. Migratory birds had been 
implicated in H5Nl avian influenza spread; it was perceived that it was just a matter of time 
before Zambia was engulfed in the pandemic. 
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The presence of the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit signified the perception that the 
avian influenza problem had the potential to achieve national disaster status, while the Ministry 
of Finance and National Planning was included to facilitate the fmanciaI arrangements of the 
Task Force. Personnel from the District Health Management Team were included to facilitate 
countrywide dissemination of preparedness activities through the national health system, while 
the Ministry of Tourism and Environment was included specifically because of the risk of 
disease incursion presented by the movement of migratory birds, which implied wildlife and 
thus fell under the purview of the Tourism and Environment Ministry. 
The Task Force was mandated to prepare a National Response Plan for avian influenza, aimed 
at developing pre-pandemic and outbreak responses for avian influenza and initiate an avian 
influenza preparedness campaign. In the pre-pandemic phase, the main activities were to seek 
and manage funding for preparedness activities, gather migratory bird and poultry baseline data, 
and improve risk communication (primarily targeting the poUltry industry and consumers). 
There was also the aim of strengthening early warning systems through active and passive 
surveillance activities, shoring up laboratory capacity and staff training, and development of 
extension programmes promoting good farming practices and implementation of recommended 
biosecurity measures. For the health system response, the key aim was the identification and 
equipping of patient treatment facilities. The outbreak response was to focus on containment or 
delaying further spread of avian influenza in poultry populations; reduce morbidity, mortality 
and social disruption by curtailing zoonotic spread and conducting research to guide response 
measures. In verbatim: 
The overall goal of the response to Avian Influenza is to detect, control and 
eradicate the agent as quickly as possible, to return individual farms to 
production and the country to disease free status and hence prevent the disease 
spreading to humans. 
GRZ National Task Force on Avian Influenza Operational Guidelines, 2006 
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5.2.2. The framing of the highly pathogenic avian injluen1Jl threat 
The avian and human influenza prevention and control policy agenda in Zambia had been set. 
The specific areas of note are that; first, the Minister of Health played an important role in 
drawing wider government attention to the avian influenza issue. Second, the avian influenza 
problem took an animal health framing, and had now linked to concerns over biosecurity and 
poultry production and marketing practices. Third, while an assembly of multi-sectoral actors 
had been put together, as far as official documents were concerned, the roles of the other 
stakeholders were, at this stage, not very well defined beyond a gatekeeper function because 
H5Nl was not in the country. Finally, while coordination was officially left to the facilitation of 
FAO, WHO and USAID, the Ministry of Health had established oversight over avian and 
human influenza policy development. Therefore, the National Epidemics, Preparedness 
Planning and Management Committee gave the avian and human influenza issue legitimacy as 
an agenda item, and facilitated wider stakeholder involvement. 
What is striking, however, is that, while the overall purpose of the WHO's international call was 
for pandemic preparedness, avian influenza had initially taken on an imminent threat framing in 
Zambia. Several key events in the agenda setting narrative thus far point to this. Firstly. there is 
the almost 'crisis management' nature of FAO's facilitation of initial Task Force meetings. 
Secondly, the Advocacy Cabinet Memo by the Minister of Health, drawing government 
attention to the avian influenza 'threat'. had done so on a platform advocating for support for a 
very serious cholera epidemic: 
So a cabinet memo was written .. ..first of all to inform government of the 
magnitude of the cholera (problem at that time) and also of the threDt of the 
avian and human influenza which was coming ... 32(Emphasis added) 
Thirdly, the coming into play of the National Epidemics, Preparedness Planning and 
Management Committee, a powerful advocacy and coordinative multi-sectoral body of the 
32 National Surveillance Officer. Ministry of Health (11) 
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Ministry of Health under which the National Task Force on Avian influenza was established, 
the framework for the avian influenza campaign was set up and the objective of detecting and 
eradicating avian influenza as soon as possible, "to return individual farms to production and the 
country to disease free status and hence prevent the disease spreading to humans" was 
developed. Related to this, the National Task Force had been set up under the perception that 
avian influenza was a threat to Zambia, as exemplified in the interview excerpt below: 
Actually the development of the plan was a directive from the National Task 
Force which was formed when the threat of the Avian lnfluen%ll came to 
Zambia33 (emphasis added) 
Fourth, with the arrival of avian influenza on the African continent, many respondents described 
how they perceived the proximity of the avian influenza problem at the time, and invariably 
hinted at avian influenza being an imminent threat: 
[T]he Zambian government realised that this disease is no longer like in Europe 
or somewhere in the temperate regions, but the disease Iuul already come ... 34 
(emphasis added) 
[T]he argument has been if we did the blanket ban in 2006 when the disease 
itself was far away from us, what about now when it is nearer to the Zambian 
border, after the few outbreaks in West Africa and Nonh Ajrica'?s (emphasis 
added) 
The interview excerpts above all point to a view that H5Nl avian influenza was on its way. That 
this framing of the avian influenza issue as an 'imminent threat' was widely accepted, is 
evidenced by how the initial response plans were titled. The first draft was called the 
Emergency Response Plan for Avian Influenza (2005). This means the focus, literally, was to 
33 Communication Focal Person, Health Education Officer, Ministry of Health (10) 
34 Technical consultant, National Task Force on Avian and human influenza (8) 
35 Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (3) 
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control a disease that was defmitely coming and was expected to have a high impact. The next 
iteration was called Avian Influenza and Pandemic Influenza Threat: National Response Plan 
(2005-06). A later version was known as the National Response Plan for Avian and Human 
Influenza (2007-08), which, like its predecessor, incorporated the public health concerns of the 
potential for the disease to cross the species barrier. At the end of data collection, the working 
draft was called an Integrated National Action Plan for Avian and Human Influenza (2008-
present). However, while there was wider multi-sectoral involvement in the beginning when the 
document was first called the Emergency Response Plan for Avian Influenza, by the time it was 
called the Integrated National Action Plan for Avian and Human Influenza, only the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Agriculture were active. Chapter 7 explores the waning of interest 
after the pandemic was no longer perceived as imminent. The key issue here is that in 2005-06 
there was wide acceptance of the internationally set framing ofH5Nl as a potential emergency. 
5.2.3. A vian influenza as an issue for Zambia 
As the government developed its response to highly pathogenic avian influenza, the condition 
was becoming an issue for Zambia in general, specifically with regard to perceptions of the 
proximity of disease risk. In particular, the introduction of H5Nl on the African continent in 
Egypt and Nigeria in early 2006 was a significant event. Almost all respondents from the animal 
health sector took this event as their main justification for emergency preparedness activities, as 
exemplified in the statement below: 
1 think at that time the threat was very real because then Africa got, you know. 
affected and we had countries up north being affected and the disease was 
spreading and it was a matter of time. 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
The avian influenza issue had gained real significance for the country with its incursion in North 
Africa, as there were now tangible examples of disease spread on the continent. The incursion 
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of H5Nl on the African continent had made avian influenza an African problem, providing 
further reason for the development of a policy response. The disease was now perceived as 
'real'. By stating that "it was a matter of time" this further drives the point that the threat of 
disease occurrence was also perceived as imminent. This perception, of course had been 
building up from before, in the way that that the Minister of Health had presented the avian 
influenza issue to Zambia, and in the way that the National Surveillance Officer in the Ministry 
of Health had perceived the significance of the Advocacy Cabinet Memorandum. 
Other stakeholders, who became involved much later in the policy process, also shed light on 
the significance of avian influenza's incursion on the African continent: 
You know, we all know that influenza is a very ancient disease but all along 
countries like in Africa have been thinking that influenza itself has not been a 
big deal .... Way until you know, 1997 and also until 2003 when ... the advent of 
H5 started making headlines, that was the time that WHO requested all 
countries around the world to actually prepare for eventual outbreaks because 
they saw a situation where the disease was going to spread .. . from chicken to 
chicken as well as from chickens to humans and also posing as a candidate for 
a pandemic kind of outbreak. So it was at that time that we in Zambia we saw 
situations where ... we actually saw the disease spreading from one country to 
another, and eventually it actually reached Africa. Countries like Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Egypt actually had these outbreaks and at that time you know our 
government, the Zambian government realised that this disease is no longer like 
in Europe or somewhere in the temperate regions, but the disease had already 
come ... 
Technical consultant, National Task Force on Avian and human influenza (8) 
Awareness of events relating to the evolving highly pathogenic avian influenza issue and its 
relationship with pandemic concerns had begun to grow. The respondent above was of the view 
that for many countries in Africa, avian influenza had not been considered a priority, since it 
seemed to only be a problem for countries in Asia and Europe. Clearly, the avian influenza 
outbreaks in North Africa from February 2006 brought the global reality of the avian influenza 
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problem to Africa. It had become a problem for African countries and by extension, a problem 
for Zambia. Given the different species of poultry affected by H5Nl highly pathogenic avian 
influenza, it is interesting that, other than migratory birds, the only forms of poUltry thought to 
be of any significance for the Zambian situation was the transfer of H5Nl from chicken to 
chicken. 
5.2.4. Buying in: The media, perception of risk and its economic impact 
Other than its emergence on the African continent, avian influenza had also established itself as 
an issue for Zambia in other ways. One way was in public perception of HSNI risk. Deserving 
special consideration, the media in particular, played a role in establishing the issue and in 
facilitating stakeholder 'buy in.' In early 2006, reports in the local media began to surface of 
possible incursions of avian influenza into the country, spurred, of course, by wider global 
reports of the continued spread of the poultry pandemic in Asia, Europe and Africa. These 
reports resulted in a real economic impact for the poUltry industry in Zambia, facilitated the 
inclusion of new actors in the policy process and the addition of a communication strategy to 
the avian and human influenza response. 
Up to the point the National Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza had been set up, there 
had not been any involvement of the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry in particular, or 
the trade sector in general. However, that changed when media reports of possible 'Bird-flu' 
outbreaks in the country began to surface, which began to shape public perceptions of H5Nl 
risk which had a negative impact on the poultry industry: 
[W]e realised that it (avian influenza) gained a lot of prominence in the press 
and the prominence was full of fake things and people were just downloading 
the Turkey situation or the China situation and making it appear as if it was a 
Zmnbian situation . .. . In the three months of the AI prominence in the ... (Media) 
... we as an industry lost to a tune of 30 billion kwacha36 in three months. So we 
woke up from slumber and took a leading role in the sensitization of our 
36 This amounts to approximately £3.9 million 
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members and also the general public. Because what that entailed was that 
farmers became scared, they stopped placing, they scaled down on their 
production, including large scale farmers. That had a telling effect on the 
breeders, it had a telling effect on the milling companies, it had a telling effect 
on the veterinary service providers and finally we had a blow when the 
consumer also realised that they cannot eat chicken because they have got some 
health risks. 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
While I had expected to find the poultry industry to have been an initial stakeholder in 
developing a response to avian influenza, from the above, it is clear that initially the industry 
had been unaffected and ambivalent to the global avian influenza situation. However, its 
position changed drastically as a cascade of effects from the media reports began to take hold. 
Fuelled by international reports, any significant mortality in chicken flocks was assumed to be 
the start of the poultry panzootic in Zambia by the local media. A review of some of the news 
articles pertinent to the time revealed that these reports were also in the media towards the end 
of 2005, around the period that the National Task Force was formed. According to the Poultry 
Association of Zambia's Executive Director, the reports of 'Bird-flu' outbreaks in Zambia 
sparked a panic among consumers and producers alike. The result was a significant loss to the 
poultry sector that spanned breeders, producers, the feed industry, the veterinary 
pharmaceuticals industry and finally consumers. The poultry industry was thus spurred to 
counter the negative reports and restore the industry's productivity. This was confirmed by 
several government officials who admitted that the first information brochures sent out to 
farmers were actually produced by the Poultry Association of Zambia. The poultry association 
then became the official mobilizers for the National Task Force on Avian Influenza, acting as 
liaison between its membership countrywide and the Task Force secretariat. Interestingly, these 
very media reports resulted in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia's largest poultry 
export market, banning the import of Zambian poultry and poultry products. 
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It also emerged that the Ministry of Agriculture was formulating a response for an industry they 
didn't really understand. An example of this is exemplified by the excerpt below, suggesting the 
important gaps in information perceived by the Ministry of Agriculture: 
[W]hat is very clear for Zambia is that we do not have, ... apart from what you 
can get from the commercial sector, we don't have reliable statistics .... so there 
is this survey which has been to collect more data on the poultry you know, so 
that when it comes to measuring ... the risk, you are measuring it from reliable 
information ... data of what is prevailing on the ground. So again in Zambia we 
are attempting now to collect that census data, the poultry census for the 
country, so that we can have something comprehensive ... 
Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (3) 
Very little was known about the traditional poultry sector in Zambia, given its low priority 
status on the government agenda. This made it difficult for decision-makers to discern the risks 
presented by traditional poultry production systems. Critical information gaps existed, and it 
was perceived prudent to conduct a country wide poultry census. The intention to gather poultry 
census data suggested a financially motivated, rather than a risk motived, action. Such 
information was easily obtainable from Zambia's Central Statistics Office, which collected 
information of living conditions across Zambia and included information on domestic poultry 
keeping households, down to location and species, across the country (CSO 2004). More 
importantly, neither the policy documents reviewed nor the government decision-makers 
interviewed mentioned, extensively, the links between employment, feed production and 
veterinary pharmaceutical delivery to the commercial poultry industry. The position that the 
government was formulating a response for an industry it didn't understand was voiced very 
clearly by the poultry association Executive Director: 
I think the understanding of the livestock sector, in Zambia, by the public 
service is somehow narrow. And that is another area which creates a lot of 
concern. You may wish to know that, if you look at public pronouncements, they 
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are in a fashion that depicts ignorance. It is like you have a Ministry which 
doesn't understand its own stakeholders. And that kind of gap is so enormous 
that we don't see any tangible results from the government planning for the 
sector. Because there has been this distance created where the public service 
officers have distanced themselves from the industry and they have very little 
understanding on the status of the industry in this country. Hence we have got 
cases where they are just ratifying protocols without due regard for what status 
the industry is in ... 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
The public sector, specifically the Ministry of Agriculture, was unaware that the poultry 
industry was both a sensitive industry and a significant contributor to GDP. The respondent 
above also stated that while the livestock sector contributed 16% to GDP, nearly 47% of this 
was the poultry industry's contribution, while the rest was shared among cattle, sheep and goats 
and fish. With regard to the poultry industry's response to the avian influenza media scares, the 
Poultry Association of Zambia responded by providing statements in the media refuting the 
reported incursion of 'bird-flu' into Zambia (Zambia Daily Mail, April 3, 2006) and reassuring 
the nation of the safety of chicken consumption. Subsequently, the communication strategy 
developed included sensitization workshops with journalists on responsible reporting. 
The media reports also facilitated an entree for other stakeholders in the avian and human 
influenza prevention and control policy process, among them, the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, the National Agricultural Information Service (NAIS) unit under the Ministry of 
AgriCUlture, and the Health Education Unit under the Ministry of Health. The World Bank also 
became involved, partly because the media reports had raised concern, and because it had 
identified a gap in Zambia's National Response Plan with regards to communication. Personnel 
from NAIS trace their introduction to the avian and human influenza prevention and control 
policy process to reports of alleged avian influenza outbreaks in Livingstone, in the southern 
part of Zambia, and a high density, low income residential area of Lusaka known as Bauleni. 
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The origin of the whole thing is that when we had first report from Livingstone 
that birds were falling there .... it was reported, in fact by ZNBC7, and the way 
it was reported it was "Bird-flu comes to Zambia" .... So us at NAIS we did not 
have that information, meanwhile our friends the vet people, they picked up the 
issue. Before they (the vet 'people') could go very far, there was a consultant, a 
World Bank consultant that had come. I remember we had the first meeting at 
World Bank, by that time they were at Anglo American building there. So her 
main concern was how Zambia had handled the first alarm, those alarms that 
were there. That it was mishandled and she wanted to find out the systems that 
are there. During all that period, the people that were giving responses ... 
updating the communities about the whole disease were mainly the health 
people. 
Senior Information Officer, National Agricultural Information Service, MACO (12) 
This report, which appears to have been covered by both electronic and print media, later turned 
out to be a case of poisoning (Xinhua News Agency, June, 27, 2006). At this stage, it was still 
mainly the Ministry of Health updating the nation on avian influenza. This is corroborated by a 
review of several news articles on the avian influenza situation in Zambia between the period 
October to December 2005, in which statements on avian influenza were given by the Minister 
of Health (Xinhua News Agency Article date: October 27, 2(05), the Deputy Minister of Health 
(BBC Monitoring International Reports, November 18, 2(05), and the Director of Public Health 
and Research, who was also Task Force co-chair (Xinhua News Agency Article date: December 
10,2(05). 
As described by a Senior Information Officer from NAIS, the World Bank became concerned 
with the way that the initial media reports had been handled. The World Bank, through its 
representative, wanted to know what communication structures were in place. During this 
process of inquiry, the World Bank also made an assessment of Zambia's National Response 
Plan. 
37 Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation. This is the national broadcasting service. 
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[Allier we did the National Response Plan the World Bank came along and that 
was presented to them. Comments were made on the National Response Plan 
and one of the ... critiques of the document was that it didn't have a 
communication component. So we were then told to bring on board Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, and they would lead the communication 
component. But you must appreciate that Ministry of Agriculture has a 
communication component called NAIS, the National Agriculture and 
Information Centre, so they were also co-opted into that committee and so was 
the Ministry of Healtk 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
The involvement of the World Bank of course is not surprising, because in the context of the 
global pandemic response, it was one of the key international bodies funding the avian influenza 
control initiative. Indeed, the World Bank was the largest financial contributor to the 
development of the avian influenza framework in Zambia. The World Bank made its release of 
close to one million dollars for preparedness activities in Zambia conditional on the Task Force 
including the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting as leader of the communication 
strategy, as evidenced by one respondent, "All projects have come with a condition that we 
involve the Ministry of information and Broadcasting, but we have NAIS and Health Education 
wings under MACO and MoH respectively.,,38 By identifying the need for the National 
Response Plan to have a communication strategy, an entree was provided for personnel from 
NAIS and the Health Education Unit under the Ministry of Health to be co-opted into the policy 
process. 
H5Nl was not in the country during the period of data collection, but was still a problem for 
countries in the parts of the world that had actually experienced outbreaks. By virtue of its 
continued spread, it represented a possible problem for animal health and a potential threat to 
38 Senior veterinary research Officer (4) 
144 
human health. However, perceptions of avian influenza risk appeared to have resulted in a real 
economic impact. This impact, while apparently not providing further impetus for avian and 
influenza prevention and control policy formulation, facilitated the active involvement of 
stakeholders such as the Poultry Association of Zambia. The substantive effect of perceptions of 
avian influenza risk as generated by the media also resulted in; firstly, development of a 
communication strategy that required the involvement of the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, and later NAIS and the Health Education Unit under the Ministry of Health. 
Secondly, the generation of reports by the Poultry Association of Zambia to assure the public of 
the safety of chicken, and thirdly, sensitizing the media on responsible reporting. 
5.3. Issue framing: Problem definitions for avian and human influenza in Zambia 
The issue of avian or human influenza should never ever ever be narrowed to a 
health or livestock issue, it goes far beyond that. In a situation of a major 
outbreak, assuming the virus goes under some mutation and it becomes lethal 
to human beings, certain level of infection will require the government banning 
gatherings, the government instituting curfews, the government asking the 
military to play certain specific roles and a particular ministry, it will require 
the cordoning of airports, cordoning off any other strategic institutions. Now if 
you look at all that, which immediately comes into play, should we get to that 
level, God forbid, it is not at the level of a ministry that such decisions can be 
made, it will always be at a level above a ministry. 
National Coordinator, Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (20) 
The respondent above summarises quite nicely that avian and human influenza cannot be 
viewed as merely a human health or livestock issue. The discussion up to this point has 
demonstrated that the agenda setting process in Zambia had various dimensions which 
illuminated some of the key stakeholders of the policy process, as described to me by my 
respondents. This reveals the different framings that were created in understanding the avian 
influenza problem. To bring this all together, this section presents, specmcally, the various ways 
in which the avian influenza problem was framed by respondents: 
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• An exotic emerging disease 
[W]e don't have avian influenza as you know. It is an exotic disease to us, but it 
is a possible emerging disease ... 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal person, Ministry of Agriculture 
(2) 
• A zoonotic disease of limited zoonotic potential: 
o [A]vian influenza is a disease (that) mainly starts in animals then it passes to 
hu,man;9 
o [A]vian influenza basically was viewed as a more of an animal disease which 
then moves into human beings ... 40 
• A problem most likely to emerge from peasant farmers with poor biosecurity and low 
awareness. 
[A]s we talk about avian influenza we believe that avian influenza may come 
from a poor farmer who doesn't believe in biosecurity ... 
... we see most of these guys as lack of ... knowledge. They don't really 
understand some of these issues so we think that it is from there, lack of 
information and knowledge that the disease can come ... 
Non-Governmental Organization Poultry Consultant on Avian Influenza (6) 
• A disease whose treatment in humans is known to be highly technical and resource 
intensive. 
[W]e have learnt from our colleagues that have had the outbreak the case 
fatality rate is very high. Also the nature of management of a patient with avian 
influenza is highly technical and we are not in a position to manage to treat a 
lot of patients if we had ... because a lot of them would need to be managed 
possibly under intensive care kind of management. 
Health Education Officer, Ministry of Health (10) 
3~ask Force Member and Animal Health Focal person. Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
40 Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (3) 
146 
• A bird disease that represents a pandemic threat. 
[T]here is an understanding that this disease of birds can now infect human 
beings. To what extent it affects human beings; ... you go back to the (WHO) 
avian and human influenza pandemic phases ... 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
• A disease that could affect Zambia's trading status. 
[I]t poses a danger to our own exports because once the poultry products 
.. . from Zambia for example are found to be infected with that avian influenza 
then we cannot export it. 
Acting Director, Domestic Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry (18) 
[Y]ou may wish to know that in the region, it's only this country that has not 
recorded any major disease outbreak and hence we are considered the cleanest 
environment in the whole region. And we would want to remain as such. 41 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
The problem definitions above express both the current state of avian and human influenza in 
Zambia and the perceived risk it represented for the various stakeholders, and more specifically 
the animal health, public health and trade sectors. Therefore these problem definitions represent 
the three ways in which the risk of avian and human influenza is perceived in Zambia. First, the 
reality, as understood by decision-makers is that avian influenza is an 'exotic' condition, i.e. not 
in the country, but it is a trade threat. Secondly, there is the understanding of its zoonotic 
potential and where some of the risks lay, i.e. a condition of poultry whose risk of spread is 
related to poor 'biosecurity,42, and thirdly the implications for Zambia should an H5Nl 
incursion occur and become fully zoonotic. The above also suggests a process of developing 
ownership of an agenda that some respondents perceived to be externally driven as exemplified 
in the abstract below: 
41 In this case, the reference was made in light of other diseases and not just highly pathogenic avian 
influenza 
42 Interestingly in the context of avian influenza prevention and control awareness, three conceptual 
understandings of biosecurity were identified, biosecurity was viewed as a process i.e. the steps needed to 
exclude disease, a state; the extent to which measures to exclude disease existed and an act; the extent to 
which measures to exclude disease were utilized. 
147 
[P]robably this thing is being looked at more from the developed World point of 
view... they probably looked at the threat of avian influenza and then they 
spearheaded this whole thing of us forming a Task Force. us coming up with a 
preparedness plan and all that ... 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
This last excerpt summarises very neatly the sentiment of many of the animal health 
respondents; that the avian influenza response is largely an externally driven agenda. The three 
ways in which the risk of avian and human influenza is perceived in Zambia also have 
implications for the policy formulation process, which will be discussed in the following 
empirical chapters. The implications include shifts in priorities over time, changes in 
stakeholder involvement, and the potential risks created, or missed in the process. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Policy formulation: Defining roles, coordination and interrelationships 
6 Introduction 
The previous chapter described avian and human influenza prevention and control policy 
agenda setting in Zambia. It introduced and described the roles of six key policy stakeholders; 
the FAD, the WHO, the World Bank, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the Poultry Association of Zambia, in the agenda setting process. The key issues identified were 
that highly pathogenic avian influenza took on a largely animal health framing; and was also 
viewed as an emergency. It was its status as an imminent zoonotic threat that raised H5N I' s 
profile on the Zambian Government agenda, resulting in considerable political support for 
policy formulation. The chapter argued that the economic impact of perceptions of H5Nl risk 
was a strong motivation for the participation of the Poultry As~ociation of Zambia in policy 
development. Also identified were the three ways in which the avian and human influenza 
problem was understood by policy-makers in Zambia. That highly pathogenic avian influenza 
had been framed first as an impending emergency second as a largely animal health problem 
and third as a potential zoonotic threat is important to understanding the specifics of policy 
formulation. 
Continuing this analysis of how the national policy on the control and prevention of HSNl was 
set and developed across the sectors of animal health, public health and trade in Zambia, this 
second empirical chapter is an analysis of the avian and human influenza prevention and control 
policy formulation process. It also highlights some of the tensions, challenges and deficiencies 
in avian and human influenza policy formulation in Zambia for the period 2005-2007. The 
chapter introduces the key policy formulating body for avian and human influenza prevention 
and control. It then describes the formulation process of five areas of policy decision identified 
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as significant by respondents; the trade ban, the surveillance strategy, the communication 
strategy, the declaration of avian influenza as a notifiable disease and the fonnation of Rapid 
Response Teams. The discussion of each includes an analysis of respondents' perceptions of 
what transpired in relation to policy formulation and the effect the initial framing of the avian 
and human influenza problem had in defining the policy process. In particular, the chapter 
identifies the 'imminent threat' framing as a problem for policy development as Zambia moved 
from an emergency focus to preparedness and capacity building, because it limited the 
legitimate involvement of important stakeholders. It also restricted Zambia's ability to use 
highly pathogenic avian influenza as a platform for developing sustainable risk management 
approaches. 
6.1. The Zambia Natio1UJ1 Working Group on Avian and Human Influenza 
As identified in the previous chapter, after the formation of the National Task Force on Avian 
and Human Influenza in Zambia, a National Working Group was constituted to carry out the 
technical activities related to the emergency response. The initial animal health/imminent threat 
framing of the H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza problem in Zambia resulted in a mainly 
animal health response to H5Nl. Its status as a zoonosis and a potential candidate for a human 
influenza pandemic served to generate considerable momentum for policy development. 
Support for avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development was 
considerable. As part of the development of Zambia's avian influenza response, the Zambia 
National Working Group on Avian and Human Influenza was formed under the auspices of the 
National Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza in 2005. According to the National Task 
Force operational guidelines43, the Working Group was to be its technical arm, responsible for 
generating the response to the perceived threat of an H5Nlincursion into Zambian poultry. The 
Working Group was mandated to develop Zambia's National Response Plan for Avian and 
Human Influenza prevention and control, and spearhead all preparedness related activities. The 
personnel constituting the National Working Group on Avian and Human Influenza were drawn 
43 GRZ National Task Force on Avian Influenza Operational Guidelines, 2006 
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mainly from the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health: 
[H]ere in Zambia the Ministry of Agriculture was chosen as the leading 
Government ministry with the Ministry of Health. And under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development was the 
key ... I would actually call it secretariat. So from the inception it was mostly 
Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. There is a National Task Force; 
I think somebody has explained that it's a lot of ministries. (Then) there is 
actually the secretariat which is the Working Group. Those are the people that 
do most of the issues, drafting of policies and presenting them. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
The two Ministries constituted the core of the National Working Group on Avian and Human 
Influenza that formulated avian and human influenza prevention and control policy. As key 
stakeholders in the policy formulation process, the Ministry of Agricultme and the Ministry of 
Health assumed the role of generating, presenting and circulating the avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy in Zambia. This policy took the form of the National Response 
Plan on Avian and Human Influenza, which was still in its draft form by the end of fieldwork in 
December 2009. With the process of drafting the response plan underway, funding and material 
support began to pour in. According to respondents, the main funders were the World Bank. 
contributing close to one million dollars, and the EU, through the FAO, contributing about 
€175,OOO. 
Seventy percent of the World Bank funding went to the Ministry of Agriculture, while the 
remaining 30% went to the Ministry of Health. Most of the World Bank funding was utilized to 
set up the preparedness framework, including the purchase of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
for surveillance activities, and renovation laboratory facilities under the Ministry of Health and 
the Ministry of Agriculture. With this initial capital investment, the emergency response was 
underway. A series of planning meetings were held to chart Zambia's course of action. 
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According to the National Task Force Operational Guidelines (2006) and key respondents, the 
plan of action was to prevent an H5Nl incursion into poultry flocks. H an incursion were to take 
place, the next course of action would be to detect outbreaks promptly, curtail H5Nl spread to 
humans, limit its pandemic potential and institute measures that would restore the country to 
'peace-time' pre-pandemic status: 
When Avian Influenza became a major scare, there was a demand that every 
government should form Task Force ... (an) approach that will deal with Avian 
Influenza looking at three factors prevention, control and restoration back to 
production. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
The overall goal of the response to Avian Influenza is to detect, control and 
eradicate the agent as quickly as possible, to return individual farms to 
production and the country to disease free status and hence prevent the disease 
spreading to humans. 
GRZ National Task Force on Avian Influenza Operational Guidelines, 2006 
As the 'first line of defence', the animal health response focused on prevention and control in 
the poultry population to complement disease prevention and control in the human populace. 
Envisioned to work synergistically with the animal health response, the human health response 
was focused on a wider pandemic preparedness agenda: 
There are three phases of the epidemic, the pre-pandemic, the first phase we 
have discussed is the pre pandemic, the pre-pandemic where we collaborate 
with other stakeholders, that's why we had that committee. The idea in the pre-
pandemic is to reduce risk (through) communication to communities, that is 
why I was talking about the meetings we have been having ... Then the second 
phase is the emergence of the pandemic virus, the purpose of this phase is to 
contain the virus or delay the spread at the source; and the last one is the 
pandemic one which I wanted to discuss with you. Now naturally the pandemic 
phase was to reduce the bird to bird and zoonotic transmission, reduce 
morbidity, to reduce mortality and social disruption. 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
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6.2. From an emergency response to preparedness and capacity building 
This section provides an overview of the National Response Plan activities in the period 
covering 2005-2007. A number of preparedness related activities were undertaken by the 
National Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza, through its Working Group during this 
period. It was the role of the Working Group to formulate Zambia's response to highly 
pathogenic avian influenza. The draft National Response Plan developed by the National Avian 
Influenza Working Group had a three component plan of action; an animal health strategy, a 
human health strategy and communication strategy. Training sessions were conducted at both 
national and international levels for staff from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of 
Health on animal health, human health and communication. This included regional training 
exercises, particularly within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Laboratories at the Central Veterinary Research Institute under the Veterinary Department and 
the University Teaching Hospital44 were stocked with avian influenza diagnostic reagents. An 
additional stakeholder, the University of Zambia's School of Veterinary Medicine. provided 
further diagnostic support. The School of Veterinary Medicine possessed the only P3 
laboratory45 in the country and. other than the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute in South 
Africa. was the only laboratory competent to handle live influenza viruses in the Southern 
African region. The laboratory at the Central Veterinary Institute was to concentrate on 
influenza surveillance in domestic poultry. the University Teaching Hospital would conduct 
surveillance in humans. and the School of Veterinary Medicine would carry out surveillance in 
wild birds. While this was meant to be the case, there was considerable overlap in the Central 
Veterinary Institute'S and the School of Veterinary Medicine's surveillance focuses. In addition. 
awareness campaigns were conducted in many parts of the country. 
44 This is the largest hospital in Zambia. located in the capital city Lusaka. 
45 This is a laboratory biosafety/containment classification. The designation signifies a facility capable of 
the safe handling of indigenous or exotic agents with the potential to cause lethal disease through 
inhalation or contact. The P3 laboratory at the School of Veterinary Medicine was set up and equipped 
with support from Hokkaido University in Japan. under a wider zoonosis project, but dedicated most of 
its time to influenza diagnoses. 
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As part of the control strategy, a partial import trade ban on poultry and poultry products was 
effected in early 2006. A number of media workshops were also held, aimed at sensitizing the 
media on responsible reporting and co-opting the media into the communication strategy. Under 
the National Response Plan, this was to be the main method through which the public would be 
sensitized on avian and human influenza. The media sensitization exercise was also the Task 
Force's response to the media scares that had been generated from late 2005 to mid-2006, 
conducted to lessen the negative consequences of sensational reporting. 
Central to the preparedness strategy was the formation of Rapid Response Teams in all the nine 
provinces of Zambia. composed of personnel from the Ministry of Health, the Veterinary 
Department, and the media. These were envisioned to be the first to arrive on the scene of an 
avian influenza outbreak. Zambia had taken an emergency stance to respond to the perceived 
threat of H5Nl -avian influenza. 
6.3. The trade ban on poultry and poultry products in 2006 
For Zambia, a significant event preceding its partial ban on poultry and poultry product trade 
was the outbreak of non-zoonotic H5N2 highly pathogenic avian influenza in neighbouring 
Zimbabwe in December 2005. According to the International Society for Infectious Diseases 
(lSIO 2(05), on 8th December 2005, Zimbabwe reported the H5N2 outbreak on two ostrich 
farms in its Matebeleland North Province, an area geographically delineated from Zambia's 
Southern Province by the Zambezi River. Following this report, the spokesperson for Zambia's 
National Task Force, a senior ranking Ministry of Health official, issued a statement in the press 
announcing that all personnel at Zambia's border entry points had been instructed to halt poultry 
and poultry product movement into and out of the country, particularly along its shared border 
with Zimbabwe (Xinhua News Agency Article date: December 10, 2(05). It is important to 
note that a separate poultry and poultry product trade ban for Newcastle disease had been in 
force against Zimbabwe since 2004. The ban of poultry and poultry products from Zimbabwe 
was therefore nothing new. Following the identification of the H5N2 problem, Zimbabwe's 
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avian influenza Task Force instituted its own control measures, temporarily banning the export 
of all ostrich and other poultry products from Zimbabwe (Fin24.com news article. Article date: 
8th December, 2(05). It was claimed by a few participants at a field simulation exercise held in 
Zambia in 2009 that the outbreak in Zimbabwe had been a result of its link to a poultry 
enterprise in South Africa46• 
Following the H5Nl outbreaks in Nigeria and other countries in West and North Africa in early 
2006, on 20th March 2006, the Zambian Government announced a partial ban on import of 
poultry and poultry products into Zambia. This measure was intended to be preventive, aimed at 
reducing Zambia's risk of an avian influenza outbreak. Although the Department of Veterinary 
and Livestock Development had instigated the ban, the official announcement of this decision 
was made by the Minister of Health, Sylvia Masebo (Fin24.com News Article, Article Date: 
20th March, 2006). This particular news article further states that, "Masebo said though Zambia 
had not reported any cases of the H5Nl virus in poultry or human beings, the country was on 
full alert because threat of the feared Bird-flu was no longer far way, but on the country's 
'doorsteps' ." 
While driven by an emergency/imminent threat framing, with health personnel taking centre 
stage, the Zambian response with regard to the trade ban was not unique. With the arrival of the 
Asian-lineage H5Nl on the African continent, bans on poultry and poultry product imports were 
widespread. For example, one respondent, an FAO consultant47 assisting Zambia with the 
evaluation its National Response Plan, spoke of the ban that had been imposed in his West 
African country, based on the understanding that trade had played an important role in the 
spread ofH5Nl in the West African region. With the imposition of the ban, his country directed 
its efforts and resources to mitigating the risk of H5Nl incursion presented by migratory bird 
activity. Another respondent, a COMESA Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) expert also spoke 
46 Field work diary, avian influenza outbreak simulation exercise held in Chi samba, Zambia, 29 to 30 
September 2009. 
47 FAO international consultant (7) 
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of how poultry and poultry product trade had been threatened through bans that had been 
imposed in some COMESA member states at the height of the HSN! panzootic: 
[Olf course it threatened trade, it became a real trade issue because a lot of 
countries began to impose bans on imponation of poultry and pOUltry products, 
so the movement of birds was curtailed and that affected a number of countries. 
There is a country within the COMES A region that completely banned any 
importation of poultry and poultry products and yet that country has no 
commercial poultry production. And so if you went ... at that time if you went to 
that country and you were looking to eat chicken or something like that, you 
should be content with village chicken, because you will not find commercial 
chicken anywhere. 
COMESA SPS Expert (22) 
As a result of the perceived risk to and from trade, the poUltry industry saw itself as the sector of 
society that stood to lose the most from an HSN! incursion in the country. Given this backdrop, 
it was the view of the Zambian poultry industry that trade was the primary risk for avian 
influenza and the regulation of trade by government was the only feasible course of action to 
reduce this risk: 
[W]e have actually made it very clear to our Government that trade is the cause 
of all these risks and as long as they are not able to regulate poultry trade, 
within their means and ranks, then we are a very high risk country. 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
The Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development responded to the threat of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza by restricting poUltry imports to grandparent and parent stock, and 
hatching eggs. According to several senior respondents in the Veterinary Department and one 
respondent from the Poultry Association of Zambia, imports were restricted to these classes of 
poultry to ensure industry's continued productivity, as the supply of breeding stock was the 
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lifeline of the poultry industry. Motivated by an economic imperative, this policy decision was 
actively supported by the Poultry Association of Zambia: 
[W]e engaged Government (and) we agreed that we should actually go the 
route of banning poultry and poultry products into the country and that has 
been the practice up to now. We do not allow the import of poultry and poultry 
products into the country. But. ... we are importing breeding stock .... we cannot 
do without breeding stock, we need to continue production and breeding stock 
is very critical in that area. So we agreed with Government that they should 
allow hatching eggs and pure lines: grandparent and parent stock. So 
importation has been limited to those classes of breeding stock I have just 
mentioned. 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
The Ministry of Health and the Veterinary Department in Zambia had pursued the trade ban 
because of its perceived capacity to reduce the trade-related risk of an H5Nl incursion. The 
partial ban on poultry and poultry product imports was instituted because the Working Group 
had identified trade as a pertinent risk for an H5Nl disease incursion in the country. This import 
ban aligned with the economic interests of the Poultry Association of Zambia. The trade ban, as 
announced by the Minister of Health, was thus instituted to aid in the prevention of a possible 
disease incursion: 
[W]e decided as Government to say fine, we cut down on importation of these 
birds, wild birds and these day old chicks ... and we concentrate on importation 
of breeding stock and hatching eggs, yeah, to help us with the controls. 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal Person, Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
For many government animal health respondents, the fact that Zambia has eight neighbours and 
vast borders was cardinal among the reasons to justify the continued existence of the trade ban 
beyond 2006. Respondents felt quite strongly that Zambia's long borders, consistently described 
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as 'porous' even by one human health respondent48, was a high risk for disease incursion, a 
position that appeared to have had the backing of the FAO: 
According to Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), although Zambia is 
currently free of the virus, the country is at high risk because of many 
neighbouring countries, which has led to increase in human traffic and trade in 
poultry and poultry products. Of even greater concern, is the fact that the virus 
- if conditions allowed - can change into a form that is easily transmissible 
from human to human for instance the Spanish human influenza pandemic of 
191811919 that led to over 40 million deaths. 
Zambia's National Response Plan on Avian and Human Influenza, 2008 version, p.6 
It was the ease with which people and goods, specifically poultry and poultry products, could 
move across Zambia's 'porous' borders that was perceived to represent a potential risk for 
H5Nl's incursion into the country. Understanding that HSNI was mostly in West and North 
Africa, there was no real evidence to support this perceived high risk of H5Nl from Zambia's 
immediate neighbours. The FAO's endorsement and ranking of this risk is telling of the 
international perspective motivating the trade ban, a perspective that found resonance among 
some local stakeholders, even in the face of the multitude of trade agreements to which Zambia 
is party: 
[p]robably the greatest risk of an incursion of avian influenza into any country 
is through trade of pOUltry and poultry products, so you will notice that Zambia 
actually has got borders with about eight countries and all these borders are 
very very porous. And not only being porous but there is massive trade from 
south to north and vice versa and also from east to west and obviously 
increasing the potential, you know, for the incursion of this virus into the 
country. 
Technical Consultant, National Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza (8) 
48 Health Education Officer, Ministry of Health (10) 
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We are supposed to allow trade freely as a country, but we've looked at the 
high risk of us opening up trade as a country, ok? We feel we are at higher risk, 
one of the biggest problems being our porous borders. So we haven't hidden, 
we have come openly and said, for us, trade will be restricted to this. 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal Person, Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
To demonstrate what respondents meant by 'porous', during one surveillance visit to a border 
post in Zambia by one of my respondents and his colleagues, day old chicks from Tanzania had 
been found on the Zambian side with a local trader. The trader had at first claimed he had 
bought the day old chicks on the Zambian side, but admitted upon further interrogation, the 
source of the poultry was from Tanzania. The veterinary officer in charge of that border town 
was surprised that such a thing had happened. Interestingly, during the same surveillance 
exercise, the personnel from the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development camped 
at a lodge on the Tanzanian side of the border that they had driven to without going through a 
border checkpoint! 
The ban was not an unreasonable precaution as there were clear precedents elsewhere on the 
continent. In Zambia, like other countries on the continent, the perceived imminence of the 
H5Nl threat had necessitated the instigation of this emergency control measure, starting with a 
trade restriction following the outbreak of H5N2 in Zimbabwe in December 2005, and the 
declaration of a more substantive partial import ban in late March 2006. These trade restrictions 
had been imposed on health grounds. The Ministry of Health had taken the lead in making 
public pronouncements, evidence, at least from the public's viewpoint, of the primacy of health 
protection over trade. The trade ban was perceived to be a major control measure, despite the 
porous nature of Zambia's borders. The Poultry Association of Zambia had engaged 
government to institute the ban, and the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development 
obliged, providing for the industry's continued productivity, while keeping potential 
competition out. 
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6.3.1. The relevance of the trade ban on poultry and poultry products 
The WHO call for pandemic preparedness had been a multi-country initiative. The trade ban in 
Zambia had been instituted in a context where many of the countries in Southern African region 
were simultaneously developing response plans and shoring up their emergency response 
capacity. It must be noted that it is possible that. while countries were at different levels of 
preparedness, the aggregate effect of multiple regional responses may have had a positive effect 
in controlling H5Nt's spread. At the time Zambia was establishing its National Task Force and 
Working Group, all of Zambia's neighbours; Angola, Namibia, Botswana, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, were doing the same. 
Furthermore, each of these countries possessed different levels of potential for the commercial 
export of poultry and poUltry products, their poultry enterprises being at various stages of 
development. Of these countries, according to a USAID Stamping Out Pandemic and Avian 
Influenza (STOP Al)49 report (2008), only Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique had 
export orientated production systems, while Botswana, also an exporter, had a highly integrated 
and biosecure commercial poultry industry and therefore had a more controlled poultry 
production system that posed little risk. A country report on Newcastle disease submitted to the 
Australian International Centre for Agricultural Research (Bamhare 2(01) in 2000, states that 
countries like Namibia did not export any poultry and poultry products, its arid landscape 
imposing limitations on poUltry production that made it difficult for local industry to meet even 
the consumption demands of its human population of fewer than two million. This trend had not 
changed at the height of the H5Nl panzootic in 2005. At an avian influenza conference held in 
Pretoria, South Africa in 2006, a veterinary department representative claimed that Namibia had 
no poultry exports at aliSO. According to key informants, the Democratic Republic of Congo was 
49 This is a United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) global project on avian and 
pandemic influenza. STOP AI stands for Stamping out Pandemic and Avian Influenza. Its objective was 
to increase global capacity to contain H5Nl avian influenza in animals. therefore minimizing its spread 
from animals to humans and the opportunity for it to develop into a pandemic strain. 
50 See Regional Workshop on Notifiable Avian Influenza (NAI) in SADC 
Pretoria. South Africa. 7th - 9th March 2006 http://www.nda.agric.zaldocslGenPub/workshopAvian.htm 
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Zambia's largest poultry export market. Zimbabwe faced a double ban on poultry and poultry 
products, the fIrst being the ban imposed in 2004 because of Newcastle Disease, the second was 
the temporary ban imposed after the HSN2 outbreak. Tanzania and Angola's poultry industries 
were primarily domestic. Many of these countries had instituted trade bans against H5Nl 
hotspot countries such as Nigeria and Egypt, primarily on health grounds. This provides further 
evidence that the perceived risk of an H5Nl incursion from Zambia's immediate neighbours 
was probably not as high as it was made out to be. In the case of Zambia, the Poultry 
Association was of the view that fostering the development of the local industry should have 
been the primary reason for maintaining the ban: 
All the countries in the region have taken measures to ensure that avian flu 
does not break out in their countries and one of them is banning trade. We have 
a situation where our officers will be making reference to DIE and all sorts of 
things, but DIE is not only meant for Zambia, it's for every country, but 
economic decisions are made purely based on what you think your industry will 
take in and protect it and that is what is lacking in this country. 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
Interestingly, it was claimed by several animal health respondents that the imperative for the 
Veterinary Department instituting the partial ban was its limited number of veterinary personnel 
to adequately monitor trans-boundary poUltry and poUltry product trade: 
[K]eep in mind that some of our borders are quite porous and we don't have 
personnel at all border posts so that might be the most likely entry point. 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
You see the ban, I think even under wro, that SPS agreement, I think it 
provides for, what they call, something that I will call a conservative approach, 
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a precautionary approach because normally we don't have resources for 
disease control and our borders are quite porous and quite vast. 
Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (3) 
This view was shared by the Poultry Association of Zambia: 
We have a very fragile veterinary system such that even if we had an outbreak 
today, they would not even contain it. 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
Strengthening of the veterinary response was a core objective of the National Response Plan, 
but the Poultry Association of Zambia claimed that the limited capacity of the Veterinary 
Department to respond to a disease outbreak remained a potential issue. On the other hand, for 
government respondents, over time, perceptions on H5N1 risk from trade, and therefore the 
reason for the institution of trade ban, had become less about response capacity and more about 
veterinary personnel availability. Animal health respondents demonstrated a detailed knowledge 
of the Zambian border posts that had the most flows of poUltry traffic, and the poultry industry 
had worked with other producer associations in the SADC region to reduce imports from 
countries like Malawi and Mozambique: 
We have worked very well with Malawi and you may wish to recall that 
Malawi, we had a lot of cross border trade between Chipata and Muchinji in 
Malawi and then Sindamusale and the Malawian side, and we used to have a 
lot of day old chicks coming in from Malawi. We used to have a lot of feed 
coming from Mozambique and Malawi into Chipata and Petauke areas, (and) 
Katete. And we did a joint committee on anti-smuggling and also sensitization 
on the economic implications of avian flu and that actually worked wonders 
because as I speak to you today, Eastern province is no longer smuggling in 
chicks, they are no longer smuggling in feed, because we have sensitized our 
farmers and we have shown them how bad the disease is. 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
162 
With so much avian influenza prevention-related activity going on in the region and more 
importantly in all the countries surrounding Zambia. the trade ban was largely symbolic. First, 
the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development did not have the practical resources 
to monitor the country's vast and porous borders. On this basis, the trade ban was largely 
unenforceable. Second, Zambia's neighbours such as Namibia. Zimbabwe, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Angola did not export poultry or poultry products into Zambia. Trade 
bans imposed against these countries, except Zimbabwe, were irrelevant. Third, avian and 
human influenza prevention and control was a multi-country initiative with activities occurring 
in all the eight countries that were Zambia's neighbours. This presumably provided 
opportunities for information exchange on the avian influenza situation and extent of 
preparedness in member states. In some cases, as exemplified above, producer associations 
within these countries also undertook risk sensitization and mitigation roles. Fourth, Zambia 
was primarily inclined to poultry exports. 
The trade ban, although instituted by the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development, 
had been announced by the Minister of Health. Based on this, the expectation was that other 
Working Group members would remain cognisant of this ban. Had the Ministry of Health 
remained aware, or involved in the maintenance of this trade ban? The response from the 
National Surveillance Officer suggests not: 
1 do not think it would be possible for Ministry of Health using Public Health 
Act, or Ministry of Agriculture using the Public Health Act just declare, we 
have banned importation of this, they will not. They will look at the law; they 
will look at other stakeholders and consult each other. So at the end of the day, 
when they put up a statement, it will be a statement that everyone else agrees 
to. That's my view. 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
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The Ministry of Health respondent above was clearly unaware of the existence of a ban on the 
import of poultry and poultry products, or how the Department of Veterinary and Livestock 
Development had gone about instituting it. Interestingly, the Public Health Act is mentioned as 
a possible legal proviso to ban trade, but it was this respondent's view that stakeholder 
consultation was necessary before such a decision could be implemented. Other Ministry of 
Health respondents also had no knowledge of the existing trade ban on poultry and poultry 
products. Specifically, it was not a policy decided on by the Task Force on Avian and Human 
Influenza: 
[I]t was not a policy. It was not a policy of Government to stop trade, no. 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
At least in the opinion of some Ministry of Health officials, the decision to ban trade had not 
been made under the auspices of the National Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza, 
although the announcement of the trade ban by the Minister of Health in 2006 suggests 
otherwise. One reason for this, according to one respondent in the Ministry of Agriculture, was 
that the decision to ban trade was never followed up by the generation of a statutory instrument 
that would have made this law. The decision to maintain the import ban on poultry and poultry 
products, albeit supported by the Poultry Association of Zambia, was a non-legally binding, 'in-
house' veterinary department decision. In this regard, the animal health sector's unilateral 
decision to maintain the trade ban could arguably be interpreted as; firstly, symbolic at best; 
secondly potentially ineffectual and third protecting the economic interests of the poultry 
industry. 
6.3.2. The trade ba" and the potential role of the trtule sector 
While the Veterinary Department lamented its limited capacity to monitor trans-boundary 
poultry and poultry product imports, the Zambia Revenue Authority under the Ministry of 
Commerce Trade and Industry had personnel at many border posts in Zambia, regulating the 
movement of goods across borders and capturing trade statistics for the Ministry of Commerce 
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through the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDAs1) programme. Commissioned 
under the banner of the country's export-led agenda, ASYCUDA was a potential source of vital 
trade flow information that could have been utilized by the animal health sector to inform a risk 
assessment for the introduction of H5Nl into Zambia. In addition, according to one animal 
health respondenr2, breeding stock imports in Zambia were all air-freighted into the country; 
but no veterinary personnel were stationed at any of the nation's airports. Customs officials, 
working under the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry, on the other hand, 
are stationed at all the key airports of Zambia. Therefore, in theory, the Ministry of Commerce 
could have played a potentially important role in surveillance activities. The ministry could 
have also provided important data for the estimation of risk, but was not part of the National 
Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza: 
[M]inistry of Commerce was not really part of our Task Force. Maybe we 
didn't see it at the time as really a need for them to be on board, but in terms of 
controlling trade with regard to animal health issues, we are involved with 
Ministry of Commerce, the three line ministries in importing agricultural 
commodities is the Department of Vet, ?ARI: Zambia Agricultural Research 
Institute and the Ministry of Commerce. So with regard to trade, we do work 
with Ministry of Commerce, but with regard to avian influenza, we really didn't 
have them in the Task Force. 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
In Zambia, the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry played a role in the control of trade 
with regard animal health issues, but surprisingly, it was this respondent's view that its 
participation in avian and human influenza prevention and control had not been deemed 
necessary. Given the emphasis placed on the perceived risk from trade, the exclusion of the 
Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry was significant. There was consensus among 
51 This is a computerized customs management system. developed by UNCI' AD for foreign trade. It is 
used in the generation of trade data for statistical economic analysis. http://www.asycuda.orglaboutas.aSj) 
52 Research Scientist. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
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respondents in both the animal health and trade sectors that legally, under the Stock Diseases 
Act Cap 252 of the Laws of Zambia, the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development 
possessed the mandate to ban trade for purposes of disease control. However, while this was 
generally accepted as the norm, there was an understanding by Trade Ministry respondents that 
they would be infonned if such a decision had been passed. 
An interesting puzzle was beginning to surface concerning the non-involvement of the Ministry 
of Commerce Trade and Industry and the implementation of the trade ban. As the authority 
responsible for the implementation of Zambia's trade policy and the enforcement of trade 
agreements, was the Trade Ministry concerned about the avian influenza issue? As an issue that 
potentially affected trade, it was necessary to fmd out if the Trade Ministry was concerned about 
the avian and human influenza prevention and control. One representative said: 
[W]hat I would like to say here is that we are concerned, although we are not 
(the ones) to handle this. Basically this is an issue of medicine and the 
veterinary services. In terms of the control and what have you, the people with 
a lot of say here is the Ministry of Agriculture. But of course when it comes to 
trade, we cannot override them, we have to adhere by what they give us as 
experts in the field because when a disease enters the country, you have no 
choice but just to ensure that quarantine measures are put in place to control 
its movement otherwise you'll find at the end of the day you may remain with 
nothing. Either people are animals may perish. 
Director Domestic Trade, Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry (18) 
This suggests the avian and human influenza problem was clearly a concern for the Ministry of 
Commerce, but it was the view of this trade official that it was mainly an animal health and 
human health concern, with the Ministry of Agriculture having the fmal word on issues of 
animal disease control. An important policy tension highlighted here is the understanding that 
decisions made on the basis of health, be it human or animal health, could not be over-ruled by 
the Trade Ministry. 
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Another trade official's perspective revealed that the Trade Ministry was not fully informed of 
the avian and human influenza prevention and control policy in Zambia. Having been omitted 
from the Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza, the Ministry of Commerce neither had a 
problem defmition for, nor knowledge of, the avian influenza issue: 
[W]e have not defined what avian flu is. We don't even know. But I know 
Ministry of Health does have knowledge of what avian flu is, its effects and 
where the outbreak has been noted we have been hearing it from the media, and 
how it is transferred. Now I think, I am not an expert, but so far what I have 
gathered is that it is transferred through human beings, right? 
Director Foreign Trade, Ministry of Conunerce Trade and Industry (17) 
The Trade Ministry was also unaware of the trade ban that had been imposed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives in 2006. 
Having a frame of reference, in the form of a "problem defmition" to guide ministerial action 
was clearly important. The Director of Foreign Trade at the Ministry of Conunerce Trade and 
Industry identified the Ministry of Health as the experts most likely to know what avian 
influenza was, based on the understanding that it was the role of the Ministry of Health to 
oversee issues related to disease prevention and control. It became apparent later in this 
interview that the respondent understood 'avian influenza' to mean the influenza AlHINI 
('swine flu') pandemic that was occurring during the time of data collection. After explaining 
that avian influenza was actually 'Bird-flu' the respondent had the same understanding as other 
respondents on the existing linkages between the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Trade 
and animal disease control: 
[O]n that one, we have a comminee. Initially it used to sit in the Ministry of 
Commerce. It is a comminee of multidisciplinary officers, in the sense of the 
angle of trade. So we have representation from the Department of Trade, then 
we have the Ministry of Agriculture, Veterinary Department and then the 
marketing side. Also the Farmers Union are chief stakeholders. That team is 
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called the SpSS3 comminee. So that team, essentially what it does is, it meets 
and it looks at permits, you know, for you to bring in products. Whether they 
are agriculture products, whether they are plant or animal products, they need 
certification. Now that certification, amongst other (things), certifies that it is 
coming from a disease free zone. For us to make that decision, most of the 
information comes from Ministry of Agriculture. For the animal like poultry 
and piggery and whatever, it is the vet department that initiates that process 
and the comminee sits only ... they receive the applications, they look at them 
and then endorse them. 
Director Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry (17) 
The SPS committee implemented disease control policy in relation to trade and provided the 
link between the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture. It 
was not allowed to serve this function in regard to avian and human influenza policy 
formulation in Zambia. The final say in the certification process, at least as far as livestock and 
livestock product imports were concerned, remained the purview of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
However, the respondent went on to suggest that should the Ministry of Agriculture decide to 
impose a ban on the importation of certain classes of livestock or their products, through the 
SPS committee, the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry would be infonned: 
(The Ministry of Agriculture) execute(s) the process of banning that product 
from coming in. When it goes through that (SPS) comminee, they agree and 
then initiate an SI, a statutory instrument, which then effects that ban. And 
normally when there is an outbreak like that, the ban is with immediate effect 
and that information is sent to all the borders around Zambia so that the 
customs officials, those that inspect the goods that are coming in, they already 
know that these products have been banned for this reason and normally with 
that, they don't compromise. 
Director Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry (17) 
53 Sanitary and pbytosanitary 
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The Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development possessed the mandate to initiate a 
trade ban. It was understood, however, that the implementation of this decision would ordinarily 
proceed through the generation of a statutory instrument by the SPS committee. According to 
one animal health respondentS4, the generation of a statutory instrument had not been done. In 
addition, it was the responsibility of customs officials at ports of entry to implement trade bans. 
But the response the Working Group had generated for HSNI prevention and control had not 
taken this 'protocol' into account. It thus became clear why the animal health respondents were 
concerned that they possessed limited capacity to monitor the various ports of entry. The animal 
health framing of H5Nl problem had positioned the animal health sector as a 'core' stakeholder 
in the disease prevention response to the exclusion of the potentially useful trade stakeholders. 
Trade officials had played a role in disease prevention and control particularly with regard to 
traded products in the past: 
1 have heard of cases (where people have brought) consignments, maybe 
chicken from South Africa where there has been a Newcastle disease breakout 
and they bring them, they come to the border, our officers have been mandated 
to confiscate and destroy that consignment. 
Director Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry (17) 
It is interesting that the trade respondent above used Newcastle disease in South Africa to 
explain how customs officials go about the control of the movement of products from outbreak 
areas. A potential resource dependency existed between the Veterinary Department and the 
Ministry of Commerce with regards to both the formulation and implementation of H5Nl 
disease control policy. The Trade Ministry was in a position to capture some of the vital data 
necessary to identify directions of trade (imports and exports) useful in the identification of 
potential risks. This information would have been useful in decision making concerning the 
allocation of resources for purposes of risk mitigation. The Trade Ministry also possessed the 
personnel that could be used to enforce trade sanctions at relevant ports of entry. 
54 Senior Epidemic-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (3) 
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It is important to understand that the two trade officials cited here were largely of the view that 
the Ministry of Agriculture's authority to control trade was in the event of an actual outbreak in 
a source country: 
[W]henever there is an outbreak of either Bird-flu or avian influenza anywhere 
in the world; they (the Ministry of Agriculture) receive that information. They 
even know which countries have been affected, which areas have been affected 
and immediately they execute the process of banning that actual product from 
coming in (from that country). The moment that a disease threatens the life, 
health and security of animals, plants, or human beings, they quickly inform the 
enquiry points or information centres. And once these information centres have 
it, they have the full knowledge that they need to make such a decision. 
Director Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry (17) 
While clearly concerned, both Trade Ministry respondents agreed that it was not the mandate of 
the Trade Ministry to override decisions made by Ministry of Health or the Ministry of 
Agriculture concerning disease control in relation to trade policy, the main concerns being the 
loss of either human or animal life, should a trade-related disease incursion occur. But it was 
understood that they would be informed if such a decision had been made, so that they could be 
able to support this decision in dispute resolution, or apply for an exemption from participating 
in the trade of certain products: 
What I would like to inform you is that although we are signatories to those 
(trade agreements), under certain conditions, we can apply for what we call a 
derogation where basically either you don't participate in one aspect of trade 
or we impose what we call a safeguard measure against the importation of one 
product which is defective. 
Director Domestic Trade, Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry (18) 
Therefore, there were many potential merits to be derived from the inclusion of the Trade 
Ministry in the policy process, including the authentication and support of the trade ban with 
Zambia's multilateral agreements and enforcement of the trade ban at Zambia's various entry 
points. The emergency/imminent threat framing, however, had excluded the Trade Ministry in 
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the beginning, and possibly continued to do so as the emphasis shifted from an emergency 
response to capacity development under the preparedness objective: 
I don't know whether it was an oversight on our part or really, given that 
maybe the disease was not here and this is just preparedness and since the 
control of imports can be ... is done from our offices, maybe then they could be 
updated ... 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
6.4. SurveilllJnce and the risk of avian inftuenZll 2005-2007 
The 2008 version of the Zambian National Response Plan on Avian and Human Influenza stated 
that the risk an HSN} incursion in Zambia was likely to occur through one of five potential 
introduction routes; live bird imports; poultry product imports; illegal poultry and poultry 
product trade; returning travellers previously in direct or indirect contact with infected poultry 
or poultry premises overseas; and the movement of aquatic migratory birds (NRP 2008 version). 
According to respondents, it was from these potential entry points that several high risk areas 
were identified and targeted for surveillance in the country; namely border districts, areas 
proximal to water-bodies that hosted aquatic migratory birds in particular, and Zambia's 
international airports. After instigation of the trade ban under the emergency framing of the 
highly pathogenic avian influenza problem, avian influenza surveillance and awareness became 
the mainstay of preparedness activity in Zambia. Resources were limited, and there was a 
paucity of information on the likely HSN} risks inherent in the country's poultry production 
systems. The next section discusses resource limitations and risk uncertainty as they affected 
surveillance activities in Zambia. 
6.4.1. Wild bird surveillance and the risk of avian influenza 
Zambia's avian influenza surveillance activities had initially started off in wild birds, largely 
understood in the beginning to be Zambia's primary risk of disease incursion. With concurrent 
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H5Nl outbreaks in domestic and wild poultry in Asia, Europe, and Africa accompanying 
disease spread of in 2005-2006, concerns were raised over the potential role that migratory 
birds played in disease epidemiology (Gaidet et al. 2(08). In late 2005 through to 2006, as was 
the dominant paradigm at the time, Zambia had also adopted the view that migratory birds were 
to blame for the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza, a perception that had persisted 
during the time of data collection: 
Zambia itself is a vulnerable country because this is a fly route for some of 
those birds from the North Pole. 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
I think the greatest risk would be from these migratory birds. We have got one 
major fly way that connects us here to Central Asia and the Far East and that 
intersects with major flyways so migratory birds coming from there where we 
know the disease had a very high impact. So ... the most danger would be from 
migratory birds. That would be the single most important source of the 
infection. 
District Veterinary Officer, Member, Rapid Response Team (14) 
[W]e realized that this could be a big problem for Zambia given that we would 
also have migratory routes for birds ... 
Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (3) 
According to Zambia's National Response Plan (2008), the flyways of primary concern were 
the Black SealMediterranean and east Africa west Asia flyways. The perception of the highly 
pathogenic avian influenza risk was not just based on the migratory flyways that transacted 
Zambia, but the 52 different species of migratory birds that Zambia receives from the 
Palaearctic region. These migratory birds congregated around several of Zambia's large water 
bodies and swamps every year: 
In Zambia we have large water bodies like in the Southern Province. Kafue 
National Park, Lochinvar National Park and also in the north we have 
Bangweulu plains. we also have Lake Tanganyika there, where every year, 
large numbers of migratory birds actually congregate. So you find that like in 
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Lochinvar National Park at any given time, you will be amazed to find that you 
have more than 400 different types of species of these birds, some migratory 
others just local birds. But we have a lot of ducks as well, and geese which are 
actually implicated as the reservoirs of these viruses and our preliminary 
results have shown that actually there is virus activity, influenza virus activity 
in these areas. 
Technical Consultant, National Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza (8) 
From this researcher's perspective, it was interesting that general avian influenza viral activity 
had been detected in these areas. While this served a research imperative, the viruses identified 
were all low pathogenic strains of avian influenza, a predictable fmding. In addition, this 
research imperative was not primarily focused on the immediate policy relevant H5 and H7 
subtypes of highly pathogenic avian influenza that were of zoonotic and potential pandemic 
concern: 
So we actually have set up research activities where we actually look for this 
virus, either in domestic chickens or in the wild water birds. So we get this 
information and we actually feed the government we give them the status of this 
disease, not necessarily the avian influenza the H5 or the H7, but we are 
actually looking for any of the influenza subtypes from the H 1 to H 16 we are 
out there looking for these viruses. 
Technical Consultant, National Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza (8) 
This data was arguably useful for establishing a baseline for avian influenza activity. However, 
for the government, the priority was to identify the presence of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza subtypes. According to one government animal health respondent, government 
surveillance of wild birds had been conducted through the support of the F AO and the French 
organisation Agricultural Research for Development (CIRADss). The government had also 
drawn on fmdings from the University of Zambia, but no highly pathogenic avian influenza 
strains were found: 
55 Centte de cooperation intemationale en recherche agronomique pour Ie developpement 
173 
So far .... UNZA 56 have done extensive work in the water bodies, collecting fecal 
samples and having them analysed at Hokkaido University and I think ... and 
they have not come up with any avian influenza viruses. We have also done a 
little bit of work with CIRAD, although that was just a one off thing, and even 
then we didn't find anything. 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
On the basis of this, the government shifted its emphasis from continuous surveillance in wild 
birds, to targeted surveillance of wild bird mortalities and focused its attention on other risk 
areas: 
The human population potentially at high risk is in Southern, Central, Western, 
Luapula and Lusaka provinces. Targeted surveillance should be initiated in 
these habitat areas to identify unusual wild or domestic bird mortalities. 
Zambian National Response Plan on Avian and Human Influenza, 2008 
version, p 17. 
That time we were talking of probably avian influenza being carried by these 
migratory birds so it was a priority for us. When this thing came up with avian 
influenza. there was that notion that they were the cause, they carried the 
disease. So we were at great risk because we have some migratory birds that 
come into the district. However, later on, emphasis was reduced to the Kajue 
Flats, you know. So we don't have that activity. 
District Veterinary Officer, Member Rapid Response Team (15) 
6.4.2. Sfl11IeilUmce in the traditio1llll poultry sector 
For preparedness purposes, the traditional poultry production sector was defined as scavenging 
and free-range flocks in rural areas, owned by households keeping an average of 10-15 
chickenss7• The sector's importance lay in its role as an affordable source of subsistence poultry 
meat, eggs and income for the rural population. In terms of housing, poultry in the traditional 
production system is of variable standard; with some flocks spending nights in family huts, 
56 UNZA is the official acronym for the University of Zambia 
57 Zambian National Response Plan on Avian and Human Influenza, 2008 version 
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straw runs, or trees. The traditional sector in Zambia is scattered throughout the country. While 
Zambia's National Response Plan for Avian and Human Influenza identified trade as a pertinent 
risk, the Veterinary Department felt confident that the trade ban had largely assisted in 
'plugging' the flow of 'risky' cross border imports. With imports restricted to breeding stock 
and hatching eggs, surveillance activities focused on the traditional sector of production. This is 
because the recipients of the legal imports, the commercial breeders and producers, were 
assumed to be 'high biosecurity' enterprises with independent surveillance systems in place: 
[T]he big commercial farms and breeders, they do keep in regular touch with 
us and they do have their own surveillance system going on. Well, they have 
pumped in a lot of money in that so they are quite active when it comes to 
surveillance. Our backyard colleagues, quite a number do follow us and they do 
carry out vaccinations. But the problem we have is mainly with the free range. 
Thefree range normally just leave their birds to run around. Under FAO, that's 
the area we are targeting closely for surveillance. 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal Person, Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
The National Response Plan for Avian and Human Influenza also claimed that the low levels of 
biosecurity 'inherent' in the country's traditional and backyard production systems placed the 
country at high risk of contracting highly pathogenic avian influenzaSB• Interestingly, the 
commercial breeders and producers, Zambia's primary link with global poultry, and lifeline of 
the local industry, were left to conduct and report on their own surveillance. The rationale for 
leaving commercial poultry to its own devices was that these 'big players' had invested 
considerably in their businesses, which translated into high levels of biosecurity, strict 
surveillance systems and a 'negligible' risk of an H5Nl incursion. On the opposite end of this 
'risk' paradigm was the free range, or traditional, poultry production system. It was assumed 
that this sector's minimal investment, low levels of 'biosecurity' and scavenging nature of 
flocks placed it at high risk of acquiring avian influenza, and was thus targeted for surveillance. 
58 Zambian National Response Plan on Avian and Human Influenza, 2008 version 
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It is also interesting that the assumptions of this surveillance approach seemed to be endorsed by 
theFAO: 
[I]t is widely accepted that these sectors (sector one and sector two: breeders 
and commercial producers respectively), because of their biosecurity levels, 
chances of them actually getting avian influenza are pretty minor. That's why 
FAO doesn't want to deal with them because their biosecurities are high. So we 
are dealing with (sector) three and four, these are the emerging and the 
traditional farmers. 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
The FAO's support for surveillance activities focused on emerging and traditional farmers and 
not commercial breeder or producer establishments in Zambia spoke to the widely held view 
that the traditional production sector was inherently risky. While this was true for endemic 
conditions, the exotic nature of HSNl made this view suspicious. The NGO GRAIN (2007) had 
argued that much of the avian influenza problem was as a result of commercial poultry 
activities, rather than backyard poultry flocks. Given that many of the initial H5Nl outbreaks in 
Southeast Asia, Europe, and even in North and West Africa had occurred in large commercial 
poultry establishments, the only rational explanation for this perception of the relative safety of 
commercial enterprises over backyard flocks is that the highly contested view that H5Nl risk 
lay largely in backyard production systems had been transferred to the Zambian context. 
6.4.3. HUllUln influenza surveillance 
For human health. after training health staff on avian and human influenza, the surveillance 
strategy involved the monitoring of seasonal influenza trends at the major health centres and the 
establishment of health desks at ports of entry, including the Lusaka international airport. For 
the Health Ministry, the rationale was that, having established a baseline, any changes in disease 
trends would indicate a problem and alert the health system to a potential outbreak: 
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H5N 1 like for UTJf9, what we did was to do a sero-surveillance where you 
provide a baseline of what is the circulating .. Jor you to determine what are the 
circulating influenza viruses that you have. from which you will now be able to 
say how is the pattern, the trend. If there is any deviation from the normal trend 
that you have been looking at, then you should be able to start suspecting that 
this must be something else and then you decide to look at it further. 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
While the primary occupation was keeping H5Nl out of the country, having established a 
baseline for seasonal influenza in humans, any changes would be monitored and regular reports 
submitted to the National Epidemics Preparedness Management and Control Committee under 
the Ministry of Health: 
We have a national epidemics report that will highlight whatever epidemics are 
coming up and usually all epidemics are issues that are handled critically and 
seriously. We actually reach a situation where in case we need more funding. 
emergency requests can be made to Cabinet when we have such a situation. So 
the same can be done for avian influenza in case we have an outbreak. But at 
the moment what we are focusing on is to try and prevent the outbreak from 
coming in. 
Health Education Officer, Ministry of Health (10) 
The National Epidemics Preparedness Management and Control Committee under the Ministry 
of Health was identified as the forum upon which the Ministry of Health was to monitor the 
influenza burden in the country. Even the respondents from the animal health sector mentioned 
that they reported to the National Epidemics Preparedness Planning Management and Control 
Committee every fortnight on the avian influenza situation in the country. Through the 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) platform, the health sector's main 
59 The University Teaching Hospital 
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surveillance strategy, the health sector was poised to monitor any possible occurrence of human 
cases of avian influenza. Among the training activities carried out by the health sector in 
relation to H5Nl and pandemic preparedness was the training of district staff on general 
influenzas within the IDSR framework: 
[T]he activities that we did were, first of all, trainings, trainings of the 
provincial staff, all the provinces just letting them know what avian and human 
influenza is all about. And then I remember we included the avian influenza 
component in our technical guidelines, integrated disease surveillance 
technical guidelines so that ... . .when we teach about IDSR, avian influenza 
should be part and become a reportable disease ... 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
From the above, it is evident that the IDSR framework was central to the Ministry of Health's 
preparedness strategy. As mentioned by the National Surveillance Officer above, the health 
sector had included avian influenza in the technical guidelines for IDSR and had made human 
avian influenza reportable within this framework. In comparison, the animal health surveillance 
strategy appeared to be more ad hoc, based on the perceptions that commercial enterprises were 
safe, wild birds were an indeterminate hazard, and traditional production systems represented 
the highest risk of a disease incursion. These risks had to be mitigated and communicated to the 
public through the communication strategy. 
6.S. Preparedness and the communication strategy 
The key to preparedness in Zambia was the communication strategy. Throughout the period 
2005-2007, the communication strategy was running. For purposes of preparedness, the 
communication strategy consisted of the production and distribution of education information 
and communication materials, such as posters and radio and TV adverts. These were targeted at 
high risk groups such as poultry producers and traders in high risk areas of the country, 
including poultry markets. According to several respondents, the Poultry Association of Zambia 
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was instrumental in this regard, producing the first education materials that went out to the 
public in 2005: 
Poultry Association has been a big partner also in providing information about 
the association and also informing the association. The first brochure actually 
we did, or they did, Poultry Association did with input from the Ministry was 
the first information going out on avian influenza at the time. J think that was 
2005. 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
Later, the Veterinary Department produced additional extension materials for farmers that had 
to be withdrawn because a Knowledge Attitudes and Practices (KAP) study facilitated by 
UNICEF revealed that they were misinterpreted by target groups: 
[I]n the initial stage, our friends from vet somehow decided to do it (the 
communication strategy) on their own. They came up with some information 
and education materials which they distributed. Later on people condemned 
them because they were misinterpreted by the farmers. J think they just got a 
photo ... one of the materials they had used, they just photographed a chicken 
and then made it into a poster, distributed that poster, later on when they went 
to do some evaluation, they realised that farmers had misinterpreted, they 
thought the chicken wanted to fart ... 
Senior Information Officer, National Agricultural Information Service, MACO 
(12) 
These materials were redesigned, with the Health Education Unit under the Ministry of Health 
and the National Agricultural Information Service (NAIS) under the Ministry of Agriculture 
playing a more active role in the production and pretesting of education materials. Another part 
of the communication strategy involved active engagement of the media. The intention of this 
was to foster a partnership for public awareness and educative extension, with a few workshops 
targeted at sensitizing the media on responsible journalism. The initial engagement of the media 
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was in a series of media workshops, some emphasizing that reporting in Zambia needed to focus 
on the wider development agenda: 
A lot of media workshops were held between Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
Agriculture and the information sector... with the journalists. 1 remember one 
being on responsible reporting for journalists and so on and editors, 1 think 
there was even, uh, what was it called? A media breakfast and so on. 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
It is said that responsible reporting could arise from many considerations or 
situations and in developing countries like Zambia, handling issues like the 
Avian Influenza required skills of responsible journalists with the desire to 
forestall the threat that epidemic poses and the need to alert the citizenry. While 
the media in the Western countries can afford to report in a certain manner, 
journalists in developing countries like Zambia have a duty to support the 
development agenda ... 
Zambia Daily Mail, 2007 http://www.daily-
mail.co.zmlmedia/newslviewnews.cgi?category-23&id-1215505391 
The initial media workshops, conducted in 2006 and 2007, were a collaborative venture 
between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture. It is important to mention this 
because, while the World Bank funding came with the condition that the two Ministries 
incorporate the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services to lead the communication 
component, the development of the communication strategy still largely fell to the two 
ministries. According to respondents, the Information Ministry had been involved initially, but 
as the avian influenza problem lost its emergency edge, the Information Ministry later began to 
lose interest, forcing Health and Agriculture to seek in-house alternatives: 
[T]he Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services initially were 
also a part of this but it has been very difficult to bring them on board 
because 1 think their approach to information is more on news than on 
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educative extension. So currently we are working more with NAlS, 
which is a branch of the Ministry (of Agriculture) and the health 
education unit under Ministry of Health. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
The Information Ministry's involvement in the communication strategy had largely been short-
lived, mainly because in their understanding, information had to be 'news worthy' rather than 
educative. As a result, NAIS and the Health Education Unit took the place of the Information 
Ministry, because, unlike the 'sensational' approach to information the Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting was perceived to have, NAIS and the Health Education Unit's expertise 
provided the kind of extension that was more appropriate for preparedness activities. The 
Information Ministry, like other initial stakeholders, had been co-opted into the Task Force and 
the National Avian Influenza Working Group under the imminent threat/emergency framing, 
rather than a preparedness framing, therefore. the non-arrival of avian influenza in the country 
also contributed to their subsequent loss of interest in H5Nl. Understandably, an 'outbreak' 
would meet their criteria for what counted as 'news-worthy', but, as implied by the respondent 
above 'preparedness' did not. 
A respondent from NAIS agreed that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 
was initially active in leading the communication strategy and added more insight into the 
perceived reason for the Broadcasting Ministry's 'exit': 
At first there was a lot of interest from our friends, the Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting. Those were supposed to oversee the communication 
component, but after seeing the incentives that were there, that's what I 
suspect, it appeared almost everybody pulled out, so it only remained with now 
with NAIS organizing everything. Each time we invited our friends from 
Information usually they could not support. 1 think they, according to them, 
have got more serious assignments to attend to; following the president and the 
ministers outside Zambia, its more attractive than the avian influenza. 
Senior Information Officer, National Agricultural Information Service, MACa (12) 
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This respondent was also of the view that the Information Ministry had a more journalistic, 
rather than educative, approach to avian influenza. This is evidenced in the comparison of the 
sensational and possibly more fmancially rewarding, value of reporting presidential and 
ministerial travels rather than the activities around avian influenza preparedness. 
6.6. The dec1ll1'ation of H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influe1U.lJ as a notifiable disease 
As argued in Chapter 5, in Zambia, perceptions of H5Nl risk had a real economic impact in 
2006. Following the media scares of mid-2006, it was the assessment of the Poultry Association 
of Zambia that the poultry industry lost close to 30 billion kwacha, which is equivalent to about 
£3.6 million. This loss was distributed across poultry breeders, producers, feed suppliers and 
veterinary pharmaceutical providers. The poUltry industry, through the Poultry Association of 
Zambia therefore advocated that Government declare H5Nl a disease of national economic 
importance, a decision remembered by respondents as having been made towards the end of 
2007. The Veterinary Department declared H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza a notifiable 
disease, another policy decision made as part of preparedness activities. The rationale for 
making H5Nl notifiable was to ensure a permanent disease vigil. Again, the process of 
prioritizing HSNI in this regard had in part been championed by the poultry industry: 
[I]t is only now that the Government is considering avian flu to be among the 
notifiable diseases, meaning that before then, it was not even given any kind of 
place among the notifiable diseases in this country. Not even the DNEls60 as 
they call them. So we fought hard to make sure that avian flu is recognised and 
given the place it deserves because we believe that avian flu can actually lead 
to the demise of the entire pOUltry industry in Zambia. 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
Once identified or even suspected, by law, HSNt outbreaks were reportable to the relevant 
Government authority. Therefore, this, like the trade ban, was an important policy decision. 
However, there was a significant discrepancy. This notification was not gazetted. 
Fundamentally, this meant that no statutory instrument had been generated to support this 
60 Diseases of National Economic Importance 
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declaration. The decision had not been released into the public domain and, more importantly, 
had not come into force. For purposes of preparedness and disease control, the fact that H5Nl 
influenza was not gazetted also created another problem; limited Government support. This is 
exemplified in the quote below: 
[W]e have declared avian influenza nationally as a notifiable disease, but it's 
not gazetted. It is a disease of national economic importance and it's a 
notifiable disease, but it's not yet gazetted. And that in itself has brought in a 
few challenges because there is no specific allocation on part of Government. 
There is no specific funds allocated to avian influenza and most of the support 
we have gotten has been through donor support. So that's one of the hitches 
because though we recognise it as something big, the commitment on part of 
Government hasn't reflected that especially in the funding and resource 
allocation. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
The decision to fmally declare avian influenza a notifiable disease had clearly assuaged the 
poultry industry, but like the trade ban, it had done very little to support the preparedness 
agenda legally. The fact that this declaration had not been gazetted meant that this was another 
symbolic 'in-house' policy decision by the Department of Veterinary and Livestock 
Development. In addition, while it was argued that H5Nl was an important disease, its lack of 
legal recognition entailed that it had not been allocated any specific funding. Essentially, the 
preparedness response was solely dependent on external support. 
6.7. Preparedness and the role of Rapid Response Teams 
Finally, the most visible and possibly contentious preparedness activity undertaken by the 
National Avian Influenza Working Group was the constitution of Rapid Response Teams. These 
were formed in all the nine provinces of Zambia, consisting primarily of veterinary, medical and 
media personnel, corresponding with the animal health, human health and communication 
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components of the National Response Plan. The rationale for the Rapid Response Teams was 
that they would be the flTSt to respond to an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza. The 
key trigger for responding would be high poultry mortalities: 
(For) the highly pathogenic avian influenza, the school of thought is that if it's 
there, definitely birds should be dying. The fact that no birds are dying en mass 
means we don't have it. So that's why we only go looking for it when you have 
high mortalities, ok? lfwe have an actual outbreak then definitely we will move 
in there. Now that's when we have the Rapid Response Teams come in and all 
that. 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
The logic was straightforward, no massive poultry deaths, no highly pathogenic avian influenza. 
There was still active surveillance going on in humans and in traditional poultry flocks, as 
demonstrated earlier. The Rapid Response Teams were viewed as pivotal for Zambia's national 
emergency preparedness plan. A USAID fundedIF AO facilitated desk top simulation exercise 
conducted on H5Nl preparedness in early 2008 (FAO/uSAID 2(08), however, revealed the 
lack of integration of the Rapid Response Teams as a 'shortcoming' in Zambia's National 
Response Plan: 
[W]hat that simulation exercise revealed was that there was very little 
coordination ... One of the most significant things that we noted was that the Vet 
worked independently of human health, and the vet went about doing what they 
would do, overlooking the aspect of the involvement of the human health ... 
... initially we had trained what are called Rapid Response Teams, and these 
were supposed to be trained as one unit, but there was an oversight I think in 
the implementation phase that we trained them separately, the vets trained their 
staff and the health trained its staff. They were trained alright, but they worked 
as parallel lines. So we have actually revisited to combine these teams so that 
should there be an outbreak of Avian Influenza the Rapid Response Teams are 
the first people to react. And these Rapid Response Teams currently are in the 
provinces and we want to extend them to the districts. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
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The separate training of the Rapid Response Teams was to be expected. Even for purposes of 
training. Government agencies can only develop a response within the limits of their defmed 
mandate. Given that each Government agency has its own norms and practices, in cross sectoral 
collaboration, even in the various policy decisions reviewed in this Chapter, there was usually 
very little opportunity for joint action, which creates difficulties in defining how such training 
would be conducted. It is interesting that there were plans to extend these Rapid Response 
Teams to Zambia's districts, which number 721 First, this indicates how poorly the resource 
implications of extending the Rapid Response Teams to district level were thought through. The 
team's sole purpose would be to respond to a specific disease event, an H5Nl outbreak. Second, 
it suggests a conflation of the avian influenza response, a primarily poUltry problem, with a 
pandemic influenza response, a global human health concern. Albeit having a high case fatality 
rate in humans, human to human transmission of HSNl remained poor in outbreak areas. For 
Zambia, HSNl's likelihood of occurrence, potential magnitude and possible consequences were 
still not known. The event could just as likely be the isolated mortalities in a small poultry flock 
as the 'catastrophic' event that the National Task Force was preparing for, which would require 
the involvement of stakeholders other than those currently constituting the Rapid Response 
Teams. In regard to this, one respondent described other shortcomings the February 2008 desk 
top simulation exercise revealed: 
I liked that thing because it really showed the shortcomings of our response 
plan. It really brought those things out. The shortcomings were, it became 
apparent that we need Ministry of Defence, for example. I mean in an outbreak 
situation, you need armed forces to enforce whatever laws or whatever rules, or 
whatever plans you are going to come up with. Road blocks, who is going to 
manage the road blocks? If it's the vet personnel, how effective are they going 
to be? They won't be in an outbreak situation. You need the army, that's one. 
And then you talk about, let's say disposal, ok? Who controls, let's say the 
caterpillars, the excavators and things like that? Its local Government. They 
were not there. So how are you going to carry out a proper disposal without 
those guys? And again the issues of quarantine, you need the police force, 
Home Affairs comes into play, where were they? They were not there! In what 
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capacity are you going to say we need the cops to do ABC when they haven't 
been involved all along? They won't understand. And you see the thing is when 
people don't understand what you are planning to do, they will not cooperate 
with you. So you see, the simulation exercise brought those problems into sharp 
focus. Yeah, the need to get a whole more ... an encompassing kind of action 
plan which would bring other stakeholders into play. I think it's very important 
that we had that, actually. 
Research Scientist. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
It is clear that the emergency framing of the H5Nl problem was still driving policy formulation. 
The above statement also provides evidence that the roles of stakeholders who constituted the 
Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza had not been clearly defmed and their involvement 
in policy formulation had been minimal, at best. The 'worst case scenario' described by the 
respondent above also reveals a perception that an outbreak of H5Nl in Zambia had the 
potential to be an explosive, high impact event requiring massive poultry culls, the institution of 
quarantine measures and the implementation of a possibly military type response. Furthermore, 
it also provides evidence of the barrier the initial animal health framing had created for wider 
stakeholder involvement. It was not an outbreak in pOUltry that the country was preparing for, it 
was a pandemic. However, in light of the preparedness focus, some respondents still felt that the 
Rapid Response Teams were the 'crown jewel' of the response plan, in addition to the 
awareness campaigns: 
[T]he country has prepared itself to a level where we have actually embarked 
on public awareness so that as many people as possible know about this disease 
and also we have formed Rapid Response Teams in various parts of the 
country. Noticeable to say is the animal health teams are working closely with 
the human health teams. As you know this is a disease that actually cross-cuts 
between humans and animals so we are working very very closely across. So we 
are approaching this disease control strategy from what we can say 'One 
Medicine' kind of approach. So the veterinary side as well as the human side 
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are working together because of the nature the disease actually spreads. It cuts 
across the livestock as well as the humans. 
Technical Consultant, National Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza (8) 
While it is plausible that a highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak would be accompanied 
by simultaneous human cases, from trends witnessed in other areas that had experienced HSNI 
outbreaks, human cases occurred within a few days to many months after initial outbreaks in 
poultry. Taking a few cases from Africa, for example, according to a WHO HSNI timeline of 
major events (WHO, 2010), the flISt reported human case in Egypt was in March, 2006, a 
month after the disease was confIrmed in poultry. Djibouti had its fIrst human case in May 
2006, also a month after the official report of H5Nl in poUltry. Nigeria had experienced its flISt 
human case in January 2007, a year after H5Nl was identifIed in poultry and ornamental birds. 
Clearly, this information was not used to inform the utility of Rapid Response Teams in 
Zambia. 
6.8. Chapter summary 
The chapter has explored the tensions and challenges that the initial problem framing created for 
policy formulation. In essence, what had occurred was a shift in the approach to policy 
formulation, from an emergency response to a preparedness/capacity building response, 
informing many of the policy formulation activities and resulting challenges reviewed and 
analysed in this chapter. The Poultry Association of Zambia played an important role in many 
aspects of policy formulation, while much of the veterinary response was symbolic rather than 
substantive and was not premised on a strong evidence base. The economic imperative of the 
Poultry Association was in implicit conflict with the symbolic actions of the Department of 
Veterinary and Livestock Development particularly with regard to the trade ban and declaration 
of avian influenza as a notifIable disease, both of which had no legal basis. The Trade Ministry 
was both uninformed and excluded from the decision-making process, based on the 
understanding of the primacy of health over trade. This highlighted a potential policy tension in 
the relationship between public health, animal health and trade. In this context, however, input 
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from the Trade Ministry would have been of potential benefit. The preparedness response 
activities, particularly the initial H5N2 trade ban against Zimbabwe and the rationale behind the 
formation of Rapid Response Teams poorly distinguished avian influenzas and pandemic 
influenza. Critical questions arise as to the effectiveness and the sustainability of the Zambia's 
approach to risk management, particularly as it relates to trade restriction, disease notification. 
poultry surveillance and Rapid Response Team coordination. The next chapter examines these 
questions in the development of avian and human influenza prevention and control policy after 
2007, and explores the strengths and weaknesses of Zambia's preparedness activities. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Avian and human influenza activities in Zambia 2007·2009: 
ChaUenges and Opportunities. 
7. Introduction 
The previous chapter examined five areas of policy decision and highlighted the tensions and 
challenges in the avian and human influenza policy formulation process over the period 2005-
2007. Building on the chronological analysis provided in the two preceding chapters, this 
chapter examines H5Nl policy activities covering the period 2007-2009, and pulls together the 
analysis of avian and human influenza policy development in Zambia by assessing the 
challenges, strengths and gains of policy development. This chapter assesses the impact of 
international agencies on Zambia's response to highly pathogenic avian influenza. It argues that 
although international agencies may have shaped the highly pathogenic avian influenza 
response in ways that were not, objectively, in the interests of disease preparedness, there were a 
number of benefits for animal health, human health and trade. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section begins by reviewing key aspects of 
international support in avian and human influenza policy development in Zambia. It describes 
and then analyses the factors influencing waning interest in policy development in the post 2007 
period. This is followed by an analysis of issue prioritization as it pertains to avian and human 
influenza prevention and control. The first section then concludes with an outline of the debates 
around which Government agencies should coordinate avian and human influenza prevention 
and control, and similar policy development in Zambia. 
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The second section presents some of the positive outcomes of the avian and human influenza. 
policy process as adopted in Zambia. These are described in terms of four possible milestones 
for preparedness were identified from interview data. This is followed by a highlight of some 
significant sector-specific benefits of the avian and human influenza policy in Zambia, 
including the integration of the avian and human influenza. response into institutional 
frameworks. This analysis is based on interviews with respondents from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry, the Poultry 
Association of Zambia, the COMESA secretariat, Africare and the Disaster Management and 
Mitigation Unit under the Office of the Vice President. 
7.1.lnter1Ultional influences in the policy process 
Chapter 5 outlined the role of the FAa. WHO and USAID in setting the agenda for avian and 
human influenza prevention and control policy in Zambia. International agencies played a 
cardinal role in driving avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development 
in Zambia. These roles were multifaceted and in aggregate, they shaped the direction policy. 
This section will examine the roles that the World Bank. FAa and USAID played in influencing 
avian and human influenza. prevention and control policy development in Zambia. A brief 
consideration of the international policy response is warranted to properly contextualize the 
nature of international influence in Zambia. Scoones and Forster's (2010) work argues that the 
international reaction to highly pathogenic avian influenza. was primary driven by three 
important, profession-specific 'outbreak narratives' that framed the avian and pandemic 
influenza. problem; agricultural centred veterinary and livelihood concerns (OlE, FAa), public 
health concerns over human-to-human transmission (WHO, UNICEF), and humanitarian and 
economic disaster focused pandemic preparedness (heads of government, the business 
community and UN system humanitarian agencies). The thrust of the international response to 
avian and pandemic influenza. was the creation of global preparedness mechanisms for both 
avian influenza. and the threat of a human influenza. pandemic (Scoones 2010). Scoones and 
Forster (2010) identified the WHO. FAa. OlE. World Bank and UNICEF as some of the 
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bridging actors in the international response. They also state that World Organisation for 
Animal Health (OlE) guidelines were the basis of the international animal health response. The 
OlE provided prescriptions for key focus areas for preparedness, particularly in developing 
country contexts. The organisation's focus was to bring up to speed the veterinary services of 
developing countries. It was then the role of the FAO and the World Bank to coordinate 
investments to meet this end. 
This case study supports Scoones and Forster's arguments. In Zambia, the international 
community, primarily the WHO, FAO, the World Bank and USAID were central to avian and 
human influenza prevention and control policy development. While the international 
community's intention had been to provide guidelines to nurture the development of Zambia's 
National Response Plans61 , it is argued here that its role, for the most part, was prescriptive. 
Because H5Nl was nowhere near Zambia's borders, a situation that remained unchanged after 
2007, the country was dealing with an issue that was largely viewed as externally driven. One 
respondent, for example, was of the view that the whole preparedness process was responding 
primarily to a developed world agenda: 
[p]robably this thing is being looked at more from the developed World point of 
view... they probably looked at the threat of avian influenza and then they 
spearheaded this whole thing of us forming a Task Force, us coming up with a 
preparedness plan and all that ... 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
In this research, eight areas of support were identified in the examination of respondents' 
perceptions of the role played by the international community in avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy development in Zambia. The areas of support identified from 
interview data could be summarised as follows: 
i. Preparedness plan development (mainly the FAO and WHO) 
61 For example, the WHO's pandemic preparedness guidelines 
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ii. Response plan assessment (World Bank, FAO) 
iii. Financial assistance with start-up costs (World Bank, EU, FAO) 
iv. Stakeholder inclusion (World Bank, USAID) 
v. Capacity building (FAO, EU) 
vi. Material support (F AO, USAID) 
vii. Preparedness plan component strengthening (UNICEF) 
viii. Risk communication development (USAID through AI.COMM) 
ix. Integration of Zambia into the regional early warning system (FAO). 
Much of the funding for avian and human influenza policy development in Zambia was 
provided by the World Bank. Financing and support for avian influenza policies came with 
restrictions on the nature of activities that could be pursued in the emergency response to the 
perceived threat of avian influenza. Priority areas were predefmed; there were no debate among 
respondents on how these funds were to be disbursed. Most of these funds were channelled 
towards activities in the animal health sector. Through several rapid assessments by the World 
Bank and other members of the donor community, Zambia's National Response Plan had to be 
authored to a standard and focus that met international agency approval before funding could be 
disbursed: 
International influence is strong in AI programmes. Most of the funding comes 
already committed to certain activities perceived as important by the 
international community, so countries have to design policies which can be 
supported by these activities. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
[Altier we did the National Response Plan, the World Bank. came along and 
that was presented to them. Comments were made on the National Response 
Plan and one of the critiques of the document was that it didn't have a 
communication component ... 
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[Alfter the World Bank assessment we had quite a number of assessments, (and 
after) one of the initial rapid assessments, a total budget of $1 million was 
approved ... 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
There is certainly evidence from this study that the international agenda for avian influenza 
control was not necessarily closely aligned to Zambia's national interests. An area where the 
limitation of international prescriptions for preparedness was pronounced concerned the 
communication strategy. One important condition set forth by the World Bank concerned which 
stakeholders to include: 
[W]e were then told (by the World Bank) to bring on board Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, and they would lead the communication 
component. But you must appreciate that Ministry of Agriculture has a 
communication component called NAIS, the National Agriculture and 
Information Centre (Service), so they were also co-opted into that comminee 
and so was the Ministry of Health. Apparently they also have their own 
communication segment ... 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
Conditionalities such as who to include in the policy process is evidence of an attempt by the 
World Bank to control the direction of policy development. A communication strategy was 
important, therefore decision-makers in Health and Agriculture identified structures within their 
institutional frameworks that could contribute to the communication component. To help 
translate the communication strategy into a workable plan of action, the National Agriculture 
Information Service (NAIS) and the Health Education Unit under the Ministry of Health were 
co-opted into the National Working Group. These units later substituted a 'disinterested' 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services in leading the communication strategy: 
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At first there was a lot of interest from our friends, Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting. Those were supposed to oversee the communication component. 
But after seeing the incentives that were there, that's what I suspect, it 
appeared almost everybody pulled out, so it only remained with now with NAIS 
organizing everything ... 
Senior Information Officer, National Agricultural Information Service, MACO (12) 
While possibly well intentioned, this conditionality was unappreciative of local capacity. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, a World Bank consultant had in fact come in to assess what 
communication structures were present in the country. However, even with this assessment, the 
World Bank had insisted on the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services' inclusion. 
The importance, capacity and relevance of communication structures in Health and Agriculture 
had been overlooked: 
We were not really involved in the initial stage, but I think over a period of 
time, the project on avian influenza has come to appreciate that NAIS is better 
placed in terms of interpreting either animal or crop diseases because most of 
the journalists who are there at least have an agricultural background so 
interpreting that becomes much easier. So in terms of avian influenza, I think 
NAIS is bener placed to have a bener interpretation of communication flow to 
the audience or the readers. 
Information Officer, National Agricultural Information Service, MACO (13) 
The way NAIS is set up, we have got the broadcasting section, where we are 
using television and radio, ... and our programmes are so famous, they are 
known. Then we also have the publication where we are using the print media, 
books, magazines, then we also have what we call a quarterly magazine .... and 
then from that we also have the press component where we have to collect the 
so called hard news, package them come out on television and on radios and 
also we have got a column in the Daily Mail every Thursday ... where we have to 
produce a feature there, there is always a feature for NAIS. So through such 
type of arrangement, I don't see why we can fail to communicate about such 
issues to other ministries. 
Senior Information Officer, National Agricultural Information Service, MACO (12) 
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There was certainly adequate capacity among Health and Agriculture, and even the Poultry 
Association of Zambia, to successfully implement the communication strategy, but this was not 
aligned with World Bank prescriptions. With the withdrawal of the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting Services, and viable alternatives in place, for some respondents, the relevance of 
this World Bank inclusion was hard to justify: 
[A]ll projects have come with a condition that we involve the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, but we have NAlS and Health Education wings 
under MACO and MoR respectively. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
It was the view of many respondents that NAIS and the Health Education Unit under the 
Ministry of Health had proven themselves to be assets in the communication strategy of the 
avian and human influenza prevention and control policy in Zambia. However, a World Bank 
quarterly report appraising this project states, rather vaguely, that only slight progress had been 
made on the public awareness and communication components in Zambia (World Bank 2(08). 
There was thus a mismatch between the World Bank and internal stakeholders' assessment of 
what had been achieved in the communication strategy. 
It would be misleading to claim that all international agencies involved in Zambia's response to 
the perceived threat of avian influenza did so in ways that ran counter to the country's interests. 
For instance, there was evidence that USAID played a more supportive, rather than controlling, 
role in policy development. From border awareness meetings, communication strengthening 
through its AI.COMM project and even a biosecurity awareness project with traditional farmers 
through Louisiana State University and a local NGO, Africare, USAID's presence was 
everywhere. USAID had also funded a risk mapping exercise which was the first attempt at 
doing a risk assessment for the Southern African Region62• This risk mapping exercise was 
independent from avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development in 
62Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (3) 
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Zambia. It looked at countries in the southern African region, specifically South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique (Mullins, Bisschop and Ross 2(08). 
This analysis, the final report of which was completed in August 2008, did not inform policy 
development in Zambia. 
USAID also donated personal protective equipment to the Veterinary Department. Through 
USAID's AI.COMM communication project, other stakeholders, such as immigration officials, 
customs officials, and teachers, had been brought on board: 
We've worked with AI.COMM which was dealing with communication for 
avian influenza. It was a USAlD project that was based in South Africa, but I 
am told it has now wound up. But what they did, last year and early this year, 
was to help us train border health workers. That border training, it was cross 
cuning. We had health workers, we had veterinary officers, we even had some 
teachers, we had people from the immigrations or customs and the other 
stakeholders around ... 
Health Education Officer, Ministry of Health (10) 
By providing Africare with funding, USAID facilitated the participation of this NGO in the 
National Task Force: 
We have also worked with Africare, with regard to avian influenza. They also 
were given some money, I'm not too sure whether this is under USAlD, but it's 
with Louisiana State University, if 1 am not mistaken. They have been working 
with Poultry Association and ourselves ... 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
International agencies were also partly responsible for reinforcing the animal health framing of 
the avian and human influenza problem in Zambia. One international agency with such 
influence was the FAO. It supported agenda setting, policy formulation and implementation on 
multiple fronts. In Zambia's National Response Plan (2008 version), it was the FAO that was 
cited as stating that Zambia remained at high risk of an avian influenza incursion because of its 
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vast borders. In addition to coordinating investments from the EU, and organisations such as 
USAID. the FAO was also involved in communication component strengthening, provision of 
diagnostic support, staff training, National Response Plan development and assessment. and 
communication material production, all primarily focused on animal health: 
Some communication materials were ... produced; this was with helpfrom FAO. 
And again FAO had a small project to help us with the initial preparatory 
work, it was funded by EU, they did quite a lot in terms of diagnostic support to 
the labs and training of members of staff and also production of the initial 
awareness materials that we were to give out to the public as well as to our 
farmers and to members of staff. I must mention. .. that initial project by FAD 
that was funded by EU was mostly for animal health and it did not include 
human health ... 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
FAO sent a technical team of experts looking at .... the communication strategy 
.... So when they came they did an assessment of what had been implemented so 
far under the World Bank and what Zambia needed to do moving forward ... 
They have identified a number of areas of interventions which need to be 
addressedfor us to address the challenges of. .. avian influenzafor thefuture ... 
Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, and Cooperatives (3) 
Despite the activities that had been carried out by the Zambian government, an F AO 
international consultant was sceptical about how much had really been achieved in Zambia: 
I think that in the beginning it (avian influenza related activity) was very strong 
but after that it has been very difficult. In the document 1 have seen that this 
National Task Force have very little meetings. It can be said that Zambia has 
very insufficient support, financial support. The Government maybe has not 
given money. But Zambia has only support from the World Bank firstly and 
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secondly now, it is from SPINAP At3• So when they gather themselves just in 
chattering and no any concrete activities to be implemented. So they focus in 
other priorities. 
FAO international consultant (7) 
The issue of insufficient funding is significant, because most of the support for policy 
development came from the international community. This section has only been able to 
provide a brief snapshot of the areas of international support and influence in policy 
development. This overview has demonstrated that the support provided by the international 
community was considerable. Despite what local stakeholders perceived to be gains, the World 
Bank report (2008) and the F AO consultant, cited above, remained sceptical of what had been 
achieved in policy development. Interestingly, it was these organisations that played a 
prescriptive role in policy development, while, according the respondents, USAID's role had 
been more supportive. Despite the support provided by the donor community, local stakeholder 
interest in policy development after 2007 began to wane. The process became less about 
capacity building and more about meeting donor-defmed preparedness milestones. 
7.2. Waning interest in avian and human influenZ4 activities after 2007 
The shift from an emergency to a preparedness and capacity building focus over the 2005-2007 
period had several consequences that. in aggregate, led to respondents' perception of a waning 
of interest in avian and human influenza prevention and control policy development. After 
2007, stakeholder interest in H5Nl related activity in Zambia outside of Health and Agriculture 
began to dissipate. Under the 'imminent threat' framing, Zambia had initially oriented its 
response to tackle a disease of poultry that was perceived to be on the nation's doorsteps. 
Accordingly, through the National Task Force, stakeholders became actively involved in 
participating in emergency response activities. After two years of preparation, interest began to 
fall away, resulting in poor local stakeholder participation. Issue attention waned because the 
'imminent threat' of H5Nl had not materialised. In fact. it was this continued 'delay' that de 
63 Support Programme for Integrated National Action Plans for Avian Influenza 
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facto turned the emergency response to a preparedness activity. This resulted in an increasing 
difficulty for Health and Agriculture to bring stakeholders together for meetings: 
In the initial stages ... 2005 to 2007, I must say the Task Force was very active, 
people were more aware and into the activities and programmes that were laid 
out. I think at that time the threat was very real because then Africa got ... 
affected and we had countries up north being affected and the disease was 
spreading and it was a matter of time. But then things stalled I think from 2007 
to date and of course, like with many other things, human beings being what 
they are, if something that you are expecting for a long time is not coming 
along, the interest just falls out ... 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
[O]ne of the things we have been trying to, you know to struggle (with) is the 
stakeholder meetings. You know there is a tendency sometimes, when a thing 
"delays" in inverted commas. You know we don't want it. But when nothing is 
coming ... people relax a bit ... 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
Over time, the difficulties in maintaining stakeholder involvement in the policy development 
process arose as a concern. One respondent even claimed that the reason for this was that local 
stakeholders were probably questioning the validity of the National Task Force on Avian and 
Human Influenza: 
[F]rankly speaking, in the beginning people used to come but somewhere along 
the line they started questioning their own relevance or whatever. Maybe the 
validity of the Task Force was also questionable, I don't know. I mean I am just 
guessing. I don't know why ... I mean initially you get these people coming just 
at the inception when the Task Force was formed, then they stopped coming for 
meetings. I mean something must have happened. Why did they stop? Because 
in the end it was just about Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health and 
Information. Tourism, Trade, Home Affairs, DMMU, Local Government, they 
were nowhere to be seen. 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
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The Task Force, however, had been legitimized by its designation as an ad hoc subcommittee of 
the National Epidemics Preparedness Planning and Management Committee under the Ministry 
of Health. The Task Force had been constituted in response to an emergency framing of the 
avian and human influenza problem; therefore its ad hoc committee status did not lend itself to 
the coordination of 'peace-time' preparedness and capacity building activities. It was not a 
structure oriented for the coordination of ordinary day-to-day disease prevention and control 
activity involving sectors whose usual mandate was not disease control. The imminent threat 
framing had lost its capacity to drive stakeholder engagement. Stakeholders who had originally 
been active in policy development and preparedness activity implementation had gradually lost 
interest in the process. H5Nl had simply taken too long to arrive: 
I think that excitement which used to be there among stakeholders has died out 
because, nowadays you call for a Task Force meeting, very few tum up, you 
know? Some are even asking "is there an outbreak now?" that kind of thing ... 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal Person, Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
It was also the perception of some respondents that the roles of stakeholders in the process had 
not been clarified from the onset. Their roles also remained undefined in the shift from 
emergency response to preparedness. Through the imminent threat/animal health framing, local 
perceptions of HSNt risk had been tapered by a narrow and time-dependent definition of the 
policy problem. But even at the level of the Task Force, it was the animal health component that 
was more active in coordination. It is unlikely that local stakeholders would be active from the 
onset. because they lacked understanding of the risk of H5Nt highly pathogenic avian influenza 
as it affected them: 
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I think for the local stakeholders there is more of inertia than fatigue because 
they have never truly been active. The inertia is more from a lack of perception 
of the reality of the risk ofHPAI. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
In the absence of an outbreak, it was the donor community and the Working Group, with its 
personnel from animal health and human health who remained active in the policy formulation 
and implementation process. By default, the role of coordination fell to the Veterinary 
Department, which hosted and led the Working Group, the technical arm of the Task Force: 
What is very active, I must say is the Working Group because out of the Task 
Force, they had a secretariat and this secretariat was supposed to spearhead 
most of the technical work being undertaken by the Task Force. That 
component is still active and in there that is where the University of Zambia 
came into play, Poultry Association, now ZA WA64 was also co-opted and so on 
and so forth. But the ... major body, the Task Force, you have Tourism not 
attending anymore because they don't feel ... .it' s only the line ministries which 
maybe feel the need, but the others are a bit ... you know, because it has taken so 
long ... 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
The Working Group, in turn, could only concentrate on carrying out the technical activities 
related to preparedness planning under the donor funding that had been received, as was its 
actual mandate: 
Actually most of our stakeholders have been called to a few meetings here and 
there. But when it comes to active participation, I think it ham't yet been there, 
so I can't say we have involved them very actively .... I think it is also us; maybe 
we haven't yet sold the programme widely. I think we have concentrated so 
64 Zambia Wildlife Authority 
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much on the technical issues and carrying out activities under the donor funds 
that we have been given. .. 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal Person, Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
In summary, the National Task Force had been launched with considerable momentum and 
international support. Much of this momentum had been lost with the non-arrival of avian 
influenza in the country. While there had been local interest in avian and human influenza 
policy development in the beginning, heightened by the arrival of H5Nl on the African 
continent, the non-arrival and continued lack of evidence of HSNl's presence in the country 
contributed to diminished interest in Task Force activities. 
7.3. The prioritization of avian and human influenza prevention and control in Zambia 
The international community had funded the policy process of avian and human influenza 
policy development and therefore it was mainly international considerations that shaped the 
policy process. Given this background, what was the level of priority accorded to avian and 
human influenza prevention and control by local policy stakeholders in Zambia? The evidence 
points to the amount of support provided for policy development, albeit limited, as one of the 
major reasons for participating among respondents. In 2008, the Government received an 
additional $500,000 USD under the Support Programme for Integrated National Action Plans 
(SPINAP) for Avian and Human Influenza from the European Union6s through the African 
Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-mAR): 
[T]he African Union asked Zambia to prepare a proposal because they were 
getting some funding for a project for preparedness for avian influenza and we 
finally signed this contract in 2008 in September and the funds were given to us 
in November. This project is called SPINAP that is the one that is currently 
65 As explained by Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group, 
respondent 4 
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running now, helping out with preparedness for avian influenza. Again it 
follows the similar panern with the programme for the World Bank, it has the 
three components, communication, human health and animal health. But the 
budget for this is very limited, $500,000, and the bulk of it again is coming to 
the Ministry (of Agriculture) ... it's really activity based and the goodness with it 
is that it is building on to what the World Bank left off. 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (l) 
The following sections examine how the H5Nl issue was prioritized by animal health and 
human health stakeholders. 
7.3.1. Animal health: HSNI highly pathogenic avian influenza support in the face 
of other disease priorities 
In terms of the framings introduced at the end of Chapter 5, the animal health community 
largely perceived H5Nt highly pathogenic avian influenza to be an 'exotic' zoonosis. For this 
reason, in objective terms, it was low on the list of animal health priorities for the country. 
However, international funding was attached to H5Nl and not the other priority diseases in the 
country. This provided local animal health stakeholders with a clear financial incentive for 
involvement. The prioritization of avian and human influenza prevention and control was then 
linked to the amount of external funding that H5Nl related activities had received. This external 
funding was explicitly cited as the reason for the active involvement of Government manpower 
in the establishment and coordination of preparedness activities: 
I would give it a pretty high priority, given the amount of funds which have 
been provided. The government has basically provided, let's say manpower. I 
mean with regard to funds, the government has not provided any funds. Not 
much, anyway. Beyond the usual, maybe let's say you are going out in thefield 
to collect samples, so they would provide funds for that like your stipend, for 
you to be able to get your accommodation and meals while you are out there in 
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the field, that is as far as the government support can go. But as far as maybe 
buying equipment or buying vehicles and stuff like that, no they haven't. 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
External funding and support were cardinal for avian and human influenza policy development 
in Zambia. It was H5Nl 's status as an emerging zoonosis of global pandemic concern that had 
attracted international support for avian influenza programmes in Zambia, mainly in the form of 
funding and materials for avian and human influenza policy development and related 
preparedness activities: 
We don't have avian influenza as you know. It is an exotic disease to us, but it 
is a possible emerging disease. But I think in terms of its importance, because 
of its zoonotic nature, we do rate it quite highly, that's why I think we are 
receiving so much support ... 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal Person, Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
Because of this support, there was some confusion among some respondents' perceptions, as 
exemplified in the two excerpts above, on the level of priority accorded to avian and human 
influenza policy development by Government. Was it a donor related priority, or government 
driven priority? The level of priority accorded to avian and human influenza among animal 
health respondents had one unanimous theme, however; avian influenza was a priority because 
it had received funding: 
In my view, for the Government it is not a priority because most of the activities 
that we are doing is pecause there is some funds from outside... all avian 
influenza related activities are funded entirely by external funding .... At the 
moment it is only our department, but even then, I don't want to give credit that 
we are doing it because there is no Government funding allocated to that, so it 
could be because we have a project and somebody has to coordinate that ... 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
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In direct response to the animal health framing of the H5Nl problem, the responsibility of 
concentrating on avian and human influenza activities had fallen to staff in the Department of 
Veterinary and Livestock Development. Government support for avian and human influenza 
activities did not go beyond availing its staff to work on avian and human influenza activities. 
Other animal diseases in the country required veterinary intervention and resources. It was 
inconceivable that the national Government would allocate its own financial resources to H5Nl, 
an exotic condition, when they had limited resources for other diseases. The Government could 
only supply field allowance provisions, a normal aspect of day-to-day animal disease control. 
However, on the ground, there were 'more important diseases' that the Veterinary Department 
had to deal with than an absent highly pathogenic avian influenza: 
[D]efinitely the Government has availed staff to concentrate on activities on 
avian influenza. Generally I think it is quite important. Of course there are 
more important livestock diseases we are dealing with in terms of funding and 
all. I know right now that Government can't come out and allocate a big sum of 
funds to avian influenza when other diseases don't have funds. 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal Person, Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
I mean you have to remember that they (other animal diseases) already exist in 
Zambia. We have FMD66, its spreading like fire, ok? So definitely the 
Government provides funds for FMD, because it's there. The Government will 
definitely providefundsfor CBPp67 because it's there on the ground, right now. 
I mean I wouldn't be surprised if animals are dying somewhere of CBPP. Ok? 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
It is noteworthy here that the examples of existing diseases provided here were all of cattle. 
H5Nl was not viewed as a priority just on the basis of its absence, but importantly that it was a 
condition of poultry. The poultry sector was simply not viewed as important. In the view of 
66 Foot and Mouth Disease 
67 Contagious Bovine Pleuro pneumonia. 
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Government, incorrectly, as suggested in Chapter 6, poultry were not associated with major 
economic losses. The poultry sector was never a priority area for the animal health sector to 
begin with: 
When you look at our focus, we are more oriented towards canle. So most of 
the diseases that affect cattle are given priority .... You go to poultry, you have 
Newcastle Disease, which is classified as a Disease of National Economic 
importance, which should imply that Government should take afront role in the 
control of this disease, but in the past, there has never been a case where 
Government has procured vaccines for Newcastle. And probably you will look 
at it and what you get is that birds or bird diseases are not so significant or are 
not so associated with major economic losses. And, I think, it's not just because 
it is avian influenza and it is not there, it's because its poultry and it's not so 
significant. It's not wrinen but it is implied in the way we do things. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
For the Government, other livestock diseases took priority over H5Nl highly pathogenic avian 
influenza. The competing priorities within the animal health sector were making it increasingly 
difficult for the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development to maintain active 
involvement in avian influenza prevention and control. Human resources in the animal health 
sector were drawn to H5Nl policy formulation because H5Nl had the fmancial backing to 
trump what were considered within the country to be the 'real' concerns of Zambia's animal 
health sector: 
[A] lot of resources have gone to avian influenza but if you look at the Zambian 
scenario, it's not a priority, if you look at the opportunity cost ... on the part of 
Government, there is a lot of manpower which has been directed to avian 
influenza ... and not on the other important diseasesfor the country. So you find 
that in a way the Government or the Zambian people have lost out, because 
... the manpower is limited and most of them are employed to control the major 
diseases for the country. . .. A lot of them, when this disease came, they sort of 
diverted their attention to the avian influenza, neglecting the other diseases 
which have suffered at the expense of avian influenza ... at the time this was 
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being done it was not a priority because animals were dying from other 
diseases and losses were being experienced by our people .... Yes you can 
argue, you know, for emergency preparedness but I think over and above, a lot 
of resources have gone into this which should have been focused on the more 
important diseases for the country and this is what has been the argument by 
other people where they say, I remember the Permanent Secretary was even 
arguing to say "We have other pressing issues than avian influenza, why should 
we focus our attention or our resources more on this?" (Emphasis added) 
Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, and Cooperatives (3) 
To emphasize the point, the respondent above quotes the permanent secretary as asking why the 
Ministry of Agriculture needed to concentrate on H5Nl when there were more pressing issues 
in the country. The Government, through the Department of Veterinary and Livestock 
Development was not concentrating on these diseases because attention had been directed to 
avian influenza. H5Nl prioritization in the animal health sector had begun to fall mainly 
because of competing resource priorities and highly pathogenic avian influenza's continued 
absence from the country. 
7.3.2. Human health: Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response and the 
national epidemics preparedness and management committee 
In line with original 'imminent threat' framing of H5Nl highly pathogenic avian influenza, the 
fact that H5Nl avian influenza had not arrived in the country was viewed by the animal health 
sector as reason not to prioritize it. It was necessary to explore if a similar downward shift in 
prioritization had occurred among policy makers in health. In contrast, even though the disease 
was not in the country, perceptions of H5Nl priority remained high for the health sector. It was 
regarded as having the same level of priority as any other infectious disease: 
The level (of priority) basically is almost at the same level as any other 
infectious disease. We have this epidemic preparedness and control committee 
that meets to really look at what is happening in the country. We get reports 
from everywhere. Because we have a national epidemics report that will 
207 
highlight whatever epidemics are coming up and usually all epidemics are 
issues that are handled critically and seriously. We actually reach a situation 
where in case we need more funding, emergency requests can be made to 
cabinet when we have such a situation. So the same can be done for avian 
influenza in case we have an outbreak. 
Health Education Officer. Ministry of Health (10) 
The National Epidemics Preparedness Management and Control Committee under the Ministry 
of Health was the forum upon which the Ministry of Health monitored the infectious disease 
burden in the country. During the course of data collection. several respondents from the animal 
health sector mentioned that they reported to the National Epidemics Preparedness Planning 
Management and Control Committee every fortnight on the avian influenza situation in the 
country: 
[T]he National Epidemics and Preparedness Comminee where we also sit, we 
do present avian influenza updates there ... 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal Person. Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
It was through the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) platform that the 
health sector would monitor any possible occurrence of human cases of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza. The main priority of the health sector was to keep the disease out of the country: 
At the moment what we are focusing on is to try and prevent the outbreak from 
coming in. 
Health Education Officer. Ministry of Health (10) 
Among the training activities carried out by the health sector in relation to avian influenza and 
pandemic preparedness was the training of district staff on general influenzas within the IDSR 
framework. Data derived from this framework was collated in the national epidemics report. 
With the IDSR framework feeding into the National Epidemic and Preparedness. Prevention. 
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Control and Management Committee, the public health sector was sufficiently on alert to any 
potential human outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza. The health sector had included 
avian influenza in the technical guidelines for IDSR to make human avian influenza reportable 
within this framework. It was thus the IDSR framework that was central to the Ministry of 
Health's avian and human influenza prioritization strategy: 
[T]he activities that we did were, first of all, trainings, trainings of the 
provincial staff, all the provinces just letting them know what avian and human 
influenza is all about. And then I remember we included the avian influenza 
component in our technical guidelines, Integrated Disease Surveillance 
technical guidelines so that when we teach about IDSR, avian influenza should 
be part and become a reportable disease ... 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
The health sector's framework for disease surveillance was an integrated approach, allowing the 
sector to be alerted by any potential reports of human avian influenza cases, while still being 
able to focus on other infectious diseases, including existing priority epidemics such as 
tuberculosis, mv I AIDS and malaria. With seasonal influenzas being monitored in the major 
health centres, and health workers trained on the reporting of avian influenza, the public health 
sector stood on alert to any potential human outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza. 
Even the presence of HINI in the country, while important, had not distracted the Ministry of 
Health from the H5Nl influenza issue: 
[T]here is no activity which affects the other like in terms of disease 
preparedness, disease control preparedness. If anything, they enhance each 
other. When you look at IDSR, IDSR is like a platform on which all these other 
things, new, emerging, old what have you, will sit on. That's why even at WHO 
level they say it, avian and human influenza will sit on IDSR, HINI will sit on 
the IDSR because IDSR is a vehicle. People need to know what they should do 
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when the disease is there, how to respond and things like that. So the bottom 
line is IDSR. All these, new, emerging, they will just come and sit. 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
The IDSR platfonn was a broad framework for infectious disease surveillance, allowing the 
health sector to focus on priority diseases as and when they emerged. In conjunction with the 
National Epidemic and Preparedness, Prevention, Control and Management Committee, to 
which the national avian influenza Working Group reported bi-monthly on the H5Nl situation 
in the country. the health sector was efficiently "on alert." The IDSR strategy was developed to 
strengthen national surveillance on infectious diseases of public health importance, and highly 
pathogenic avian influenza fit comfortably in the IDSR agenda. It is interesting that the animal 
health sector did not have as coherent a strategy for H5Nl surveillance as the health sector, 
given that the aim had been to develop an integrated response. 
7.4. Who should coordinate? Contentio"s over the leadership of avia" and huma" 
influenza prepared"ess planning i" Zambia 
There were, then, clear differences in prioritization of the avian and human influenza problem 
across Health and Agriculture. The co-chairing of the Task Force by the Ministry of Health and 
the Ministry of Agriculture was meant to provide a means of ensuring equitable involvement in 
the development of the emergency response. In order for the response to be mutually beneficial, 
it was necessary to have a clear understanding of what the problems were and how each would 
deal with them. This included a prioritization of the issue across the sectors to a degree relevant 
to the situation. 
There were other institutional differences identified during data analysis. For example, health 
sector respondents made reference to both international regulations and provisions and national 
statutory instruments, including the International Health Regulations (2005), the WHO 
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pandemic preparedness guidelines (2005), the IDSR framework and the Public Health Act, Cap 
295 of the Laws of Zambia in discussing avian and human influenza policy development. The 
sector's priority was to keep highly pathogenic avian influenza out and thus the health sector 
remained alert. In comparison, while most of my respondents were from the animal health 
sector68, only one respondent in the animal health sector made reference to OlE guidelines, one 
to the SPS agreement and one to the national agricultural policy. The animal health sector 
seemed preoccupied with the 'practical' aspects of disease control with little regard, beyond the 
National Response Plan, for the wider policy and legal frameworks that could guide them. The 
priority of the animal health sector was to focus on the actual diseases that existed, primarily in 
cattle, in the country. The Trade Ministry, whose focus was to foster the development of the 
local poUltry industry, was preoccupied with provisos in trade agreements and the national 
agriculture policy as they related to disease control. The Trade Ministry did not have a fIrm 
understanding of what was occurring on the ground. The Trade Ministry, however, felt bound 
by decisions made by either the Health or Agricultural Ministry on issues of disease control. 
These differences in institutional norms, procedures and priorities affected the coordination of 
the avian and human influenza issue in Zambia. Fragmentation and the absence of a strong 
institutional framework for coordinating preparedness activities had resulted in a certain degree 
of opacity in the avian influenza issue. It also affected how each sector perceived the other's 
role in H5Nl policy formulation and preparedness activity implementation: 
The Ministry of Health, they haven't been very active. We have gotten a few 
officers who are actually quite junior to be part of the team ... so you get to get 
the picture that... it is not a priority to them, and for every activity that we do, 
you really have to push them, you have to go see them, you have to call them ... 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
68 Avian and human influenza policy development was largely skewed towards animal health and so 
policy development had a disproportionate animal health presence. This was also reflected in process of 
data collection. 
211 
[G]iven that maybe the disease was not here and this is just preparedness and 
since the control of imports is done from our offices, maybe then they (trade) 
could be updated. As opposed to when the disease is in the country then maybe 
they would be co-opted ... 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
There were concerns that, as a coordination body, the National Task Force lacked the power to 
properly coordinate the preparedness response. There was also sentiment expressed that the 
Ministry of Agriculture was not suited to lead the coordination of Zambia's avian and human 
influenza response. With Agriculture taking the lead, there was no real capacity of the animal 
health sector to coordinate multi-sectoral disease control activities: 
[T]his isjust a Task Force, sofor those people I don't think there is any kind of 
obligation for them to attend these meetings. I mean, we would write to the 
p.si9 and the P.Ss are supposed to tell their people, but even that 
communication from P.S. to the relevant authority within the line ministry 
concerned wouldn't probably take place. I think for the purpose for 
coordination may be we kind of missed it there. Probably we should not have 
used Agriculture ... 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
The coordination problems had been attributed to the Task Force being chaired by the Director 
of Veterinary Services, resulting in poor stakeholder attendance or delegation of attendance to 
junior staff. The Task Force lacked the authority to call stakeholders together: 
[W]hat happens now is if you call for a meeting, the Director of Veterinary 
Services, who is the chairman, and co-chaired by the Director of Public Health 
from Ministry of Health, when they call a meeting, most of the senior officers 
69 Permanent Secretaries 
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will delegate and that actually undermines the authority of the National Task 
Force. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
This was the situation at provincial level as well: 
[S]ome more needs to be done because we have noticed that, from some of the 
meetings some members would send their deputies to deputise them, so that 
would make it very risky if there was an outbreak ... 
District Veterinary Officer, Member, Rapid Response Team (14) 
Because of these concerns, several respondents were of the view that it would benefit the 
country's preparedness response if the coordinative capacity of the Vice President's office was 
utilized. This is because the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit under the Office of the 
Vice President was better placed to bring together the relevant stakeholders to respond to 
particular • disasters' : 
We have the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit, this faUs under the 
Office of the Vice President. And ideally every situation that is classified as a 
disaster is run by them; they take over, irrespective of which ministry it falls 
under. Now with the issue of avian influenza, we were supposed to involve them 
from the beginning, but the question was, that they are not really involved in 
normal disease control, normal preparedness activities, unless we have an 
outbreak and that outbreak overwhelms the ministry and its classified as a 
disaster. But what we are looking at is to see whether we can shift the National 
Task Force to be under the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit. Yeah 
and we hope, because that is a higher office, it will have more authority to 
mobilize resources or even invite people. 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
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For Zambia, however, highly pathogenic avian influenza was nowhere near attaining disaster 
status. It was thus unclear to respondents what role the Disaster Management and Mitigation 
Unit would play in coordinating 'normal' avian and human influenza disease control and 
preparedness activities. Since the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit was among the 
initial members of the Task Force on avian influenza, I explored why this unit had not been 
charged with coordinating the Task Force from the beginning: 
DMMU70 is just a member like any other and there has been a tug of war in 
terms of where the chairmanship should sit. We have, on a number of occasions 
raised concern, not just ourselves, but other partners as well in terms of 
DMMU's role in coordinating the Al or even the swine flU which we have now. 
Basically (we are) sitting on that committee just as a general member of that 
Task Force without the Task Force really organising the role that DMMU 
should play. Because by our mandate, we are better placed to coordinate multi-
sectoral issues which we have done before through our work. 
Head of Research and Planning. Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (21) 
Like other stakeholders outside of Health and Agriculture. the role that the Disaster 
Management and Mitigation Unit should play in the preparedness process had not been defined. 
The avian and human influenza problem had been narrowed to a human health-animal health 
problem; a disease control issue, with a largely animal health framing. This obscured the 
politics behind the policy. While the technical aspects of disease control fell within the mandate 
of the ministries of Health and Agriculture. the overall result was difficulties by the two 
ministries to secure the sustained involvement of other sectors: 
[I]t is very diffiCUlt for the two ministries to coordinate other ministries 
therefore you need an institution that is above the ministerial portfolio position 
70 Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit 
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to be able to coordinate such kind of issues. But we are saying, in terms of the 
implementation, it should remain with the experts, because we are not experts. 
Head of Research and Planning, Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (21) 
The task of coordinating avian and human influenza policy development across multiple sectors 
of policy required the active involvement of an institution above ministerial portfolio. However, 
the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit, which fit the coordinating criteria, was viewed 
by other Government agencies as a last resort. The perception was that it would only come into 
play when an actual emergency or disaster had occurred and overwhelmed the line ministry; i.e. 
"a fire-fighter." Their initial inclusion in the National Task Force on avian influenza was 
because there had been the expectation that an H5Nl outbreak would be an emergency for 
Zambia: 
It would be "un-protocol" for a ministry to give another ministry an 
instruction, because ministers are generally assumed to be at the same level. 
Now zeroing into our own case, I think the problem has arisen from the 
perception that the general public has on the role of DMMU. The general 
perception is that DMMU is a fire-fighter. We should only come onto the scene 
when hell has broken loose. And then we should start cleaning up the mess. 
National Coordinator, Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (20) 
However, the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit could have played an important role in 
coordinating the avian and human influenza prevention and control policy process. Apparently 
unknown to other stakeholders, beyond its ability to coordinate inter-ministerial, and therefore 
multi-sectoral disaster-related issues, the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit mandate 
included prevention and preparedness: 
When you start talking about DMMU coordinating issues relating to 
prevention, issues relating to mitigation, they find it very strange and they start 
trying to fulfil its mandate in the area of prevention, mitigation and 
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preparedness, the concerns are, "But there is no disaster here, how does 
DMMU come into play?" So it comes from a narrow view, if I may be allowed 
to put it that way, from the narrow view that people have about the terms of 
reference of the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit. But it also comes 
from the background itself. Naturally all emergency agencies are borne out of a 
crisis, and the tendency is to liken them to emergency situations. But that will 
not be a big issue because of the general paradigm shift. Currently there is a 
paradigm shift worldwide. The movement from disaster management to disaster 
risk reduction, so that puts things in perspective. It is always cheaper to prevent 
disasters from happening than dealing with the disasters themselves ... 
National Coordinator, Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (20) 
Another contention was the possibility of duplication. Like the Disaster Management and 
Mitigation Unit, the National Epidemics Preparedness Planning and Management Committee 
under the Ministry of Health had also been created as a multi-sectoral coordinative body. Its 
focus was to respond to disease epidemic disasters specifically, under the Ministry of Health's 
mandate as the portfolio ministry tasked with human infectious disease control: 
Remember that (the) Disaster Management (and Mitigation Unit) came in after 
all our ministries were already there. In other words, we had outbreaks before, 
in other words, we had these problems before. Now, like the Ministry of Health, 
when we had outbreaks, we said, "Now let's imagine there is no DMMU," so 
no DMMU that time. So let's imagine there is an outbreak," and there have 
been too many outbreaks. Choleras, the typhoid and what have you. We said we 
can't sit idle. As a ministry responsible for outbreaks, let us put what we call as 
National Epidemics, Preparedness Control Management Committee. It's a 
multi-sectoral committee. So that multi-sectoral committee deals with, 
specifically diseases ... 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
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The National Epidemics Preparedness Planning and Management Committee had also 
positioned itself as an unofficial subcommittee of the Disaster Management and Mitigation 
Unit: 
[N]ow after DMMU came into force, we agree that the DMMU under the Office 
of the Vice President has the overall (mandate) for disasters, so in our own 
understanding disasters become an epidemic, we think that any disease will 
become a disaster. Alright. So what we have done is, we have said, alright, we 
are now going to become a small subcomminee, not official, a small 
subcomminee of the national disaster management unit ... 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
To reinforce its position as an unofficial subcommittee of the Disaster Management and 
Mitigation Unit, the Ministry of Health had a National Epidemics Preparedness Planning and 
Management Committee representative on the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit forum, 
on standby to bring to the attention problems that had overwhelmed the Ministry of Health to 
the Office of the Vice President. This in essence, suggests a claim to the Disaster Management 
and Mitigation Unit's 'fire-fighting' capacity: 
[W]hat we have done, we have picked a member of the epidemics to sit at the 
DMMU, so the Director of Public Health and Research who is alternated by 
some of us, sits there. So whatever we do in the epidemics, we also take it to 
their forum. There has been actually of late, a lot of support. For example, 
under this swine flu, DMMU has actually given us resources. Under the 
cholera, DMMU has actually released resources. So in other words, things we 
can't solve, we take it to the Office of the Vice President. 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
It was interesting to discover, however, that the National Epidemics Preparedness Planning and 
Management Committee had been established to support IDSR, and was not an 'official' 
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committee of Government. The Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza also appeared to 
have a low position of authority within the government framework: 
Maybe what you should realise is that, maybe at the National Epidemics 
Committee meeting and the Task Force, the avian influenza Task Force, I don't 
think it receives the same mandate as the Disaster Management and Mitigation 
Unit. I remember at one time, I was driving a point where I said I would have 
loved that members of the National Epidemic committee be appointed through 
Cabinet Office and even the Task Force on avian influenza. If those members 
were appointed through Cabinet Office it means that it will have a certain 
strength in real activities. I think the national epidemic preparedness committee 
this was .... first of all, this was a committee which came about in the Ministry of 
Health through WHO linking it to IDSR. Though we have used it as a plat/onn 
for advocating for things, I don't think it is one committee which is known at 
Cabinet Office ... 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
The National Epidemics Preparedness Planning and Management Committee drew its power 
from its association with the Ministry of Health and had been established under a WHO 
imperative. This 'unofficial' body had been the forum for the establishment of the National 
Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza in Zambia. The committee did not. however, serve a 
strong coordinative function in avian and human influenza related activities. This role had been 
left to the Ministry of Agriculture, because of the animal health leaning, and financing, of the 
avian and human influenza problem. Under the strength of the imminent threat framing of the 
highly pathogenic avian influenza problem, this institutional arrangement worked, up to a point. 
With the perceived waning of interest in avian influenza related activities, it was the 
coordination of the preparedness effort that became a concern. The Disaster Management and 
Mitigation Unit felt better placed to deal with this: 
[W]e are very sure that there are more positives, there are more gains in 
changing the fulcrum of coordination, because those concerns have not just 
been raised verbally, but they have been raised even in writing, because for 
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example the UN resident coordinator office indicated that there was money 
available to get into this but the office was wondering whether this money 
should go to the Office of the Vice President or to the Ministry of Health, you 
know, those kinds of issues. Meaning that as long as we do not take a common 
position, as per the expectation of other cooperating partners, we are likely to 
losing on financial aspects, we are likely to be losing on time .... 
..... when an issue enters the national integrated disaster management structure, 
it assumes certain status, the tempo completely changes ... 
National Coordinator, Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (20) 
The interest of the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit in this role however, was not an 
internally driven initiative. There was a clear fmancial imperative for participation. In addition, 
other than the questions raised by the UN resident coordinator, as described by the respondent 
above, their interest in coordination was a reflection of what was going on in the region: 
Every fora that we have attended at the regional level and sub-regional levels, 
the emphasis and all resolutions have been that the role of coordination should 
rest in the agency or authority responsible for emergency activities. And the 
reason has been that almost all emergency agencies in the region and sub-
region are located in the ministries which are higher than ordinary portfolio 
ministries. 
National Coordinator, Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (20) 
1 attended another simulation exercise in South Africa. And there were other 
countries, 1 think, attending the same thing. What came to light for me was that 
in other countries, the DMMU equivalent, the disaster management unit in the 
other countries, play a central role in both preparation, before an outbreak, 
and execution, during an outbreak. And even post outbreak, or whatever you 
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are dealing with. So again, 1 am going to say that 1 think we should give 
DMMU the chance to be the coordinator, to bring everybody into the fold. 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
For Zambia, the focus had been on preparing for an outbreak.. Developing an 'aggregate' or 
multi-sectoral risk reduction policy was important; but the lack of a coherent preparedness 
framework for multi-sectoral disease control was a key issue. This was especially difficult with 
competing priorities within and across sectors, 'different' problem framings and different 
perceptions of risk. This was compounded by the fact that the highly pathogenic avian influenza 
response was largely an externally imposed agenda in Zambia. Without an actual outbreak, 
'preparedness' or risk reduction in the face of a global concern such as highly pathogenic avian 
influenza lacked a locally defined framework for multi-sectoral coordination, including 
leadership, role allocation and focus. 
7.5. How Zambia fared: Indicators of emergency preparedness 
Up to this point, the chapter has examined some of the challenges faced in avian and human 
influenza policy development. This section of the chapter now presents some of the gains of the 
avian and human influenza policy process in Zambia. When Zambia began developing its 
emergency response in 2005, the world was at WHO pandemic alert phase 3. HSNI highly 
pathogenic avian influenza was causing disease in small human clusters, particularly in its 
Southeast Asian epicentre, its rapid multi country spread as a poultry panzootic giving it global 
significance. In retrospect, Zambia, and the entire Southern Africa region, had been in a 
'prolonged' pre-pandemic mode. With the advent of HINI (swine flu), other nations were 
"dusting off' contingency plans developed for avian influenza to respond to the new pandemic 
concern (Scoones 2010). Zambia remained uncertain as to when and how highly pathogenic 
avian influenza would affect the country. 
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The period 2005 to 2009 witnessed a number of emergency response related activities instituted 
by the National Task Force and its Working Group. While it would be difficult to 'objectively' 
evaluate the responsiveness of Zambia's national response plan in the absence of an actual 
disease incursion, or determine the benefits of the policy development in Zambia, I argue that 
the following four preparedness milestones, or measures of achievement provide possible 
"proxies" for preparedness. 
7.5.1. Proxy for preparedness 1: Veteri1UU',Y Services strengthening 
The first proxy for the achievement of preparedness milestones was veterinary services 
strengthening. Veterinary personnel had continued to receive, and immediately investigate, 
reports of possible outbreaks of H5Nl. The largely animal health/imminent threat framing of 
the avian and human influenza issue in Zambia had positioned the animal health sector, through 
the Ministry of Agriculture's Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development as the 'frrst 
line of defence,' and range of policy activity had been activated in this sector. 
All district staff under the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development were made 
aware of the importance of reporting suspicious poultry deaths. According to some respondents 
in the animal health sector, these district staff remained vigilant, reporting any potential cases of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza: 
We have made our district staff aware and they do report any suspicious deaths 
of birds and all that. 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal Person, Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
Staff from the national to district level had been trained in sampling, general influenza 
diagnosis, outbreak response and networking: 
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There have been a number of trainings which have happened. I think about 7 at 
least in various aspects of controlling an outbreak, from sampling to just 
networking in general, and also technical trainings that have gone on. A 
number of meetings also to increase the cooperation and networking among 
them ... 
District Veterinary Officer, Member, Rapid Response Team (14) 
In addition, a case definition for highly pathogenic avian influenza had been formulated and was 
the basis of the veterinary response. While the surveillance strategy that had been put in place 
had not found any evidence of H5N1 in the country, it had remained responsive to potential 
threats: 
[T]he school of thought is that if it's there, definitely birds should be dying, 
because it's highly pathogenic avian influenza. Thefact that no birds are dying 
en mass means we don't have it. So that's why we only go looking for it when 
you have high mortalities ... 
Research Scientist, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) 
Through a series of false alarms, while frustrating, the Veterinary System had proven itself 
capable to respond to public concerns of potential problems quickly: 
[W]e have had a number of false alarms. Any birds dying people would inform 
us, "we suspect this," and the Vet Department would be informed and we have 
collected samples and most of them have been negative ... 
Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, and Cooperatives (3) 
The animal health sector thus appeared poised to respond to potential outbreaks of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza. 
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7.5.2. Proxy for preparedness 2: Health services strengthening 
As a result of the avian and human influenza activity, the WHO accredited influenza laboratory 
at University Teaching Hospital and the laboratory at the University of Zambia were recognised 
for their diagnostic capacity, and integrated into the surveillance and preparedness 
infrastructure. Health personnel were trained by the WHO on general influenzas and charged 
with training other health workers: 
WHO came ... 1 think it was early this year (2009) to train on general influenzas, 
how to contain them, and then we trained what we call trainer of 
trainers ... there are two laboratories, as you know, we have a very good 
laboratory at the University of Zambia, at the Vet section there, they call it a 
phase three (laboratory). There is another laboratory here which is WHO 
accredited at UTH. So those two laboratories for us, they have been doing what 
they do; the normal influenza studies and 1 think. .. we have been very 
comfortable. 
Deputy Director, Public Health and Research, Ministry of Health (9) 
[N]ow the lab in Zambia is made of the Government lab and then the 
University lab which is now a P 3 lab, indicating that even for Zambia to have a 
problem right now, when it comes to avian and human influenza surveillance 
identification, we heavily depend on the lab at the University for that. 
Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, and 
Cooperatives (3) 
Therefore diagnostic capacity for avian and human influenza was in place. In fact, the first cases 
of HINI in Zambia were promptly diagnosed by the laboratory at the University of Zambia, all 
made possible by the framework established under the preparedness agenda for avian and 
human influenza. 
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7.5.3. Proxy for preparedness 3: Public awareness 
The third proxy for preparedness, I argue, was the amount of public awareness generated on the 
avian influenza problem. Through continuous effort, it was respondents' view that the 
communication strategy had reaped dividends. Farmers, traders and the general public had been 
made aware of the avian influenza problem. Primarily a poultry problem, many poultry farmers 
had been sensitized about highly pathogenic avian influenza to the point where they were not 
asking what highly pathogenic avian influenza was, but asking instead, when this condition was 
likely to come to Zambia: 
[A]ctually, you find farmers asking you that, "We have heard so much about 
this avian influenza, when is it coming to Zambia?" 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
For Government, particularly those in the animal health sector, such questions from their target 
group was indicative of how much had been done in terms of sensitizing the community about 
highly pathogenic avian influenza. It also demonstrated to Government how effective the 
implementation of the pre-outbreak communication strategy had been: 
The public right now has been waiting for this news to come, and one of the big 
things which is still coming back right now is that people have been asking that 
when is the disease coming to this country that is from the general public and 
it's been an issue right now, so that in itself has given us a litmus ... 
Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, and Cooperatives (3) 
Health workers had not been excluded from the pool of communication target groups, not just in 
their role as health service providers, but also as potential small scale chicken producers, an 
important source of income for many medium income households in Zambia. The channels for 
disease reporting had been established: 
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Because basically even as health workers, we can be able to start identifying 
that there is a problem. Like ... if you are a health worker you are keeping 
chickens then you see that there is that high mortality, then you know there is a 
problem and be able to communicate to the relevant levels. 
Health Education Officer, Ministry of Health (10) 
7.5.4. Proxy for preparedness 4: Multi-sectoral collaboration 
At national level, the Working Group had also facilitated the involvement of other stakeholders 
such as the University of Zambia, to provide diagnostic support and technical advice, the 
Poultry Association of Zambia, to bring together its membership for the farmer awareness 
campaigns and the Zambia Wildlife Authority, to support H5Nl surveillance in wild birds. In 
addition, Rapid Response Teams had been formed in all of the provinces. 
While important stakeholders had been omitted from the Task Force, implementing the 
communication strategy also facilitated the involvement of other stakeholders in the policy 
process at district and provincial levels. This included stakeholders such as immigration 
personnel and the Zambia Revenue Authority. This was especially important in the 'high risk' 
and 'porous' border districts: 
We were working together with Ministry of Health and the various stakeholders 
in the districts. The ... police, immigration, ZRA and the community as well. 
Initially we had to sensitize the community on the signs; what is avian 
influenza, what are the signs, the symptoms. How does it come about in the 
community? What does it affect? Does it affect humans and all that? 
District Veterinary Officer, Member Rapid Response Team (15) 
One respondent felt that, at national level at least, the Government now had the capacity to 
respond in a coordinated manner: 
[F]or me I have no doubt, even if people might say no the coordination is not 
there, what, what, what, what, let there be a threat, seen tangible threat, you 
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will wonder how the various arms of government, which this time around they 
seem to be sleeping will come to work. 
National Surveillance Officer, Ministry of Health (11) 
7.6. UlUInticipated benefits: Integrating the avian influenza response into wider disease 
control objectives 
One, perhaps unexpected, gain was the higher priority given to the poultry sector post avian and 
human prevention and control pOlicy development. With no real precedent for the prioritization 
of the poultry sector by Government, it was the international avian and pandemic influenza 
response that had ignited interest in the country's poultry industry. The effort put into avian and 
human influenza preparedness by Government and the Poultry Association of Zambia had 
provided an opportunity for the animal health sector to focus on some of the pressing problems 
that had beset poultry production in the country, particularly the traditional sector. The high 
contact rate between government officials and fanners provided an entree for increasing 
awareness and extension in other aspects of poultry disease control. In the absence of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza, it was Newcastle disease that was the main killer of flocks in the 
traditional poultry production sector in Zambia and in the Southern African region. An FAO 
regional Avian Influenza Working Group of the Laboratory Diagnosis Sub-Committee meeting 
in early 2008 endorsed nation-wide Newcastle disease vaccination campaigns within the SADC 
region for the purposes of accessing poultry producers for avian influenza surveillance and 
sensitization. It was claimed that this approach, in the event of a suspected outbreak, would 
exclude Newcastle disease as a potential suspect. Zambia therefore adopted this stance, to the 
benefit of the traditional poultry sector: 
We even bought some Newcastle disease vaccines. Because these diseases are 
quite similar so we thought that we should encourage vaccination against 
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Newcastle mainly for the free range poultry ... this is a sector where they don't 
really bother vaccinating. 
Task Force Member and Animal Health Focal Person, Ministry of Agriculture (2) 
A Non-Governmental Organisation, Africare, under a project funded by USAID through 
Louisiana State University, had embarked on a separate project focusing on biosecurity risk 
management in traditional flocks. Africare had also become a member of the National Task 
Force on Avian and Human Influenza in Zambia, as a partner in the preparedness process. 
Although the Africare project was meant to fall under the avian influenza control agenda, its 
scope had been broadened to include other poUltry related conditions as well: 
[W]e ask them (farmers) questions, "Do you buy vaccines? Do you vaccinate 
your chickens, like against Newcastle? Do you disinfect the poultry areas? Do 
you do A, B, C, D? Those are the areas that we are looking at. Do they have the 
vaccines that are needed, and how clean is the water that the birds are getting? 
Do they have restricted entry to the poultry houses, and if so, how? If they don't 
have those things, we teach them that in veterinary science when we talk about 
the biosecurity in poultry production, say (with) chickens, only maybe one or 
two people should have access to this house. When time for the right vaccine 
comes, if its gumbor071 you give at this time, and you give the booster at this 
stage, this vaccine has to be carried this way ... so those are the issues that we 
try and teach them. .. 
Non-Governmental Organization Poultry Consultant on Avian Influenza (6) 
The early involvement of the Poultry Association of Zambia in the avian and human influenza 
response process had positioned the association as a hub for information dissemination to 
poultry producers and farmers. The framework the Poultry Association of Zambia had 
established for the avian influenza response also proved useful in providing the association's 
71Gumboro Disease or Infectious Bursal Disease (mD) is a viral disease of young chickens. It affects the 
development of the chicken immune system. Mortality can be in excess of 40%, and it also causes 
secondary infections that negatively impact production efficiency. htn>:/!www.gumboro.comldiseasel 
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membership with vital information concerning the control of other diseases of economic and 
production importance: 
[W]hat we have actually belaboured to do is to try and give them as much 
information as possible on how they can prevent it and this has actually helped 
matters and in addition to that we have not only touched avian flu, we have also 
touched other notifiable diseases like Newcastle and many other poultry 
diseases. We are using the same format to try and build the capacities of our 
farmers to try and prevent such outbreaks which have a bearing on the 
economic status. 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
For government, the farmer awareness meetings that had been carried out under avian influenza 
preparedness had also provided opportunities for veterinarians in government employ to teach 
farmers about other poultry diseases. With the advent of influenza AIlIINl, a fresh window of 
opportunity had been opened to discuss other disease problems with farmers, thus raising the 
profile for poultry diseases in general: 
[W]e are having farmer awareness meetings and at it is interesting that in these 
farmer awareness meetings one of the things that comes up is the swine flu so it 
is an opportunity to also educate people on generally poultry diseases and 
other animal health uh, constraints. 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force Member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
In no area was the benefit of the established structures for avian and human influenza 
prevention and control more pronounced than in the health sector. The preparations against 
avian influenza had clearly aided the Government's preparations against pandemic A/HINI 
influenza: 
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[Flor the HiNi .... a smaller sub Task Force was formed from the main 
committee of the National Task Force to address that ..... Usually that is the 
procedure when there is an outbreak of any infectious disease . .... That smaller 
Task Force is comprised of literally the same people that work in the avian 
influenza committee. So I would say it has not really affected avian influenza, 
instead it has like enhanced the preparations because now we see that here we 
have a situation. It has helped us to see how best we can further prepare for an 
outbreak of avian influenza, in case it comes. And from this subcommittee we 
have been able to actually send people to go to all the border areas including 
the airports. 
Health Education Officer, Ministry of Health (10) 
There were thus significant sector-specific gains of the avian and human influenza policy in 
Zambia. There was increased interest in both the traditional and commercial sectors of Zambia's 
poultry industry and more attention paid to poultry conditions than had been the case in the past. 
The human health sector had also prepared itself to a point where it was in a better position to 
respond to the HINI influenza outbreak when it came. 
7.7. Chapter summary 
This chapter examined some of the perceptions around waning interest in avian and human 
influenza policy development. The combination of an imminent threat framing, non-arrival of 
H5NI in the country and coordination failures was partly responsible for interest lag in avian 
and human influenza policy development after 2007. The chapter also examined tensions 
around priority competition and funding in the animal health sector and identified tensions in 
institutional norms and procedures that resulted in a lack of clarity around the avian and human 
influenza response across animal health and public health. Although this was the case, the 
chapter highlighted the positive attributes of the imminent threat framing, inCluding the 
achievement of several potentially beneficial milestones which I presented as 'proxies for 
preparedness'. While many preparedness milestones, particularly with regard to training and 
sensitization, had been achieved, the absence of an authoritative coordinative body was a factor, 
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leading to tensions around who should coordinate. The three empirical chapters so far have 
chronologically identified the tensions concerning leadership, priorities, problem framings, 
resource dependencies and perceptions of risk in avian and human policy development. It began 
by outlining the role of international agencies in shaping the development of avian and human 
influenza policy in Zambia and went on to explore why local stakeholder interest in policy 
development began to wane post 2007. Given this policy analysis, the next chapter will explore 
the feasibility and utility of risk analysis in informing multi sectoral coordination, role 
allocation and focus in avian and human influenza risk management in Zambia. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The OlE Risk analysis framework: A tool to inform better multi-
sectoral zoonosis risk management? 
8. Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the challenges to, and strengths of, the avian and human 
influenza prevention and control policy as adopted in Zambia. Focusing the analysis on 
particular aspects of the policy process, it argued that the construction of the policy framework 
for zoonotic avian influenza risk management and pandemic preparedness in Zambia was 
largely driven by the actions of, and financial aid provided by, international agencies. Through 
financing, the World Bank, FAO and USAID shaped the direction avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy took. They also reinforced the animal health framing of the H5Nl 
avian influenza problem through four processes. First, they defined the H5Nl problem and its 
possible sources. These sources included Zambia's multiple neighbours, interfaced by porous 
borders, and its 'high avian influenza risk' traditional poultry production sector. Second, they 
decided on which 'key' stakeholders to include in policy development and third, they influenced 
the nature of intervention programmes. Fourth, the bulk of financing was skewed towards 
animal health, which, by default, placed the veterinary department at the helm of policy 
development. With the agricultural ministry controlling most of the resources, the flow of 
finances affected the understanding of risk and the politics of the policy process, sustaining the 
emergency framing from the period between 2005 and 2009 and sending both government 
veterinary and research institutions alike searching for the elusive H5Nl influenza virus in 
traditional poultry and wild birds. 
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This approach was, however, not completely aligned with the national Government's economic 
development imperative. As a result, many useful local links, implementing structures and 
coordinative mechanisms established under the development agenda were ignored. Despite this, 
the previous chapter posited that there were gains made in the policy process. Under the avian 
influenza preparedness banner, national decision-makers pursued several activities, namely, 
capacity building in both veterinary and health services, conununication strengthening and 
improvement of laboratory capacity. Although framed under pandemic preparedness, the 
explicit impetus for policy development, the threat of an incursion of zoonotic avian influenza, 
did not materialise. The response was clearly substantial, with what respondents considered to 
be a major 'manpower' and 'man hour' cost for Government, when H5Nl avian influenza itself 
could not be found! Interestingly, as the risk of an incursion seemed to abate, the pressure from 
the international conununity for more decisive action continued. 
The three preceding policy analysis chapters together overviewed the processes for avian and 
human influenza prevention and control policy development in Zambia and its links to the 
international experience of H5Nl. They demonstrated the political nature of zoonosis risk 
management in a resource-constrained country, and how this cannot be separated from the 
technical task of assessing the risk being addressed. The politics concerned problem framings, 
perceptions of risk, the nature of stakeholder involvement, and the policy problems created by 
the use of external evidence and finance to construct the policy response. 
In 2008, USAID conunissioned an avian influenza risk mapping exercise for the Southern 
African region. This was not used to inform policy development in Zambia. The reasons given 
were that the risk mapping exercise was not specific to Zambia, had been conducted rapidly and 
had been dismissed for lacking methodological soundness: 
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[T]hey just interviewed a lot of people. It wasn't comprehensive, there were no 
questionnaires and things like that, so a lot of people questioned how they 
arrived at assessing the risk in the manner that they did ... 
Senior Epidemio-surveillance Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (3) 
Decision-makers in Zambia certainly saw the need for a thorough risk assessment specific to the 
Zambian context. To facilitate this, among the several activities undertaken, was a poultry 
census exercise: 
[W]e picked some activities out of that to help us with our preparedness and 
one of them is the census that we are carrying out, poultry census, to help us 
map our farms and know exactly where they are which will help us in terms of 
risk assessment and so on. 
SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Force member, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives (1) 
Furthermore, the policy analysis itself highlighted several gaps that suggested the need for a risk 
assessment in this context. For instance, there was the view that many of the local stakeholders 
did not understand how the risk of H5Nl avian influenza affected them. The evidence base to 
support the trade ban was weak. A risk assessment would have provided a basis for the 
establishment, and determining the effectiveness, of the surveillance strategy. Rather than 
Zambia's porous borders, it was the more plausible H5Nl incursion risk presented by the 
country's poultry production systems and its links to migratory birds, traditional birds and to 
human health that needed to be more explicitly defmed. Furthermore, role and resource 
allocation in risk management were poorly considered. 
In retrospect, the likelihood of avian influenza overwhelming Zambia and causing a human 
pandemic was remote, even at the height of the pandemic scare in Southeast Asia. With regard 
to risk management, several issues can be highlighted. The response developed by Zambia was 
233 
disproportionate to the problem at hand and it is clear that politics played a major role in 
defming the dynamics of the policy process. Implicitly, several animal health respondents 
understood that the avian influenza response outside of Nigeria and Egypt was a waste, but 
remained complicit because project funding was made available which 'somebody' had to 
manage. The lack of an authoritative coordinative body for multi-sectoral risk management was 
another critical issue. These various aspects of policy development all have implications for the 
feasibility and utility of conducting a risk analysis, particularly in informing multi-sectoral 
coordination, role and resource allocation and focus in the management of avian and human 
influenza risk in Zambia. 
Drawing on theory and the policy analysis fmdings, this chapter analyses the ways in which 
understanding policy processes and context could inform risk analysis in such a way as to foster 
better policy coordination in the case of avian influenza prevention and control, livestock trade 
and the wider issues of human pandemic preparedness in Zambia. Specifically, this chapter sets 
out to answer the last two research questions; (l) How feasible is it to conduct an OlE type risk 
analysis in a manner that informs the development of risk management policies across trade, 
public health and animal health and more widely in a context of a resource-constrained country 
like Zambia? (2) What would a policy relevant model for risk analysis appropriate for this 
resource-constrained country setting look like? 
The policy analysis presented the actors, their interests and the way this affected policy 
outcomes. Given the study fmdings thus far, i.e. how Zambia constructed risk management 
policy in response to the 'global' H5Nl risk, it is important to dete~ne the potential for 
assessments of risk to inform the development of context-appropriate policy responses. There 
are numerous risk analysis frameworks available (see for example Covello and Merkhofer 
1993), but because of H5Nl's animal health nature and zoonotic potential, this thesis focuses 
only on the World Organisation for Animal Health (OlE) risk analysis framework, 
conceptualized by its proponents as the 'gold standard' for the assessment of animal infectious 
disease risks. The chapter begins by highlighting some of the policy limitations of the current 
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OlE approach to risk analysis, detennines what would aid the risk analysis process and what 
might be lost by conducting a risk analysis in this way. Following this critique, a national level 
model for an OlE risk analysis within this context is proposed and its context-specific policy 
implications are assessed. It discusses the stakeholders likely to influence or be influenced by a 
risk analysis in this context. This chapter fundamentally argues that the key to the feasibility of 
the analysis of the risk of multi-sectoral affecting emerging infectious diseases such as zoonotic 
avian influenza is flexibility in how risk is framed across the public health, animal health and 
trade systems. By this, I mean risk must be presented in ways that speak to each sector's 
interests. 
8.1. Risk analysis and the policy context: A critique o/the DIE risk analysisjrll11lework 
One area of consensus in the large risk literature is that, separate from the actual dangers 
presented by various hazards, 'risk' is socially constructed (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; 
Horlick-lones 1998; Slovic 1998). This has been apparent in this study. Chapter 5 demonstrated 
how different policy actors both understood and responded to the externally defmed threat of a 
zoOnotic avian influenza incursion into Zambia. Perceptions of avian influenza risk were framed 
differently both within and across various sectors, including the poultry and allied industries, the 
media, health, agriculture and trade. The implication of this is that, while the health of food 
animals such as poUltry is important, given their linkages to food safety, livelihoods, public 
health and the economy, risk perceptions associated with food animals influence policy 
processes in different but significant ways. It can be argued that risk analysis can also be 
influenced by, and more importantly, benefit from these social processes. It is here that insights 
from Beck (1992) and Giddens (1998) aid in highlighting the importance of having a more 
discursive treatment of 'risk' in the process of science-based analyses of risk. 
Focusing on the OIE risk analysis framework (Murray et al. 2004), which is a science-based 
method for the assessment of risk rooted on the system developed by Covello and Merkhofer 
(1993), this section critiques the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to risk analysis in 
relation to policy processes. The OIE risk analysis framework (figure 8.1) is based on a heuristic 
235 
conceptualized to involve four interacting and iterative stages; hazard identification, risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication (Vose et al. 200 1; WHOIF AO 2006; OlE 
2010). This structure makes the OlE risk analysis framework amenable to a structured 
discussion on the policy considerations relevant to its application in different contexts. 
However, according to Millstone (2007) who makes a more general argument on the scientific 
approaches to risk analysis and their interactions with policy processes, the separation of risk 
assessment from risk management and risk communication is misleading. It detaches political 
processes from scientific expertise, entities that are intimately entangled. 
For the OlE framework, which fits what Millstone (2007) terms a 'Red Book' model72 of 
decision-making, the risk assessment is the most technical component of the process. It can be a 
qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative assessment of risk on the basis of expert 
knowledge and/or empirical data (Vose et al. 2001; Murray et al. 2004). Together with the other 
stages; hazard identification, risk management and risk communication, the framework is 
subject to the policy processes of the particular context that the risk assessment is conducted. 
This is the starting point for assessing the feasibility of the OlE risk analysis framework to 
inform multi-sectoral risk management in Zambia. As demonstrated by the policy analysis, the 
framing of risk, and therefore its assessment, involves the interplay of both contextual and 
social influences. This sentiment is echoed by Millstone (2007), who traces the historic 
development of thinking around science's interactions with politics, and prominent risk 
sociologists such as Beck (1992); Giddens (1998) and Slovic (1998). 
One weakness of the framework is that it primarily relies on the engagement of expert 
knowledge, and their presentation of the underlying assumptions and the steps followed in the 
determination of risk (Vose 2000; Pfeiffer 2(07). By relying primarily on the knowledge of 
scientific experts, I argue that this approach leaves the framework blind to social influences, 
72 According to Millstone (2007), the term comes from the red cover of a seminal report produced in 1983 
by the National Research Council in the US. This report presented a version of inverted decisionism or 
technocratic model that is very similar to the OlE risk analysis framework pictorially represented in figure 
8.1. 
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and, in the case of risk management policy development in resource-constrained countries, 
partial to the narratives on risk voiced by the international agencies holding the purse strings. 
The last point is an important potential flaw, because, as noted with similar technocratic models 
(van Zwanenburg and Millstone 2005; Millstone 2(07), international agencies could select only 
experts whose viewpoints chime with their policy agendas, making their assessments of risk as 
highly contestable as the avian and human influenza policy process in Zambia. Another concern 
is a lack of robustness in this approach's dealing with the ambiguities of scientific uncertainty 
and surprise (Stirling and Mayer 2000; Stirling and Scoones 2009) and, a failure to fully engage 
political processes and social choices in addressing risk (Millstone 2(07). A solution, as argued 
by Cumming (201 Ob), is that risk assessment for infectious disease needs "to develop a more 
holistic perspective" of risk ''that includes explicit consideration of the roles of policy, disease 
management, and feedbacks between ecosystems and societies." 
Clearly, the OlE risk analysis framework as currently conceptualised, does not take these factors 
into account. There are novel approaches that suggest ways of better combining science and 
policy making such as Millstone's (2007) 'co-evolutionary model'. However, the OlE risk 
analysis framework already has acceptance as the current 'gold standard' for the assessment of 
animal health, and by association, zoonotic disease risks. Its importance to policy is highlighted 
in the fact that, since the inception of the WTO in 1995, the OlE framework in general has 
achieved recognition within the WTO SPS agreement as the standard for facilitating trade in 
animal and animal products (Thiermann 2005; OlE 2010). The framework has been, and 
continues to be, applied to assess animal disease risks for scenarios other than those that are 
trade-related (McDiarmid and Pharo 2(03) and has been successfully adapted to a human health 
setting (e.g. Clements et al. 2010). The framework is intended to provide a structured approach 
to risk assessment and is considered by scholars and practitioners in the animal health 
profession to be an iterative and transparent standard for quantifying risk and informing policy 
(WHOIFAO 2006; Murray et al. 2004). Therefore, rather than reject it as not feasible on the 
basis of the preceding critique, it is important to suggest how it can be made more amenable to 
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social processes. Part of its appeal, as argued by Hueston (2003)73, is that the framework holds 
promise for the consideration of policy processes in the assessment of risk. Hueston, however, 
offers no concrete example of how this may be achieved, therefore this chapter examines one 
way in which this can be possible. Another key strength of the OIE risk analysis framework is 
assists decision-makers thinking around particular aspects of risk, which in tum helps better 
inform resource allocation in risk rrutigation (McDiarmjd and Pharo 2003). To determine how 
the OIE risk analysis framework can be improved to inform multi-sectoral zoonotic risk 
management policy in the context of avian and human influenza prevention and control policy 
Zambia, all four components will now be scrutinized through a policy lens. The following 
discussion draws on insights developed by Millstone (2007) in his co-evolutionary model of 
science and politics in policy makjng. 
Figure 8-1. The structure ofthe OlE risk analysis process. 
Adapted from Murray et al. (2004). 
73 Hueston's discussion speaks of the OlE risk analysis framework in very general ways. 
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8.2. Pertinent themes for the feasibility of a risk analysis in Zambia 
There are important policy themes that must be taken into consideration when undertaking a 
risk analysis in a resource-poor setting such as Zambia. This section highlights the importance 
of being cognisant of the policy implications of carrying out risk analyses in such contexts. 
Noteworthy is that the evolution of the emergency response in Zambia was a highly political 
process, a state that cannot be detached from any risk analysis. In addition, the OIE risk analysis 
framework places the OIE squarely in the centre of the highly political arena of international 
animal trade and the equally political avian and human pandemic influenza policy problem. It is 
interesting, however, that as part of the OIE framework, the OIE's veterinary services 
evaluation process sets as a benchmark independence from political influence (e.g. Vallet and 
Pastoret 2009). This aim of separating science from politics is impossible. Hueston's (2003) 
conceptual paper on science, politics and animal health policy argues that the veterinary 
profession is potentially limited by a dependence on scientific or authoritative opinion and its 
exclusion of political and social phenomena. Pushing this argument further, this chapter sets out 
to demonstrate that the political and contextual dimensions are just as important as the 
biological considerations when it comes to the multi-sectoral risk management of emerging 
zoonosis such as H5Nl avian influenza. The policy study demonstrated that there were 
differences in the understanding of risk among sectors at the interface of animal health, public 
health and trade. This resulted in an amorphous understanding of H5Nl risk, stakeholder 
exclusion in risk management and some inefficient resource considerations. 
Four themes identified in the policy study are useful in suggesting ways of conducting an OlE 
type risk analysis appropriate for the Zambian context. The first theme is that different, but 
contiguous, framings of avian and human influenza risk drove the policy response. The second 
theme was a lack of understanding by local stakeholders of how H5Nl avian influenza affected 
them. The third theme was a lack of clarity over roles and resource considerations in the 
intervention strategies developed. The fourth theme draws on the differences in norms, 
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procedures and priorities across various sectors. It is from here that I argue that it is critical to 
identify the relevant institutions where a risk analysis to inform multi-sectoral zoonosis risk 
management policy would have the most effect, including the aspect of role allocation. 
The following analysis for conducting an OlE risk analysis will specifically examine the 'what' 
'how' 'when' and 'who' interactions of risk as they relate to policy. It is structured according to 
the components of OlE risk analysis framework, and draws on the four themes listed above. The 
themes are used to analyse the OlE risk analysis framework's presentation of hazard 
identification, risk assessment, risk communication and fmally risk management. 
8.2.1. Policy considerations/or haZlU'd identification 
Definitions are provided to guide the risk analyst through each stage of the risk analysis process. 
These defmitions will also be used to guide this analysis. An OlE framework risk analysis 
begins by identifying 'what' the hazard, or source of risk, is. In OlE risk analysis parlance, it is 
the hazard identification stage of the risk analysis process that identifies 'what' the hazard of 
concern is. The OlE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (the Code) defmes hazard identification as 
"the process of identifying the pathogenic agents which could potentially be introduced in the 
commodity considered for importation" (OlE 2010, p.xvii). This definition explicitly mentions 
commodities intended for importation because the Code's purpose is to guide the facilitation of 
free and safe trade. In the handbook on import risk analysis for animals and animal products 
(Murray et al. 2004), a hazard is defmed as "any pathogenic agent that could produce adverse 
consequences on the importation of a commodity" (p.v). 
There is a policy dimension to hazard identification. In the sense of policy, a 'hazard' is a 
condition that at some point became seen as a 'problem' (or 'risk') requiring a policy solution. 
This is the agenda setting process of policy development. Before H5Nt avian influenza was 
considered a hazard in Zambia, it had to achieve policy relevance. Hazard identification, in 
terms of policy, is therefore the framing of the problem. This may 'simply' refer to how the 
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agent, in this case H5Nl avian influenza, is conceptualised as a problem (see Murray et al.' s 
defmition above). But as a political process, how the risk of H5Nl was perceived, i.e. its social 
construction, is a little more complex. Perceptions of H5Nl avian influenza risk were 
constructed by divergent internal national, and external international, policy agendas and 
evidence in Zambia. Cognisance of these sometimes conflicting interactions in perceptions of 
risk and hence in developing risk management policy, if taken into account, could potentially 
enhance the applicability of the OlE risk analysis framework in the context of a country such as 
Zambia. Tensions such as H5Nl's status as a global health concern due to its pandemic 
potential, a poultry industry or trade concern, or its "exotic" status in the Zambian context, need 
to be acknowledged before context-specific consensus of this policy problem can be achieved. 
It is consensus that would then allow policy makers from different policy sectors to focus on an 
'objective' view of risk. 
The H5Nl problem was expressed in the three ways conveying how the H5Nl avian influenza 
'hazard' was understood by policy makers across animal health. trade and public health. First. 
the reality. as presented by respondents. was that HSNI avian influenza. as a hazard, was an 
"exotic" condition that threatened trade. Secondly, there was the understanding that it was a 
potential zoonosis whose risk of incursion lay in traditional poUltry flocks with poor 
"biosecurity", and thirdly HSNI carried plausible implications for public health if an incursion 
occurred and in the process H5Nl became fully zoonotic. These multiple perspectives are what 
should explicitly form what Millstone (2007) terms the 'framing assumptions' of a risk analyst 
called upon to provide advice in policy making. This is because, as argued at the end of Chapter 
5, these framings also represented the different aspects of HSNI risk that were important for 
policy makers across animal health, public health and trade, and created the internal policy 
framework of the H5Nl problem in Zambia. These different animal health, trade and economy. 
and public health framings of the H5Nl problem formed the internal policy response, bringing 
specific actors to the policy process. The resulting policy framework then addressed four 
contiguous disease and disease management issues. First, there was the root consideration of 
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H5N1 avian influenza (or HSN1 emergency preparedness) second, there was the consideration 
of general avian influenzas, third, there was the aspect of human seasonal influenzas and fourth, 
there was the core policy issue of human influenza pandemic preparedness and capacity 
building. 
An important question for a risk analyst to ask, other than what the hazard is, is for whom (and 
how) H5N1 avian influenza presents a 'hazard'. To be feasible as a tool to inform policy in a 
setting such as Zambia, the process of hazard identification should first unpack and properly 
categorize different policy perceptions into risk statements germane to each policy-relevant 
stakeholder. This essentially entails that a hazard identification be performed in such a way that 
it 'maps' how the HSN1 avian influenza 'hazard' relates to general avian influenzas, human 
influenza and pandemic preparedness across sectors. This is important. This is because the 
policy analysis demonstrated that, as a standalone problem, different levels of priority were 
accorded to H5N1 avian influenza. It remained high in the public health sector and low in the 
animal health sector but just the perception of H5N1 risk resulted in real consequences in the 
poultry industry. Other local stakeholders did not know how H5N1 affected them. The outputs 
of a risk analysis dealing with a potential zoonosis such as H5N1 avian influenza would 
theoretically have a broad audience with divergent conceptions of risk and priorities. Since the 
objective in Zambia was to develop a coordinated, multi-sectoral risk management framework, 
fostering this theoretically entails bringing on board different framings of risk and thinking 
about information gathering for hazard identification in adaptive and stakeholder inclusive 
ways. In Millstone's (2007) conception, this requires bringing scientific and non-scientific 
considerations more explicitly in policy processes, thus allowing the appropriate actors 
participate in the risk analysis process (Slovic 1998). The process of information gathering may 
therefore benefit from a stakeholder analysis, beyond international agency considerations, to 
identify important stakeholders, their viewpoints and information contributions. This is 
necessary to comprehensively define the hazard and capture information about how the hazard 
affects, and, more importantly, maybe affected by different policy relevant stakeholders. This 
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data gathering process is also important for the risk assessment stage, which is discussed in the 
next section. 
8.2.2. Policy considerations for risk assessment 
The Code defmes risk assessment as ''the evaluation of the likelihood and the biological and 
economic consequences of entry, establishment and spread of a hazard within the territory of an 
importing country" (DIE 2010. p. xxii). The OlE manual on qualitative risk analysis (Murray et 
a1. 2004) states that risk assessment involves four stages, a release assessment, exposure 
assessment, consequence assessment and finally, risk estimation. It is the position of the OlE 
that the processes of release and exposure assessments require the skills of a veterinary 
epidemiologist, while the consequence assessment may require an economist's input 
(McDiarmid and Pharo 2003). Authors such as Vose et al. (2001) contend that it is ideal for risk 
managers to understand the policy process to inform risk assessors. In Millstone's co-
evolutionary model, the risk assessment stage is mostly about scientific considerations 
(Millstone 2007). However, for scenarios where risk management is intended to be multi-
sectoral, I argue that, in addition to being equipped with the framing assumptions of the various 
interested parties, a risk analyst would be at an added advantage if they had some working 
knowledge of policy processes beyond a purely 'scientific' viewpoint. 
The process of risk assessment begins with a risk question, which defmes what can go wrong 
and how. Specifically, after hazard identification, the relevant stakeholders then formulate the 
risk questions they intend the risk assessor to help answer, which defines the boundaries of the 
risk assessment. The OlE risk analysis process conceptualizes data gathering within an 'expert 
knowledge' framework. To help answer these questions, Pharo (2003) states that this requires 
gathering and collating evidence that describes the risk-relevant epidemiology of the hazard 
such as host range, vehicles of carriage and transmission, and survival under different 
environmental conditions. In the paper on risk analysis by McDiarmid and Pharo (2003), the 
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sources of information considered reliable included libraries, the internet and specialists. The 
framework is accommodating of grey literature (Wooldridge 2(00), but it is the 'expert' sources 
that are considered important in meeting the information requirements to explain the virology of 
H5Nl. Beyond this, however, the question of what can go wrong and how, still needs to focus 
on determining for whom and how is each negative outcome important. The stakeholder analysis 
at the hazard identification stage and the engagement of these stakeholders at the risk 
assessment stage could provide important data for an inclusive assessment of risk. Especially in 
resource-constrained settings where data are scarce, this multi-sectoral data collection process 
provides a viable data source. 
8.2.2.1. Risk framing in Ztunbia and its implications for risk assessment 
The policy analysis demonstrated that the H5Nl issue in Zambia started off as a public health 
concern (Chapter 5). It was the policy process, influenced by international agencies that brought 
the issue into the animal health domain. The common denominator for both public health and 
animal health in the beginning had been, and remained, H5Nl's potential effect on human 
health. The risk question therefore revolved around HSNl's zoonotic risk, although the policy 
study found that the problem had wider consequences. It had economic (poultry and allied 
industry) effects (Chapter 5), concerns over potential health system effects, particularly in the 
handling of possible outbreaks (Chapter 6), possible tourism industry effects as well as 
concerns over its effects on the poultry industry in general. 
How did decision-makers go about addressing these concerns? A particular policy framing and 
disease mitigation approach underscored the country's avian and human influenza prevention 
and control response. It focused primarily on the prevention of an external incursion of H5Nl 
avian influenza and less on the local and regional contextual factors that could potentially 
influence its transmission, establishment and spread. As argued by Leach, Scoones and Stirling 
(201 0), typical approaches to disease control usually emphasize the prevention of 
'contamination' rather than a critical consideration of 'configuration' or context. This was the 
case in Zambia. The policy study demonstrated that decision-makers in Zambia were influenced 
to focus primarily on mitigating the risk of disease contamination. This was exemplified by the 
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imposed partial poultry and poultry product import ban even from countries unaffected by 
H5Nl and concerns that HSNl avian influenza was on the country's 'doorsteps'. It was also a 
valid concern, which should be taken on board in the risk assessment process, given the 
importance of disease freedom for the purposes of trade. 
In Zambia's National Response Plan, five potential introduction routes for H5Nl avian 
influenza in the country were listed; live bird imports; poultry product imports; illegal poultry 
and poultry product trade; returning travellers previously in direct or indirect contact with 
infected poultry or poUltry premises overseas; and aquatic migratory birds (Chapter 6). For a 
risk analyst, these are the modes of 'release' considered pertinent by policy makers in Zambia. 
While this demonstrates some consideration of the potential routes through which H5Nl avian 
influenza might enter the country, and thus demonstrate policy-maker contemplation of the 
'how' of H5Nl risk, stakeholders were focusing more on the 'when'. In the waning interest in 
policy development, the primary reason for loss of interest was the continued 'delay' in the 
arrival of H5Nl avian influenza: 
[A]ctually, you find farmers asking you that, "We have heard so much about 
this avian influenza, when is it coming to Zambia?" 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
For local decision-makers, there were tensions between the preoccupation with the temporal 
concern of H5Nl risk, and externally defined evidence on the spatial concerns of risk: 
"According to Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), although Zambia is currently free of 
the virus, the country is at high risk because of many neighbouring countries, which has led to 
increase in human traffic and trade in poUltry and poultry products,,74. Beyond the five modes of 
release listed in the country's National Response Plan, however, there was no clear mapping 
('configuration') of how an H5Nl avian influenza incursion and outbreak might occur in the 
74 Zambia's National Response Plan on avian influenza, 2008 version, p.6 
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Zambian context. A risk assessment, guided by stakeholder-relevant risk questions, would be 
pertinent in assisting policy-makers and stakeholders focus more deeply on 'how' an H5Nl 
avian influenza incursion and outbreak might occur in Zambia. This would help to better define 
resource allocation in risk management. 
The policy study also revealed that commercial breeders were perceived to have high 
biosecurity, based on the strength of their investment. However, it has been argued by 
independent NGO's such as GRAIN (2007) that many of the HSNI avian influenza outbreaks in 
Southeast Asia were in large commercial institutions with poor biosecurity. For Zambia, other 
than illegal cross border trade, human travellers and migratory birds, breeders were the link with 
the global poultry industry and, potentially, at risk of acquiring H5Nl avian influenza. Another 
important risk consideration is that the poultry industry in Zambia had orientated itself towards 
poultry exports. This implies that should Zambia have an outbreak, it could be a potential source 
of H5Nl avian influenza for its trading partners. In terms of risk assessment, it is thus very 
important to consider the 'configuration' of the risk system to better inform disease 
management. 
From the policy analysis, three interlinked risk systems would have to be considered in the 
weighing of H5Nl risk release in this context. These three risk systems are the biological risk, 
the ecological risk and the policy risk. These are essentially the map that a risk assessor could 
develop to determine the risk of release, exposure and consequence(s) of an H5Nl avian 
influenza incursion. The biological risk system would draw on virology and epidemiology, as 
this; in many respects, is a technical exercise. The ecological and policy risk systems, as they 
relate to risk assessment, require some unpacking. The ecological risk system, as conceptualised 
in this discussion, is the poultry production system at play in the Zambian context. This 
encompasses production characteristics and the nature and extent of interaction among 
production systems, processing systems and market distribution systems. In the case of Zambia, 
the production systems include the traditional backyard production systems, semi-commercial 
housed production systems, emergent production systems, commercial production systems and 
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commercial breeding systems. Together, the biological and ecological risk systems detennine 
the likely points at which fIrst, the production systems interface each other (and hence the 
means through which H5Nl avian influenza could spread from system to system), and second, 
the human exposure to HSNl avian influenza may occur. The policy system includes, but is not 
limited to; the identifIcation of the institutions, resources, stakeholders and policies available for 
risk management. These are important in identifying the type and feasibility of interventions 
that already exist to mitigate this risk. 
A release assessment would begin by determining the current disease status of countries with 
which Zambia has trade dealings. The information on Zambia's trading partners and trade flows 
is available from the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry, the Ministry of AgriCUlture, 
Zambia's Central Statistics Office and the Poultry Association of Zambia. The disease status of 
Zambia's trading partners (sources of breeding stock) can be found on the OlE website. The 
next step may involve verifying the claim that Zambia's poultry breeders, of which only six 
hatcheries supplying the entire commercial poultry industry (including emergent and small scale 
production systems) 7S, actually have the levels of biosecurity and surveillance systems in place 
to support the claim that they are at low risk of an HSNl incursion. Much of the production 
information in the commercial sector can be obtained from the Poultry Association of Zambia. 
Information on the nature of production in the traditional sector can be obtained from the 
Central Statistics Office which publishes information of house-hold poultry production systems, 
as well as NGO's such as Africare that work with small scale producers. This information can 
also be supported by data from the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development. 
8.2.2.2 Conceptual scenario diagram for the assessment of multi-sectorial zoonotic 
risk in Zambia 
75 According to Zambia's National Response Plan for Avian and Human Influenza (2008), the country has 
four poultry production systems. These are commercial sector, emerging sector, small scale (also called 
backyard production) sector and the Village/free range sector. 
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From the policy analysis, I now propose a scenario diagram to represent the routes for 
introducing (contamination) zoonotic H5Nl avian influenza into the population of interest and 
potential routes of spread (configuration) (figure 8.2). In determining the risk of H5Nl release, 
one could consider the product to be a diseased poultry or their products, the possibility of 
biological carriage via human travel or via aquatic migratory birds. For poultry and poultry 
products, a risk analyst could trace the movement of these commodities through the entire 
production system, by conceptualizing physical pathways through the supply chain from 
hatcheries, producers, small scale producers, fmally to markets (formal and informal), overlaid 
by a biological pathway defming host-pathogen interaction and an examination of biosecurity 
measures throughout the supply chain. A second set of pathways could be developed for 
biological carriage via human travel and the third would be through aquatic migratory birds. 
The scenario diagram represents many of the key issues around risk identified in the policy 
analysis. It is a conceptual example of how a risk assessment might present the zoonotic H5Nl 
avian influenza problem to incorporate trade, public health and animal health. These sectors 
provide possible policy mitigation points, trade "surveillance" (through border and import 
controls, including poultry and poultry products in transit), veterinary surveillance (domestic 
commercial and traditional poultry, food safety, poultry markets and wild poultry) and human 
surveillance (port health, hospital and health centre surveillance and food safety). This is a 
possible 'policy pathway', or more accurately, a 'risk management policy pathway', since the 
movement of poultry and poultry products is defmed by complex socio-economic and policy 
interactions. The physical pathways in figure 8.2 could consider trade agreements and SPS 
protocols, poultry production and marketing, avian influenza surveillance in humans and poultry 
and food safety. It must be mentioned that, as a configuration omission, the issue of food safety 
was not specifically addressed in avian and human influenza prevention and control policy 
development in Zambia: 
[W]ithin our department, there are some people that are dealing specifically 
with food safety. In relation to Avian Influenza, all we have tried to do is, 
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probably in our extension, is to inform people how they should handle certain 
suspected cases .... and... I wouldn't say we have done much. We ... we have 
restricted importation from certain countries that are affected. But we haven't ' 
really developed a defined approach. Yes, in relation to public health ... 
Senior Veterinary Research Officer, National Avian Influenza Working Group (4) 
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Figure 8-2. Conceptual scenario diagram for the movement of poultry and poultry products and HSNI following import. 
The physical pathways are represented by the blue and red arrows. The biological pathways (H5Nl transmission routes) are represented by the green arrows. Blue arrows represent poultry products and red arrows 
represent live poultry. The grey dotted line represents poultry and poultry products in transit, while purple arrows represent pathways for human contact with each risk system. 
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While it is important to conceptualize risk pathways in sensible, realistic and manageable ways, it is 
the position of Horlick-Jones (1998) that the resource and managerial aspects of risk should not be 
separated from the assessment process. The scenario diagram here attempts to include these critical 
aspects of risk management. For a risk assessment to be policy relevant, it must relate avian and 
human influenza prevention and control and trade policy activities to zoonotic H5Nl avian 
influenza risk which includes an assessment of each sector's roles and actions in each risk pathway, 
including some consideration of existing legal and policy frameworks, mandates and provisos. The 
policy study demonstrated that a potential plethora of information sources outside Health and 
Agriculture that would inform a risk analysis. However, stakeholders, such as the Ministry of Trade 
Commerce and Industry had been excluded from the policy process while their data and 
participation would have eased the resource constraints placed on the animal health sector. Such 
data can be obtained from the Poultry Association of Zambia, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry, the Zambia Revenue Authority, 
Zambia's immigration service, Zambia Ornithological Society and the Ministry of Health. 
The conceptual risk model presented in figure 8.3 is aggregated from the physical and biological 
pathways in figure 8.2. This conceptual risk model incorporates the 'practical' data inputs for a risk 
assessment to inform avian and human influenza prevention and control policy in Zambia. It also 
aggregates the biological, ecological and policy risk systems, with the primary focus being on how 
public health is affected, which was the root concern for the development of the avian and human 
influenza prevention and control policy. The Greek letters represent the parameters of the risk areas 
that could potentially be assessed in relation to H5Nl epidemiology, ecology and policy that would 
need to be instituted to reduce the risk of trade-related H5N 1 introduction. These parameters are 
explained in the summary provided in table 8.1. In addition to expert opinion and the literature on 
H5Nl epidemiology, this could potentially form the basis for the analytical framework for the risk 
release, exposure and consequence. 
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Figure 8-3. A conceptual risk model for the assessment of the risk of HSNI introduction in Zambia. 
Such a model would examine (1) Release assessment; involving a consideration of the trade-related, 
human travel related and aquatic migratory bird related pathways through which viable H5Nl could 
be introduced into Zambia from affected trading partners and regions including border inspection 
and SPS protocols; (2) Exposure assessment; involving a consideration of the pathways through 
which Zambian poultry and poultry products and high risk humans (occupational exposure) and 
consumers (distributive exposure) could be exposed to H5Nl following trade-related, human travel-
related and aquatic migratory bird-related introduction. This would examine biosecurity, husbandry, 
wild bird and domestic bird contact rates and food safety protocols (3) Consequence assessment; 
involving a consideration the ways in which an H5Nl outbreak(s) would affect public health, the 
economy, or be spread further to Zambia's export markets. This would examine losses to the 
poultry and related industries, health system effects and the wider economic consequences (4) Risk 
estimation; involving a summary of the previous estimates. 
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Risk Pathway Interpretation Data input 
parameter 
a, • Seasonal migration of wild aquatic birds Ornithological data for Zambia 
• Contact rates with local aquatic ducks Husbandry practices in traditional 
• Contact rates with traditional poultry from flocks 
communities living near large water bodies with Identification of areas where contact 
the most migratory bird activity between traditional and aquatic birds 
is most likely 
a2 • Border entry protocols for live poultry SPS protocols at ports of entry 
• Inspection protocols (SPS) Import data 
• Source verification Import permits 
• Transit vehicle inspection protocols Quarantine procedures for imported 
• Quarantine procedures breeding stock 
• Personnel at checkpoints 
avian influenza surveillance and 
a2' • Border entry inspection for poultry products 
control 
• Inspection protocols (SPS) 
• Source verification 
• Transit vehicle inspection protocols 
• Quarantine procedures 
• Food safety protocols 
p, • Monitoring of biosecurity measures and Poultry sector description data 
husbandry in the commercial producer sector 
Sectoral activities around 
PI' • Monitoring of biosecurity for poultry from the • avian influenza surveillance 
emerging sector coming into the producer sector and control 
• Monitoring of biosecurity and husbandry in the • Human influenza 
Ji2 emerging sector surveillance 
• Monitoring of biosecurity and husbandry in the • Food safety 
JiJ small scale sector 
y, • Monitoring of poultry product food safety for 
the commercial sector prior to marketing 
Y2 • Monitoring of poultry product food safety 
protocols for the emerging sector prior to 
marketing 
l!. Informal product markets 
• Surveillance of poultry products from the 
formal (emerging) sector 
• Surveillance of poultry products from the 
informal (small scale) sector 
E Informal live animal markets 
• Monitoring of poultry health in informal 
markets 
• Monitoring of health and mixing in informal 
markets 
Table S. 1. Conceptual parameters explaining symbols used In the conceptual risk model shown 10 
figureS.3 
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Conceptualized like this, such a risk model would examine zoonotic H5Nl avian influenza entry 
into poultry production systems, release into these poultry production systems, possible routes of 
exposure of other poultry flocks and the risk of human beings contacting potentially infected 
poultry and poultry products. The aspect of exposure of human beings to zoonotic H5Nl is 
fundamental, since in Zambia, for policy-makers at least, the zoonotic risk was more important than 
the effect on poultry industry productivity. Broadly speaking, the human populations at most risk 
would probably be those working very closely with poultry (occupational exposure) and those 
working in poultry trade (distributive exposure). An important aspect for the risk assessment to 
address is actually 'when' human exposure is likely to occur following detection of outbreaks in 
poultry. The literature shows that in other contexts, human cases occurred between a month (Egypt) 
to a year (Nigeria) after poultry outbreaks were detected (WHO 2010). This provides the possible 
timeframe in which the health system would have to respond in order to reduce the risk of further 
spread. For decision-makers in Zambia, there was also a need to answer the question when HSNI 
avian influenza would come to Zambia. A qualitative risk assessment would assist policy makers 
decide if the risk is acceptable or not. If further insights are required, a more data intensive 
quantitative risk assessment would give indications of time frame probabilities. 
8.2.3. Roles in multi-sectorial risk mtJMgement in Zambia 
The Code defmes risk management as "the process of identifying, selecting and implementing 
measures that can be applied to reduce the level of risk" (OlE 2010, p. xxii). The stages of risk 
management, according to the OlE, are risk evaluation, option evaluation, implementation and 
monitoring and review (Murray et aI. 2004). Risk evaluation involves determining whether or not 
the risk calculated by a risk assessor requires intervention. Option evaluation seeks to defme the 
nature of this intervention and identify the various approaches available to manage risk. 
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There is, however, an important policy question that requires contextualizing to apply a modified 
version of the OlE risk analysis framework, and that is 'who' manages risk? Vose et al. (2001) 
state, rather definitively, that risk management, as a process, is undertaken by risk managers 
knowledgeable in policy and in possession of the appropriate level of technical know-how to 
communicate efficiently with persons assessing risk. In the preamble of their paper on risk 
analysis. MacDiarmid and Pharo (2003) state that the process of risk analysis is intended to assist 
decision-makers weigh the risks posed by particular courses of action. While it is appreciated that 
both papers are technical overviews of the OlE risk analysis framework, they do not attempt to 
unpack the terms 'decision-maker' or 'risk-manager'. These two terms could refer to different sets 
of policy actors or the same set of people. It should be bome in mind that in the development of 
multi-sectoral zoonosis risk management policy, the term 'risk manager' is actually fluid, applicable 
to a multitude of stakeholders. In this policy analysis. for example. we identified a 20-person Task 
Force on Avian and Human Influenza, the Department of Veterinary and Livestock Development, 
the Ministry of Health, the FAO, the WHO, USAID, the National Agricultural Information Service 
(NAlS) and the Ministry of Health's Health Education Unit, all working to 'manage' the same risk. 
In addition, there were stakeholders such as the Poultry Association of Zambia, who acted to 
manage media-generated perceptions of risk: 
[W]e realised thai it (avian influenza) gained a lot of prominence in the press and 
the prominence was full of fake things and people were just downloading the 
Turkey situation or the China situation and making it appear as if it was a Zmnbian 
situation. .. . In the three months of the AI prominence in the ... (Media) ... we as an 
industry lost to a tune of 30 billion kwaclul6 in three months. So we woke up from 
slumber and took a leading role in the sensitization of our members and also the 
general public ... 
Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Director (16) 
76 This amounts to approximately £3.9 million 
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In multi-sectoral risk management settings, therefore, it is more useful for the risk analyst to 
understand policy processes and be able to explain the technical aspect of risk assessment in 
accessible ways to different stakeholders rather than expect 'risk managers' to be conversant with 
the technicalities of a risk assessment. The policy study revealed that there were various technical 
and non-technical strands to the preparedness effort as it related to the management of zoonotic 
USN 1 avian influenza risk. There was the public health response, based on the Integrated Disease 
Surveillance and Response (IDSR) framework. There was the animal health response, based on the 
developed National Response Plan framework. There was also the omitted, but potentially 
important, trade response. based on their capacity to translate, support or implement trade 
agreement provisos for the purpose of animal health, plant health or human health protection. It 
would be unrealistic to expect that these different policy communities would have 'risk managers' 
with "the appropriate level of technical background to communicate effectively with risk 
assessors ... n The policy analysis also revealed that at ministerial level, 'risk managers' in one 
ministry were unable to effectively issue risk management instructions to 'risk managers' in other 
ministries. nor were they expected to: 
[I would be "un-protocol" for a minislry to give another ministry an instruction, 
because ministers are generally assumed to be at the same level. 
National Coordinator, Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (20) 
For the OlE risk analysis framework to be useful in the Zambian context, the framework should aim 
to assist effective risk management by highlighting response system vulnerabilities across sectors in 
the process of characterising the dynamics of zoonotic risk. There is also a need to direct the 
explanation of the response system vulnerabilities to the appropriate audience or set of decision-
makers. The role of risk analysis to inform decision making would therefore be enhanced if risk is 
17 Vose eloJ. (2001) p.814 
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considered across the entire policy spectrum and not just from one viewpoint. This may also include 
taking inventory of the resources available across the entire policy spectrum to manage said risk. It 
is of interest for a risk analyst, for example. that perceptions of risk in the animal health sector were 
actually about veterinary capacity to manage the policy response, rather than manage the risk. 
While there was acknowledgement of the limited capacity to manage the policy response, the policy 
study also revealed that the resource implications for the management of risk were poorly 
considered, such as the proposal to formulate Rapid Response Teams in Zambia's 72 districts. 
Resource management is therefore cardinal to risk mitigation. 
The policy study demonstrated that coordinating the preparedness response was a challenge for 
Health and Agriculture. While the two Ministries were technical experts in human and animal 
disease management, respectively, they lacked the authority to bring other stakeholders into the 
fold. Comparatively, the Ministry of Health was institutionally more powerful than Agriculture, 
because it hosted the multi-sectoral National Epidemics Preparedness, Planning and Management 
Committee. However, the effectiveness of coordination was limited by decision-maker 
incognisance of differences and possible complementarities in priorities, norms and policy 
frameworks. 
Differences in priorities, norms and policy frameworks affected the development of the H5Nl avian 
and human pandemic influenza preparedness risk management policy. There were thus challenges 
in properly linking the policy response to livestock trade policy in Zambia (in the sense of the 
public health, trade and animal health policy positions and actions) and holistically addressing the 
various conceived modes of HSNI avian influenza introduction and routes for human exposure. 
Overall, there was an inherent difficulty in bringing the different stakeholders to view the risk 
management issue in mutually beneficial ways. To address this, the policy management identified 
under the policy considerations for risk assessment, could actually help to identify context-
appropriate risk management options that draws both on multiple framings of risk and the resources 
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of a wide pool of policy relevant stakeholders, thus aiding the process of assigning roles and 
resources more appropriately across sectors. 
8.2.4. Policy considerations for risk communication 
The process for risk communication is not straightforward. In Chapter 6, the policy study 
demonstrated that the communication strategy developed in Zambia for the pre-pandemic phase 
concentrated on primarily sensitizing poultry producers on H5Nl Avian influenza. It took a very 
top-down, animal health approach to communication of risk. The communication strategy was 
developed at sectoral level; entailing that primarily poultry farmers, veterinarians and medical 
personnel were made aware of the highly pathogenic avian influenza problem, but important arms 
of government, such as the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry, that could have played a role 
in policy development were excluded. While a number of stakeholders had been included in the 
Task Force, many of them did not really understand how HSNI avian influenza affected them. 
Clearly, as long as a policy issue is on the agenda, risk communication is not just about a 
unidirectional communication to stakeholders about risk, but an evolving process of continuous 
dialogue across sometimes different epistemic communities. 
The Code defines risk communication as ''the interactive transmission and exchange of information 
and opinions throughout the risk analysis process concerning risk, risk -related factors and risk 
perceptions among risk assessors, risk managers, risk communicators, the general public and other 
interested parties" (OlE 2010, p. xxii). For the OlE risk analysis to be useful, there has to be a 
consideration of who the policy relevant risk communicators are for a given risk problem in a given 
context. There is need to also think about how risk is communicated to, and by, different policy 
stakeholders, including the public, the media. farmers, medics, veterinarians, decision-makers 
across different sectors and even the donor community. Equally important is that in the process of 
risk communication, a context appropriate forum is used, allowing for as much dialogue and 
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feedback in the risk analysis process as possible. Such a risk analysis process would derive most 
benefit if presented both on a forum capable of reaching the largest number of policy relevant 
stakeholders and in ways that engages the interests of each policy relevant stakeholder. This entails 
structuring risk in flexible and stakeholder inclusive ways across public health, animal health, trade 
and more widely. Such a forum and approach would provide an audit of the multi-sectoral zoonosis 
risk management policy, including the identification of the institutions, resources and policies 
available for risk management. More importantly, it would be able to mobilize the necessary 
resources and institutions to enforce and evaluate the risk management response. 
8.3. Sumnuuy 
This chapter laid out the OlE risk analysis framework in the context of the risk literature set out in 
Chapter 3. It began by providing a critique of the framework, highlighting its technical, expert led, 
nature and how it artificially separates risk assessment from management and communication. 
However, given the OlE risk analysis framework's entrenched status as a 'gold standard', and the 
need to help decision-makers in Zambia develop better multi-sectoral zoonotic risk management 
policies in a structured manner, rather than reject it, the chapter sought to suggest ways of making 
the OlE risk analysis framework more open and deliberative, and to take explicit notice of multiple 
risk framings, diverse stakeholders and policy processes, to better negotiate risk analysis and risk 
management among multiple stakeholders. The chapter drew on the thesis fmdings, and insights 
derived from Millstone's (2007) co-evolutionary model (whose central premise is that of framing 
assumptions), to suggest conceptual additions to the OlE framework that would make it more 
applicable to the Zambian context. 
Based on the understanding that risk is socially constructed, this chapter argued that in the process 
of hazard identification, it is the recognition of the various framing assumptions that construct the 
risk in each context that will foster wider stakeholder inclusion. This, in turn, will take into account 
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the multiple perspectives that exist in resource-constrained countries. As Millstone (2007) states, 
framing assumptions influence the questions posed, the type of evidence used or excluded, and even 
how this evidence is interpreted. He further argues that framing assumptions have significant. but 
sometimes unacknowledged influence on the policy process. In essence, this chapter argued that, by 
basing the hazard identification on framing assumptions, the OlE risk analysis framework can be 
made amenable to more open and inclusive evidence gathering and interpretation, thus treating 
'risk' and its assessment in a more discursive manner. For instance, rather than seeking to answer 
one, externally influenced, risk question as the current conception of the OlE risk analysis 
framework would probably do (see McDiarmid and Pharo 2(03), this new approach uses framing 
assumptions to develop multiple risk questions that speak to the interests of multiple policy relevant 
stakeholders. Furthermore, by acknowledging these framing assumptions throughout the various 
stages of the risk analysis process, a better map of the local risk management context can be 
developed, thus facilitating better resource allocation, risk management and risk communication, 
through a close examination and consideration of both the scientific aspects of local configuration 
and the politics of policy processes. 
Adopting this approach would help reshape the face of the current multi-sectorial risk management 
response in Zambia, which the policy analysis demonstrated to be uncoordinated, driven by narrow 
and fragmented framings, and overly influenced by international agency funding, evidence and 
advice. Zambia would benefit from such an approach to risk analysis, especially if the process of 
dialogue could assist stakeholders focus on the context-specific elements of managing avian and 
human influenza risk. The risk analysis would need to be applied in such a way that it assists 
stakeholders align resource and institutional priorities to the prevention and management of an 
H5N 1 incursion. Therefore, while the OlE framework is widely applied in animal health settings, 
on the basis of the findings of this multi-sectoral policy case study, it may require a careful 
consideration of its utility in the Zambian politico-economic context. Also important, by analysing 
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the feasibility of the applicability of the OlE risk analysis framework through a policy lens, this 
study has demonstrated that given the interactions between local context, risk assessment and risk 
management policy, the relationship between policy and risk cannot be viewed as linear. Therefore, 
in the context of multi-sectoral risk management, risk assessors should consider taking into account 
political and social phenomena in the process of risk assessment. To help foster consensus across 
stakeholders with divergent interests, priorities, mandates and focuses, flexibility in risk structuring 
is essential. 
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In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is 
indispensible. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower - quoted by Low and McGeer (2010) 
CHAPTERNINE 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This final chapter summarises the contributions this study makes to existing knowledge about the 
policy processes for multi-sectoral zoonosis risk management in resource-constrained countries like 
Zambia. Specifically, the chapter discusses this thesis' findings in the context of the literature 
examining pandemic preparedness, disease risk mitigation and management, and risk analysis. It 
makes recommendations to the Zambian government of ways to improve multi-sectoral risk 
management, and provides some recommendations for pandemic preparedness in general. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The frrst section begins with a discussion of the global 
pandemic preparedness process and approaches to policy evaluation employed in the literature. It 
outlines how this study contributes to the body of knowledge on pandemic preparedness. This is 
followed by a general review of study findings on pandemic preparedness process in the context of 
Zambia. The chapter then discusses the trade and health relationship in the context of this study's 
findings. This frrst section covers the policy analysis component of this study. The second section 
of the discussion looks at risk, risk framing and the policy implications of using risk analysis to 
inform risk management priorities in resource-constrained settings. Drawing on the avian and 
pandemic influenza and risk literature, this section reiterates some of the policy implications of 
conducting risk analyses in resource poor settings. It concludes with reflections on future 
applications of risk analyses in such contexts and makes recommendations to decision-makers 
across trade, public health and animal health sectors in Zambia on ways to improve the 
development of risk management policies. The third section of this chapter provides 
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recommendations to policy makers in Zambia on how to improve multi-sectoral risk management 
policy development. The fourth and final section provides some thoughts on future areas of research 
and reiterates the study's limitations and caveats. 
9.1. Discussion 
9.1.1. An overview o/pandemic preparedness 
The recent global focus on preparedness traces its origins to the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003. According to Heymann (2006), the response to SARS adopted 
new norms and approaches to international public health, which blurred the concept of state 
sovereignty, particularly in relation to disease reporting, information sharing and approaches to 
disease control. Similarly, Fidler (2004) argues that the post SARS era introduced new concepts and 
approaches to emerging infectious disease governance. It is important to note that while SARS was 
a global concern, other than a few news articles, it is difficult to find examples of actual discourse 
on SARS in the Zambian context. An article by Ricchiardi (2003) in the American Journalism 
Review for instance, states how a Zambian tabloid, the Times of Zambia, merely examined the 
dangers of travelling in the era of SARS. Zambia did not experience SARS and therefore could not 
draw on, or easily be compared to, the Southeast Asian experience. 
Still, by modelling the global avian and pandemic influenza response on the SARS model, many of 
the lessons learnt from SARS became part of the global avian and pandemic influenza response. I 
have argued that very specific understandings and evidence constituted the response to H5Nl avian 
influenza in Zambia. Respondents felt that the issue of avian and human influenza was largely an 
externally driven agenda. Drawing on the wider literature, Stirling and Scoones (2009) for instance, 
argue that the ramifications associated with avian and pandemic influenza actually emphasized low 
probability Western concerns (mainly Europe and North America) over the costs of control for less 
developed economies and the livelihoods of Asian subsistence poultry producers whose flocks were 
targeted for control. Indeed, there was a cost for Zambia, the neglect of prevailing animal disease 
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problems as resources and manpower were focused on an exotic risk. The concerns of the West 
included the national security framing of a possible pandemic in post 9/11 America (Scoones 2010; 
Elbe 2010), which perhaps explains the extensive aid offered for pandemic preparedness by USAID 
in Zambia. The biosecurity and pandemic threat to America, in particular, was one of the key 
international drivers of the 'at source' and at risk containment agenda, a concern that has been 
defended by K.ruk (2008) in her paper on fostering emergency preparedness in the health systems of 
developing countries. For the threat of H5Nl avian influenza, Scoones and Forster (2008b) traced 
the evidence justifying this 'at source' containment and control response to two epidemiological 
models (Ferguson et al. 2005, Longini et al. 2(05). The main concern addressed by these models 
was the global effects of a pandemic over the in-context costs- of control (Stirling and Scoones 
2009). 
For developing countries, it has been argued, the consequences of a global pandemic would be dire. 
K.ruk (2008), for example, cites three studies that postulated South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
would suffer the highest mortalities should a global influenza pandemic reach the magnitude of the 
one that occurred in 1918. Although HSNI avian influenza had its epicentre in Southeast Asia, 
Africa was soon on the global public health radar as the next potential reservoir of the HSNt virus. 
Pushing the 'at source' containment agenda in Africa, a WHO Regional Office for Africa risk 
assessment (WHO AFRO 2(05) made very bold sweeping comparisons between Asian and African 
poultry production systems to justify similarities in risk and provide recommendations for 
prevention and control. The problem was, however, that the poultry production systems in Africa 
and Asia are in reality, very different. This alone demands a contextualised approach to assessment 
of risk, the development of strategies for prevention and control, and the evaluation of risk 
management policies. 
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9. 1.2. Pandemic preparedness from the Zambian perspective 
Without examining the underlying motivations of the response as adopted in Zambia, it would 
difficult to assess what had really been achieved by the process if one relied solely on externally 
generated criteria. This study adds to the understanding of zoonotic risk management and the 
pandemic preparedness policy process as it occurred in Zambia. It closely examined how avian and 
human influenza prevention and control policy was developed and what influenced the policy 
process across animal health, public health and trade sectors. It also identified the institutional and 
contextual challenges to infectious disease risk management across sectors. The approach adopted 
was to examine risk management policy development from the perspectives of animal health, public 
health and trade policy makers. These perspectives were obtained through interviews with decision-
makers and stakeholders within the study context. In addition, the study used observation and a 
documentary review. Among the key policy documents reviewed was Zambia's National Response 
Plan to avian and human influenza. 
The study found that national decision-makers in Zambia attempted to define and address the risk of 
an H5N 1 avian influenza incursion and pandemic preparedness in a context specific way. The avian 
influenza problem in Zambia came to be understood in three main ways; a possible impending 
exotic zoonosis, a plausible pandemic concern and a real economic threat to the poUltry and allied 
industries. These framings demonstrated an attempt by national decision-makers to align internal 
national priorities with externally driven and financially lucrative international priorities. The key 
argument of this study has been that for Zambia, pandemic preparedness and H5N 1 risk 
management was driven by an international agenda and finance, even if, locally, attempts were 
made to pursue these objectives within a development framework. 
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Given that the primary motivation for policy development was pandemic preparedness, one 
problem was that the issue took on a largely animal health and imminent threat framing. The second 
problem, the thesis has argued, was that the international agenda for pandemic preparedness, 
through financial arrangements and prescriptive approaches to preparedness, was separate from 
Zambia's development agenda, and went on to establish a parallel coordination structure that 
operated, perhaps unsustainably, outside the pre-existing and potentially useful coordination 
framework. This restricted participation in the policy process to particular actors while excluding 
others. 
Politically, the imperative for U5Nl risk management in Zambia was driven by an international 
agenda, which, in tum, was fuelled by concerns of an imminent human pandemic of potentially 
catastrophic proportions. Under various framings, including those linking Western securitization to 
the need for at-source containment, billions of dollars were made available for preparedness 
activities, as highlighted in Chapter 2. Like many other countries, the need for these activities was 
imposed on Zambia, through the international call for pandemic preparedness (Chapter 5). The 
focus was H5Nl avian influenza risk mitigation, and given that poUltry in Zambia was never a 
priority to begin with, there was some questioning of the contextual appropriateness of the effort 
(Chapter 7). But in responding to the international call, the agriculture and health sectors were only 
too eager to comply, as the drive offered opportunities to improve laboratory facilities, came with 
project vehicles and motorcycles and the promise of remuneration for those directly involved in 
simulation, sample collection, training, research and educative extension exercises. 
Other stakeholders also joined the bandwagon, including NGOs such as Africare, which, 
capitalizing on the aid dollars provided by USAID, focused its 'biosecurity risk management' 
efforts on traditional poultry producers and poultry traders as likely sources of H5N 1 and other 
poultry diseases risks. The media industry was co-opted in the process, reminded of the importance 
of responsible reporting to support Zambia's development agenda (Chapter 6). Another interesting 
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player was the Poultry Association of Zambia. Because perceptions of H5Nl risk had caused 
serious economic losses (the equivalent of £3.9 million over three months), this gave leave to the 
association to wear the hat of the biggest victim. The association later benefitted from monies made 
available for the risk mitigation effort, sub-contracted by the agricultural ministry to develop the 
initial risk communication materials, expertise which Africare also utilised for the production of 
their communication materials (data not shown). The Poultry Association of Zambia was mainly 
seeking to protect its local and international trade interests through the H5Nl risk mitigation 
process. They bemoaned the complacency of the agriculture ministry towards the sector's needs and 
advocated poultry import restrictions, even if the partial import ban that was instituted was largely 
symbolic. This is because the ban lacked legal backing, Zambia's borders were too porous for it to 
be effective, veterinary personnel were too few to impose it and the trade ministry had been 
excluded from the decision-making process. 
With much of the funding directed towards animal health, the leadership of the avian and human 
influenza response shifted from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Agriculture's Department 
of Veterinary and Livestock Development. Even with 70% of the preparedness planning purse 
being managed by the Ministry of Agriculture, this shift in the fulcrum of coordination introduced 
both new challenges in maintaining stakeholder participation and created priority tensions in 
Agriculture (Chapter 7). As it was beginning to dawn that an H5Nl incursion was becoming less 
and less likely, there was an inevitable shift from an emergency response to that of preparedness 
and capacity building, but a continued neglect of priority diseases in the animal health sector. 
Funding and advice from institutions such as the World Bank and FAO had a disproPortionate 
influence on the decision making process, from highlighting the shortcomings of the 
communication strategy and handpicking some policy participants to defining the risk areas for a 
possible HSNI avian influenza incursion into Zambia (Chapter 7). In addition, local capacity in 
some areas of pandemic preparedness was generally overlooked and the roles important 
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stakeholders were to play in the preparedness process were ill defined The Zambian government 
still went on to institute measures such as the formation of Rapid Response Teams, overlooking the 
poor resource consideration of extending these to district level. The perceived HSNl threat never 
materialised, but funding continued to be provided. Poultry producers and the general public, 
primed by continuous extension exercises wondered when, if at all, an incursion would happen. 
The important effect that financial arrangements had on the policy process was again implicitly 
highlighted in the struggle to coordinate the pandemic response involving the Health Ministry, 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU) under the 
Office of the Vice President. Specifically, the query by the UN System Coordinator in Zambia in 
which clarification was sought as to where funding for avian and pandemic influenza planning 
funding should be directed was used as one justification for DMMU intervention. This was all 
happening at a point where the threat of an U5Nl incursion appeared to be dwindling. The study 
has thus demonstrated the processes through which a global agenda such as pandemic preparedness 
is actually translated into national policy and the tradeoffs that are made, thus adding to the 
understanding of the policy implications of the global pandemic preparedness policy processes in 
various contexts. 
Other than studies examining the epidemiology of avian influenza in Africa (e.g. Monne et al. 
2(08), there are limited studies that have substantively examined avian and human preparedness 
policy development in a single African country context. One study examined pandemic 
preparedness in Africa through a review of pandemic preparedness plans (Ortu, Mounier-Jack and 
Coker 2007~ Ortu, Mounier-Jack and Coker 2(08), and a few have made recommendations for 
pandemic preparedness in developing countries (e.g. Kruk 2008; Azziz-Baumgartner et al. 2009). 
This study contributes to this work by providing an analysis of how the pandemic response was 
developed in Zambia. 
268 
9.1.3. Assessing the extent of pandemic preparedness: The impol1llnce of local context 
This study adds to existing knowledge on understanding the policy processes surrounding pandemic 
preparedness and the evaluation of preparedness responses in the context of resource-constrained 
countries free from pandemic concern infectious disease threats. In this section, two types of studies 
are reviewed; those that have endeavoured to examine and evaluate policy processes within context, 
and those that have adopted external criteria in the evaluation process. The studies reviewed here 
illuminate the different faces the pandemic response has taken in different locations, drawing 
attention to the implications of generic approaches to avian and human influenza prevention and 
control in different contexts, in particular, those that have experienced highly pathogenic avian 
influenza outbreaks, and those that have not. In aggregate, these studies highlight the challenges to 
integrated infectious disease governance from both national and global perspectives. 
Among the literature providing contextual analyses of infectious disease governance, the study by 
Scoones (2010) is perhaps the most comprehensive multi-country overview of avian influenza 
policy processes, examining the international narratives surrounding the avian and pandemic 
influenza problem in the context of Southeast Asia. It provides a comparative analysis of the 
politics and science implications of the global response. It builds on previous work on avian 
influenza policy processes (Scoones and Forster 2008a; Scoones and Forster 2008b). The three core 
narratives identified were the animal health, public health and pandemic preparedness 
understanding of the avian influenza problem and its ramifications for science, policy and politics in 
both local and global spheres. It examined the limitations of a centralised, one-cap-fits all response, 
and the need to take seriously local contexts, particularly its impacts on livelihoods and the context-
dependent effectiveness of controls. While our study was not a cross country comparative analysis 
of policy processes, it examined closely policy development from the perspectives of different 
sectors in Zambia, a country free from H5Nl, and drew attention to some of the challenges to multi-
sectoral risk management given global concerns and national priorities. 
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A different kind of contextual analysis, this time focused on preparedness evaluation, was the study 
by Hanvoravongchai el al. (2010). They conducted rapid assessment of pandemic preparedness and 
the challenges to health systems in six Asian countries. The study however was limited to a health 
systems focus. They highlight the fact that in these countries national pandemic preparedness plans 
and avian and human influenza response plans were treated as separate entities. Our study had 
mainly an animal health focus, because this was the area with the most funding, and hence the most 
activity. We found that the avian and human influenza response, even though viewed differently by 
the various sectors involved, was synonymous with, and not separate from, the pandemic response. 
The importance of this fmding is that our study, although focused only on one country, made 
explicit the policy processes around the avian and human influenza problem in a country both free 
of H5Nl avian influenza and without the experience of responding to world profile infectious 
disease concerns such as SARS. 
As opposed to an in-context analysis of preparedness policy processes, several studies have opted to 
evaluate pandemic preparedness using externally defined criteria. Krumpkamp et al. (2010) briefly 
reviewed some of the common approaches for the evaluation of pandemic preparedness, among 
them the WHO pandemic preparedness guidelines and its accompanying checklist, and the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (Eeoc) tool, before providing a conceptual 
framework for evaluating pandemic preparedness based on the Hazard Analysis Critical Control 
Point (HACCP) model. The call for pandemic preparedness came with WHO generated guidelines 
for preparedness (WHO 2(05). These were accompanied by a checklist for nations to gauge their 
level of preparedness in accordance with the requirements for responding to each of the six 
pandemic phases (WHO 2(05). The 'checklist' approach has been adopted to examine preparedness 
plans in Asia-pacific region (Coker and Mounier-Jack 2006a), Europe (Mounier-Jack and Coker 
20(6) the African continent (Ortu, Mounier-Jack, and Coker 2(08) and Latin America (Mensua, 
Mounier-Jack, and Coker 2009). These studies provided insightful comparative evaluations of 
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policy content, but they all utilised externally defmed criteria to detennine levels of pandemic 
preparedness. As noted by Coker and Mounier-Jack (2006b), in reflecting on their review of 
pandemic preparedness plans in Europe, the reading of country plans is not a true reflection of a 
nation's state of preparedness. In this thesis, I have argued it would difficult to assess what had 
really been achieved in terms of preparedness if one relied solely on externally generated criteria, 
without uncovering the underlying motivations and drivers of the response as adopted in Zambia. 
This study adds to this body of work by reviewing Zambia's National Response Plan, national 
policy process and the resultant policy activities. While these other studies have reviewed the levels 
of preparedness based on the letter of policies, this study contributes to understanding the 
importance of determining 'practical' preparedness based on a proper account of the policy context. 
Using a detailed qualitative analysis of one case, this study helps unpack some of findings made in 
other studies. Ortu, Mounier-Jack, and Coker (2008) in their analysis of 35 preparedness plans in 
African countries, for instance, found that preparedness plans focused primarily on H5Nl 
prevention and control rather than pandemic preparedness, and that the human health systems were 
ill-prepared. For the Zambian context, the focus had indeed been on H5Nl, because the initial 
framing of the avian and human influenza problem was animal health weighted, with over 70% of 
the funding directed towards this sector. Furthermore, the study revealed that much of the pandemic 
preparedness activity occurring in Zambia was not reflected in Zambia's National Response Plan. 
Other than the study examining pandemic preparedness in Africa and Latin America, all the studies 
reviewed in this section were conducted in locations that had either experienced SARS or H5Nl in 
poultry or humans, or both. It is reiterated here that Zambia had no experience in dealing with 
SARS or USNt avian influenza. Zambia was in effect 'naIve' to these pandemics. This 'naivety' 
does not necessarily represent a handicap. The country was led to focus primarily on preventing 
highly pathogenic avian influenza contamination while concurrently developing more substantive 
pandemic preparedness capacity. It was clear that the concern among decision-makers in 
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government was the zoonotic potential of H5Nl.There was also the reinforcing of public health 
objectives as a result of the AlHINI pandemic, helping to renew interest in avian influenza 
preparedness in light of the broader pandemic preparedness agenda. Although the AlHINI 
epidemic was milder than anticipated, having its highest impact in South America, Zambia's health 
system was able to respond to this pandemic from the foundations established by the avian and 
human influenza prevention and control policy response. 
The avian and human influenza response in Zambia was decidedly non-pharmaceutical in its 
interventions. Indeed, WHO position papers such as the WHO risk assessment for Africa by the 
WHO-African regional Office (2006) emphasized behavioural change as the mainstay of non-
pharmaceutical intervention. The research found that the creation of awareness about highly 
pathogenic avian influenza among the public, through extension and the media, was the main 
approach adopted in Zambia's prevention strategy. In the Zambian case, the only time 
pharmaceutical intervention was mentioned was with the advent of the AlHINI pandemic, with 
Zambia making contingencies to draw on WHO regional stockpiles of tamiflu® as and when the 
need arose, with the Ministry of Health's National Epidemics Preparedness Planning and 
Management Committee defining the priority groups for treatment (data not shown). 
While a top-down approach to global infectious disease governance has been embraced by many 
parts of the world, this research has demonstrated that the actual responses in different contexts are 
driven by the challenges faced (Chapter 7). This study therefore contributes to the understanding of 
how preparedness may be assessed in different contexts. Murphy (2006), in a review of the 
response to SARS in affected countries, spoke of the absence of fundamental infection control 
'cornerstones' in resource-poor countries. In particular, Murphy states that " ... fundamental 
infection control cornerstones are often absent in developing countries. As a result, infection control 
practice in developing countries can be haphazard, with ineffective efforts to minimise disease 
transmission." Murphy's argument, however, structures responses according to an externally 
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dermed standard that can be difficult to achieve, given the' resource constraints and priority 
differences that define resource-poor settings. Murphy goes on to review the approaches to disease 
control that were adopted in various contexts in Southeast Asia during SARS that, albeit not 
standardised, perhaps still aided in its control. Through highlighting what was gained by the 
pandemic response as adopted in Zambia (Chapter 7), this thesis has argued that such 'outsider' 
perspectives can sometimes fail to recognise the merits of context specific responses. These local 
approaches may also not necessarily be compatible with externally imposed response measures, and 
the tensions created between them could, in the long run, undermine local pandemic response 
capacity. Importantly, if context specific challenges and motivations are not made explicit, they 
remain inaccessible to evaluation, and their ramifications remain unexplored. 
9.1.4. Challenges to the coordination oJpandemic preparedness 
Another contribution this study makes is to the understanding of the difficulties in coordinating 
pandemiC preparedness efforts across sectors. As stated by Kingdon (2003) fragmentation is the 
norm in modem day policy making. What is meant by fragmentation is that the different sectors of 
government work as 'silos', pursuing individual sector interests and mandates. The findings of this 
research demonstrate that part of the challenge in coordination lay in the fact that the external 
influences guiding the pandemic response in Zambia assumed that structures for handling 
preparedness activities in the absence of an actual emergency were non-existent. The study by 
Mensua, Mounier-Jack, and Coker (2009) for Latin America drew attention to the need for external 
funding in low-resource settings to ensure the achievement of sustainable levels of preparedness. 
We argued that external funding actually influenced the direction of pandemic preparedness and 
undermined local capacity and requirements. This raises questions of sustainability of such 
approaches, a question which is beyond this thesis to answer, but does require further research. 
As would be expected in a fragmented polity, the trade, public health and animal health sectors 
operated as silos with different priorities, agendas and mandates (Chapter 7). In tackling policy 
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problems, sometimes the interests of the different sectors in government can intersect. For Zambia, 
thi"s intersection fell under the Fifth National Development Plan (5th NDP [Chapter 5]), bringing 
together all arms of government and their respective mandates under the mantel of an overriding 
economic development agenda. This aligned public health, trade and animal health interests and 
provided Government ministries in Zambia with input in each other's operations through Sectoral 
Advisory Groups (GRZ 2006a). In addition, the Ministry of Trade Commerce and Industry and the 
Ministry of Agriculture also worked together on issues concerning trade and health through the SPS 
Committee under the Ministry of Agriculture (Chapter 6). The existence of the National Epidemics 
Preparedness Management and Control Committee under the Ministry of Health provided a useful, 
albeit informal, platform for coordinating multi-sectoral disease control issues (Chapter 7), but in 
responding to the global pandemic preparedness agenda, the role of coordinating the emergency 
response fell to the National Task Force on Avian and Human Influenza. This perhaps nullified very 
useful, pre-existing links between the various arms of government. 
In the end, the coordination of Zambia's response was implemented by the responsible ministries, in 
this case Agriculture and Health, with some consideration of shifting the fulcrum of coordination to 
fall under the existing national disaster mitigation and management structure. Hanvoravongchai et 
al. (2010), in their study, found that coordination of responses to avian and pandemic influenza in 
the six Asian countries they examined, fell under the Prime Minister or President's offices. 
Similarly, Scoones and Forster (2010) found that in many Southeast Asian countries, the leadership 
of the pandemic preparedness response was mainly in either the President's or Prime Minister's 
office. Other than the methodological approach adopted and objectives pursued, the main difference 
between our study and that of Hanvoravongchai et al. is that the latter was conducted in settings that 
had experienced a highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak in either poultry or humans (or both) 
and all the six countries had experienced SARS outbreaks. There was thus a pre-existing framework 
and frames of reference for the response developed in these settings., This study argues that it is 
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important to identify and utilize what already exists in each nation in order to improve effectiveness 
of preparedness activities, and more importantly, help ensure their sustainability. 
Many of the pre-existing structures identified and reinforced during the course of avian and human 
influenza prevention and control policy development in Zambia proved useful in the AlHlNl 
response. For instance, the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) platform was 
useful in the AlHINl pandemic response, in conjunction with the diagnostic capacity developed at 
the University of Zambia's School of Veterinary Medicine. The first cases of AlHlNl were 
diagnosed using local laboratory capacity developed during avian and human influenza prevention 
and control policy development (Chapter 7). While the focus had been to contain avian influenza at 
its source, when push came to shove, the response was not limited to this 'animal focus'. The 
disease management system in Zambia thus appeared to be highly adaptable. It is noteworthy that 
the Rapid Response Teams constituted for the avian and human influenza prevention and control 
policy, while still in existence, did not feature in the AlHlNl response, but the IDSR platform did. 
The Disaster Mitigation and Management Unit under the office of the Vice President was also 
useful in AlHlNl response, while their role had not been defined in avian and human influenza 
policy development (Chapter 7). The disease management system fell back on pre-existing 
coordination structures and relationships. These structures are designed to respond as problems 
arise. However, the question remains, would the disease management system be able to cope with a 
highly infectious and fatal pandemic? 
9. 1.5. Revisiting the trode health relotionship 
This study contributes to the understanding of the trade-health relationship. In reviewing 
perspectives on the relationship between avian and human influenza prevention and control policy 
and livestock trade policy among the Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Commerce Trade and 
Industry, the primacy of health protection appeared well accepted (Chapter 6). In relation to the 
HSNI avian influenza response in particular, concern was raised by the Poultry Association of 
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Zambia that the Ministry of Agriculture did not understand the sensitivity of the poultry industry in 
Zambia and was doing very little to foster the industry's development and protection from disease 
threats. Of course, many of the controls instituted to prevent an incursion of H5Nl highly 
pathogenic avian influenza were merely symbolic (Chapter 6). 
The fact that Zambia chose to ban poultry and poultry product imports while maintaining its exports 
demonstrated Zambia's development focus, but the main concern is that in the context of the 
pandemic response, the trade bans that had been instituted across the African continent potentially 
led to as yet undetermined economic losses. The assessment of the economic implications of 
poultry and poultry product trade bans across the continent requires further research. Indeed, for a 
country like Zambia in which over 80% of the population is dependent on agriCUlture, and has an 
agenda of working towards economic advancement (CSO 2004) to curtail trade on the basis of an 
unexamined risk of an HSNI avian influenza incursion is counterproductive. 
The importance of trade in economic development in the context of Zambia cannot be overstated. It 
is reiterated here that developing countries have traditionally been excluded from the world trade 
table. With many people in resource-poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa dependent on 
agriculture, including livestock keeping, for their livelihood, it is trade in animal and animal 
products that is expected to aid development. Delgado et al. (1999) in an FAO discussion paper 
have argued that the world is currently undergoing a "Livestock Revolution" in which it is expected 
that trade globalisation and market forces would create increasing pressure for exports of livestock 
products from developing countries. Diao and Hazell (2004) report in a conference brief o~ food 
security in Africa that traditional commodity exports from sub-Saharan Africa were estimated at 
$8.6 billion and newer 'non-traditional' exports at $6.1 billion, while DFID (2005) stated that the 
domestic sub-Saharan African market, including rapidly growing urban markets for higher-value 
horticultural and livestock products, was estimated to be more than three times greater than these 
combined. Given this economic background, it is reiterated that the assessment of the economic 
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implications of poultry and poultry product trade bans across the African continent warrants further 
research. 
It is the argument of authors such as Lee and Koiwsalo (200S), Kimball (2006) and Kimball et al. 
(2008) that the trade and economic communities are reluctant to support the internationalisation of 
public health. In the context of the HSNI influenza issue in Zambia. a very different picture is 
presented. While trade has been found to trump health in other contexts, this study found health to 
trump trade concerns. In this case, health had been used as a clear trump card to impose trade 
restrictions on Zimbabwe and South Africa for outbreaks of HSN2. In this specific context, there 
was a reluctance to involve the trade ministry in the management of what was viewed as a public 
health and animal health issue. Interestingly, despite their lack of involvement in avian and human 
influenza policy development, respondents in the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry 
remained fully supportive of the actions of the Ministries of Health and Agriculture. The study 
showed that disease freedom was of paramount importance for the Poultry Industry and the 
Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry. 
9.2. Reflections on the appliclltion of risk tUUJlysis 
The argument of this section of the discussion is that setting an avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy agenda for countries in Africa based on extrapolations that do not 
consider the possible role that regional and national culture plays in disease epidemiology raises 
concerns of the appropriateness of such risk analyses and the resultant disease risk management 
policies. For example, fighting cocks, ornamental bird trade and duck farming on rice paddies are 
possibly mostly Asian country practices, all of which played roles in HSNI maintenance and spread 
(Chapter 2). While parallels for disease emergence and spread exist, as seen in the outbreaks of 
HSNI highly pathogenic avian influenza in North and West Africa. this study argues that there were 
large science and policy knowledge gaps. Leach, Scoones and Stirling (2010) recommend the 
consideration of the context's configuration in the development of disease management policies. 
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They suggest not just avoidance of incursions, i.e. keeping disease out, but understanding the local 
arrangement that may aid or curtail disease development, establishment and spread. 
Global pandemic preparedness remains important, and this thesis does not dispute the validity of the 
pandemic concern. When it comes to risk, however, the underlying argument of this thesis is that in 
the multi-sectoral mitigation and management of risk, particularly in resource-constrained settings, 
responses must be constructed and addressed in context-specific, deliberative and stakeholder 
inclusive ways. Focusing on the analysis of risk, the thesis has argued that it is important to 
generate locally relevant evidence, as opposed to a complete reliance on externally generated 
evidence to inform preparedness policy development and resource allocation. Because of the 
contextual nature of risk, accepting that risk is socially constructed would make the process of 
evidence gathering more deliberative and context appropriate. 
The OlE risk analysis framework, currently conceptualised as a technocratic framework, does not 
take these factors into account. However, given its entrenched status as a 'gold standard', rather 
than reject it as not feasible, the study has made suggestions of how it can be made more amenable 
to social processes, thus offering incremental and practical suggestions that highlight the 
importance of deliberation in risk analysis and resource allocation. An important ingredient is 
structuring risk in flexible and stakeholder inclusive ways and adopting an approach to risk 
assessment, risk communication and risk management that is responsive to the aggregated local 
ecological, biological and policy configuration. By this, I mean constructing, assessing, 
communicating and managing infectious disease risk across sectors in policy relevant ways. 
In justifying the need to conduct a risk analysis in Zambia, the study first argued that resource 
considerations were poor in the plans to extend the Rapid Response Teams to the districts or even 
their usefulness in a highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak. There were also poorly thought out 
considerations in the effectiveness of the trade ban to mitigate the risk of an HSN! incursion, the 
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safety of the commercial poultry industry and the exclusion of the Ministry of Commerce Trade and 
Industry, among others, in policy development (Chapter 6). Although this study posited that a risk 
analysis may aid in defining resource priorities better, Barkenbus (1998) has argued that the careful 
identification of risks does not automatically result in the transfer of resources and attention from 
low-risk concerns to high-risk concerns. Such resource transfers would be especially difficult to 
effect in situations like that of Zambia where resource priorities are externally defined. Therefore, 
the study did not attempt to conduct a risk analysis, but conceptually illuminate the policy 
implications of conducting a risk analysis in this context. 
As highlighted in Chapter 8, there are limitations to the objective assessment of risk based on 
frameworks such as that recommended by the OlE, especially as they relate to informing policy. 
Stirling and Scoones (2009) contend that scientific assessments of risk often attempt to aggregate 
very complex social and biological phenomena into a set of probabilities and outcomes which are 
often structured to become policy, rather than inform it. They recommend more inclusive and open 
approaches to the assessment of risks. This sentiment is echoed by Stirling and Mayer (2000), who 
posit that even experts "don't know what they don't know" and recommend wider stakeholder 
consultation in the risk evaluation process. Hueston (2003) is of the view that the veterinary 
profession, in particular, limits itself by shunning political and social phenomena in its evaluation of 
risk. Risk, as previously stated, is socially constructed and the proposed framework in this research 
took this into consideration. Within the sociology of risk literature, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) 
argue that risk is 'politicized' through several social processes, giving risk a status which is separate 
from the actual dangers presented by various hazards. With this background, Horlick-Jones (1998) 
posits that risk identification and assessment are therefore both human and social activities based on 
generating meaning and "a shared understanding of reality" (p.80). Indeed, this study provided 
evidence that the risk and implications of an H5Nl incursion attained a high politics status in 
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Zambia (Chapter 5), but the multi-sectoral and externally financed nature of the policy process 
made it difficult to develop a shared understanding of the avian and human influenza problem. 
The risk of H5Nl avian influenza was framed differently across the animal health, public health and 
trade sectors in Zambia, which was separate from the actual H5Nl avian influenza situation in the 
country. It was demonstrated that in Zambia, there was a lack of understanding of many of the local 
stakeholders on how highly pathogenic avian and human influenza affected them. The avian and 
human influenza issue in Zambia was not transparent, as a result of the intersecting multi-sectoral 
perspectives constructing the preparedness response. I argued that the influence of international 
agendas, organisational norms and procedures framed how the H5Nl avian influenza problem was 
understood across these organisational divides. Risk perception was thus both socially constructed 
and fragmented by contextualized framings. 
Ashoff (2005), speaking specifically about policy coherence, but whose principles are applicable to 
the concept of multi-sectoral zoonosis risk management, provides four reasons for difficulties in 
bringing different policy communities to focus on the same policy objective. These reasons have 
some bearing on how feasible it is to improve and apply the OlE risk analysis framework in multi-
sectoral risk management. The first is the area of societal and political norms based on competing 
values, diversity, competition, representation and access to decision-making which normally do not 
support consensus building or give consensus building primacy. The second is the area of political 
decision-making based on interest divergence. This includes the general policy process, politics, 
interests and power at macro-governmental and micro-institutional levels. The third is policy 
formulation and coordination. This covers problem framing, consensus, the presence or absence of 
structures that support stakeholder interaction, arbitration and conflict management, role allocation 
and information sharing. The fourth is the area of how to effect, and determine the impact, of 
coordination. In summary, in the case of Zambia, achieving objective clarity in multi-sectoral avian 
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and human influenza risk management policy was a challenge because of the very nature of the 
political system. 
Given this background, this study proposed an integration of the socio-political structures of risk 
management into a conceptual framework for risk analysis that is largely grounded in the natural 
sciences, thus proposing an extension of this framework to increase its usefulness. To carry out such 
risk analyses, the study highlighted the importance of problem framing, identifying the different 
types of 'risk managers' and cognisance of the differences in risk management capacity across 
sectors (information that can feed back into a risk assessment), differences in institutional norms 
and priorities in developing a consensus view of risk, and an understanding of the policy process, 
especially in the aspects of coordination capacity and institutional power. Several themes from the 
policy analysis were used to argue for the feasibility and utility of conducting a risk analysis in this 
context. Fundamentally, what is required is flexibility in structuring risk in ways that are 
stakeholder inclusive. Risk communication and risk management should be responsive, and include 
local ecological, biological and policy considerations. The key lies in an approach to risk 
communication that both feeds into and draws from the risk analysis process. 
How effective this proposed approach to conducting risk analysis is requires empirical testing. 
While this could be challenging, there is a wide body of literature that can be drawn upon to support 
the development of such an approach to risk analysis. The role of stakeholder analysis in resource 
management has been posited by Chevalier (200 1), and can be extended to infectious risk 
management. For example, the risk assessment on avian influenza conducted by Pfeiffer (2007) for 
the European Food Standards Agency (EFSA) adopted an approach that involved wide consultation 
with stakeholders. Stirling and Scoones (2009) propose wide stakeholder consultation in the 
assessment of risk and many of their recommendations would help increase the robustness of this 
proposed extension of the OlE risk analysis framework. More importantly, Millstone's co-
evolutionary model (2007), forms much of the basis for the improvement of the OlE risk analysis 
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framework, because it takes into account both scientific and social phenomena in the risk analysis 
process. 
The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis presents very interesting parallels to the 
understanding of risk communication and risk management (See Dora 2006). Dowler et al. (2006) 
in reviewing the issues and methods of assessing public perceptions in the context of the 
BSEICreutzfeldt-Jakob Disease crisis in Europe spoke of lay epidemiology in the understanding of 
risk problems that mirrors expert knowledge. Such a conceptualization can be extended to generate 
data for the 'policy pathways' proposed in this study's risk model (Chapter 8). The National 
Academy of Science publication, science and decisions, a publication advancing risk assessment in 
decision making from a North American perspective, found that risk communication needed to be 
improved (NRC 2009). Van Zwanenberg and Millstone's (2006) conceptual paper on risk 
communication strategies in public policy making reviews the merits of a deliberative approach to 
risk communication that emphasizes dialogue, including the definition, analysis and the evaluation 
of the risk issues. In proposing the risk model presented in Chapter 8, a deliberative approach was 
the mainstay of the argument that was advanced. What this research proposed was the adoption of a 
deliberative approach in the OlE risk analysis framework to improve its applicability. This requires 
quite radical shifts in thinking about a predefined approach to the assessment of risk. 
More generally, several avian influenza risk assessments and conceptual models have been 
developed for Europe, Southeast Asia and Africa (Defra 2006; pfeiffer 2007; Goutard et al. 2007; 
Peterson and Williams 2(08) which could provide insights and additional data on how to best apply 
such a risk model in the Zambia. The conceptual framework for risk analysis in Africa by Goutard 
et al. (2007), highlighted the ecological considerations in conducting risk analyses in such contexts. 
This study adds to this body of work by making explicit the policy implications of conducting risk 
analysis in such contexts. It is necessary that in applying the OlE risk analysis framework in this 
multi-sectoral context, the existing policy framework for risk management is recognised from the 
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onset to avoid overly sectoral or 'silo' responses to risk that then require the development of 
additional policy interventions to negotiate. 
9.3. Recommendations 
Through the process of examining the policy processes for multi-sectoral risk management in 
resource-constrained countries like Zambia, the study can now make specific policy relevant 
recommendations to policy makers and for pandemic preparedness in general, on how to improve 
multi-sectoral risk management. The key findings in this study have been that national priorities 
often struggle with the prescriptive requirements of pandemic preparedness, particularly in the post-
SARS era. These tensions can result in the development of symbolic responses that could ultimately 
impair the effectiveness of the pandemic response in some contexts. International agencies have a 
responsibility to recognise these competing priorities, particularly in resource-poor settings, whose 
health and veterinary systems are already struggling to address real disease threats. 
While having an overarching agenda is important, it is also important to consider how this can best 
be translated into national policy. The key to sustainable pandemic preparedness lies not in 
developing new structures and approaches to preparedness, but improving existing mechanisms. 
The main recommendations made here are that in assessing the progress of pandemic response plan 
development, contextual evaluations are not only important, but are critical. There is need to 
critically review the evidence used to develop pandemic responses in different contexts. Evidence 
generated in different contexts is of limited utility for the success of global pandemic preparedness 
because while the successes and failures of other contexts provide useful learning experiences, they 
are not always transferrable. 
In as far as developing a pandemic response is concerned, it is also important to foster the 
development of synergistic relationships across different policy sectors. particularly in contexts 
where resources are scarce, so that the burden of policy development is distributed across sectors, 
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allowing them to focus some of their scarce resources on their day-to-day peace-time mandates. 
This would also serve to better involve various stakeholders in policy development. A sustained 
emergency response is impossible. It will lead to stakeholder fatigue and ultimately undermine 
response capacity. 
The following section briefly lists recommendations specific to decision-makers across trade, public 
health and animal health on improving infectious disease risk management policy development in 
the future. 
i. The coordination of the pandemic preparedness response needs to be deferred to a higher 
office above ministerial portfolio. The requirements for pandemic preparedness are such 
that a multi-sectoral approach should be advocated. The development of technical responses 
should remain with the relevant government agencies, but the aspect of coordination 
requires the intervention of an authoritative body whose mandate it is to coordinate inter-
ministerial activities. While the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit in Zambia meets 
this criteria, it must, with the aid of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health, 
clearly define its role in general disease risk management. The legitimization of the 
National Epidemics Preparedness Planning and Management Committee in the Ministry of 
Health as a subcommittee of the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit could assist in 
more clearly defming the role this unit can play in disease risk management. This would 
also more regularly involve the Vice President's office in day to day aspects of disease 
control. 
ii. There is need to involve the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry in the development 
of future infectious disease management policy, particularly for zoonotic diseases that are 
trade related, in order to legitimize policy decisions that affect trade. 
iii. the Ministry of Agriculture needs to better manage infectious disease surveillance 
activities so as to be more efficient in their use of resources. The development of a 
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surveillance strategy that works similar to the Ministry of Health's Integrated Disease 
Surveillance and Response framework is called for. 
iv. Food safety needs to be better incorporated into Zambia's avian and human influenza 
prevention and control policy. 
v. The three ministries, Health, Trade and Agriculture, should consider drawing more on each 
other's resources in establishing surveillance activities for emerging infectious diseases. 
VI. A risk analysis should be conducted to help defme resource priorities across the three 
sectors and more widely with regard to risk management and should involve consultation of 
all the relevant stakeholders. 
vii. Resource considerations for the various planned activities for preparedness need to be 
considered within the boundaries of what is feasible within this context. 
viii. Existing structures for coordination should be utilized as much as possible to disseminate 
information among the three ministries on the progress of developing Zambia's pandemic 
response. 
9.4. Conclusion 
The national level focus and policy analysis nature of this study made it very challenging, especially 
given the complex nature of developing a pandemic response and an analysis that focused primarily 
on the perspectives of national-level decision-makers from three out of the many sectors that were 
initially involved in setting the avian and human influenza agenda in Zambia. It was also a 
challenge to think about risk analysis in terms of policy. The key conclusions of this thesis are that 
the multi-sectoral H5Nt and pandemic influenza risk management policy pursued in Zambia was 
largely driven by international donor concerns which were not always aligned with national 
priorities, but that this process did bring some gains for Zambia in terms of improved laboratory 
capacity, a heightened awareness of avian influenza and a renewed interest in the poultry industry. 
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The policy analysis also underlined critiques that have been made of technocratic exercises such as 
the OlE risk analysis framework. However, such assessments will continue to be used, and 
therefore a pragmatic approach to improving the assessment of risk in resource-constrained settings 
is to consider drawing on what Millstone calls a 'co-evolutionary' approach. By bringing policy 
processes more explicitly into this technocratic exercise and allowing for multiple framings of risk, 
the model proposed in this thesis will have wider applications, but, as stated in this chapter, it 
requires empirical testing. Other areas recommended for further research include conducting policy 
analyses in other countries of Southern Africa to determine how their risk management and 
pandemic preparedness policies were developed and the trade-offs and compare them to what 
happened in Zambia. Economic evaluations are also recommended as an area for further research, 
given the wide-spread institution of trade bans across the African continent. 
The study was limited to an examination of only three sectors in a single country. Broader insights 
would have been gained if the perspectives of poultry farmers had been obtained, particularly those 
in the traditional sector. This would have been useful to gauge how much awareness had actually 
been created by the preparedness process as adopted in Zambia. It would have also been interesting 
to obtain the perspectives of those members of the Task Force reported to have been complacent in 
policy development. The research however was limited to the analysis of trade, public health and 
animal health perspectives of multi-sectoral risk management policy development. Therefore, while 
the analysis itself provides new insights into pandemic preparedness policy development, revealing 
some of the pitfalls of the avian influenza response in an African country, it is still a limited snap-
shot of a complex and evolving policy and disease situation. 
Many of the concerns over confidence in this study's fmdings have been addressed in the 
methodology chapter. To reiterate these included our use of retrospective accounts of the policy 
process. Multiple methods of data collection and analysis were used to address this concern 
including triangulation of policy documents, news articles and observation. There was also 
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extensive discussion of the study findings with my supervisor and key respondents. Therefore the 
recommendations made to decision-makers on how multi-sectoral zoonotic risk management and 
pandemic preparedness in Zambia may be improved, have been based on a reflexive and rigorous 
analysis of available data. 
This policy analysis of national level pandemic preparedness and multi-sectoral risk management 
policy development across the sectors of animal health, public health and trade in Zambia provides 
new insights on how policies are developed in resource-constrained countries in the context of 
globalization. By reviewing the feasibility of conducting an OlE type risk analysis in such a way 
that includes policy processes and context, this study highlights the need to adopt integrative 
approaches to multi-sectoral infectious disease risk management and pandemic preparedness. In an 
ever-evolving globalised world, achieving this is an important goal. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Trade Agreements Affecting Health 
WTO a~ments with major health implications 
Agreement Health impact 
GATT 1994 Reduced tariffs in many developing countries led to job losses in "uncompetitive" 
sectors, with subsequent impacts on poverty, and declines in net public revenue, 
decreasing the funds available for health. education, water/sanitation, and other key 
health determinants. 
Agreement on Continuing export am producer subsidies by the USA, EU, Japan and Canada depress 
Agriculture world prices and cost developing countries hundreds of millions of dollars in lost 
revenue that could be used to fund health, education, and other health promoting 
services. Subsidised food imports from wealthy countries undermine domestic growers' 
livelihoods. Market barriers to food products from developing countries persist and 
deny pOOrer countries trade related earnings. 
Agreement on Requires scientific risk assessments even when foreign goods are treated no differently 
Sanitary and than domestic goods (that is, there is no discrimination). Such assessments may be 
Phytosanitary costly and imperfect. 
Measures 
Technical Barriers Requires that any regulatory barrier to the free flow of goods be "least trade restrictive 
to Trade as possible." Many trade disputes over domestic health and safety regulations have 
Agreement invoked this aRreement 
General Locks in privatisation levels in committed service sectors, several of which (health care, 
Agreement on education, environmental services) are important to promoting public health, and 
Trade in Services frequently prone to market failure (that is, private provision often excludes access to the 
poor). Once a service sector is committed, there is no cost-free way to extend public 
provision of that service in the future. 
Agreement on Extended patent protection can limit access to essential medicines. Higher resulting cost 
Trade Related of drugs can consume public funding otherwise useful for primary health care or 
Intellectual investing in other health determinants 
Property Rights 
Agreement on Prohibits government's abilities to place domestic purchase requirements on foreign 
Trade Related investment; such requirements can increase domestic employment, which can be 
Investment important to improving population health. 
Measures 
Agreement on Limits government's abilities to use its contracts or purchases for domestic economic 
Government development, regional equity, employment equity or other social goals with strong links 
Procurement to better population health. While currently a plurilateral (voluntary) agreement, there is 
nel!Otiating pressure to make it a binding multilateral agreement. 
Adapted from Labonte and Sanger (2006) 
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Appendix II: Summary of Interviews 
Sector represented ID (in order of appearance) Interview Initial 
type interview 
dates 
1. Animal health and trade SPINAP Coordinator and National Task Formal 021071(1) 
Force member. Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives (1) 
2. Animal health and trade Task Force Member and Animal Health Formal and 301071(1) 
Focal person. Ministry of Agriculture (2) informal 
3. Animal health and trade Senior Epidemio-smveillance Officer. Formal and 01107/(1) 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives informal 
(3)· 
4. Animal Health Senior Veterinary Research Officer. Formal and 24/07110 
National Avian Influenza Working informal 
Group (4)· 
5. Animal health Research Scientist. Ministry of Formal and 07/07/(1) 
Agriculture and Cooperatives (5) informal 
6. Animal Health Non-Governmental Organization Poultry Formal and 27/071(1) 
Consultant on Avian Influenza (6) informal 
7. Animal HealtblFAO FAO international consultant (7) Formal and 011091(1) 
informal 
8. Anima1 Health Tecbnical consultant. National Task Formal 131071(1) 
Force on Avian and human influenza (8) 
9. Public Health Deputy Director. Public Health and Formal and 081101(1) 
Research. Ministry of Health (9) informal 
10. Public Health • Communication Focal Person. Health Formal and 02/(1)/(1) 
Communication Education Offteer. Ministry of Health informal 
(10) 
II. Public Health National Smveillance Officer. Ministry Formal and 17/071(1) 
of Health (11) informal 
12. Agriculture· Senior Information OffICer. National Formal and 101(1)/(1) 
Communication Agricultural Information Service. MACO informal 
(12) 
13. Communication Information~.NatiooU Formal and 101(1)1(1) 
Agricultural Information Service. MACO informal 
(13) 
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14. Animal health and trade District Veterinary OffICer. Member. Informal. 28109~ 
Rapid Response Team (14) Formal 
15. Animal health and trade District Veterinary OffICer. Member Formal and 2211~ 
Rapid Response Team (1~) informal 
16. Poultry production and Poultry Association of Zambia Executive Formal 01l10J09 
trade Director (16) 
17. Trade Director Foreign Trade. Ministry of Formal 03111109 
Commerce Trade and Industry (11) 
18. Trade Director Domestic Trade. Ministry of Formal 03111109 
Commerce Trade and Industry (18) 
19. Trade Secretary Zambia Trade Mission to WTO Formal and 12I08I09 
Geneva (19) informal 
20. Coordination National Coordinator. Disaster Formal 25109~ 
Management and Mitigation Unit (20) 
21. Coordination Head of Research and Planning. Disaster Formal 25109~ 
Management and Mitigation Unit (21) 
22. Trade COMESA SPS Expen (22) Formal and 12110109 
informal 
23. World bank World Bank consultant (London) Informal 27I06I09 
24. Animal Health Provincial Veterinary Officer 'I Informal 29109~ 
25. Public Health Provincial Veterinary Officer H2 Informal 
26. Trade Economist. Zambia Trade Policy Informal 27I06I09 
consultant 
27. Trade/standards Standards Officer. Zambia Bureau of Informal 11111109 
Standards 
28. Agriculture Permanent Secretary Ministry of Informal 3<W6I09 
Agriculture 
29. Public Health Director - Public Health and Research Informal 14I08I09 
MOH 
30. Public Health Deputy Director - Public Health and Informal 2110109 
Research H2 - MOH 
31. Animal Health Deputy Director Department of Animal Informal 1I08I09 
Health and Livestock Development -
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Malawi 
32. Animal Health District Veterinary Officer #1 Informal 28109/CYJ 
33. Animal Health and trade District Veterinary Officer #2 Informal 29/09/09 
34. Animal Health USAID Consultant Louisiana State Informal 12108109 
University 
35. Animal Health and RATES officer - COMESA Lusaka Informal 15/08/09 
Trade 
36. Facilitator USAID Consultant Field Simulation Informal 28109/CYJ 
Exercise 
37. Trade COMESA trade expert Informal 22101110 
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Appendix III: List of Documents for documentary review/corroboration 
Document Source 
Country Level Rapid Assessment Avian and Ministry of health 
Human Influenza 
National avian influenza Budget for provincial Ministry of Health 
tours 2006 
Zambia's Fifth National development Plan 2006- Internet Search 
2010 
Zambia's Living conditions and Monitoring Central Statistics Office 
survey 2004 
The National Response Plan for Avian and 3 versions - MOH and Department of 
Human Influenza Veterinary and Livestock Development 
1. Emergency Response Plan for Avian 
Influenza (2005) 
2. Avian Influenza and Pandemic 
Influenza Threat: National Response 
Plan (2005-06) 
3. National Response Plan for Avian and 
Human Influenza (2008) 
Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources Department of Veterinary and Livestock 
introductory letter for SPINAP Development 
Zambia: SPS Management Recommendations of a Internet Search 
Joint World BanklUSAID Assessment Team 
Report: National Integrated Desktop Simulation Department of Veterinary and Livestock 
Exercise for the Control of Highly Pathogenic Development 
Avian Influenza in Animal and Human 
Populations. 4 - 5 September, 2008 - Suwilanji 
Gardens, Lusaka - Zambia 
Report: Field Simulation Exercise for control of Department of Veterinary and Livestock 
outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Development 
29 - 30 September 2009 
The Public Health Act, Cap 295 of the Laws of MOH - Internet search 
Zambia 
The Stock diseases Act, Cap 252 of the Laws of MACO - Internet search 
Zambia 
The Control of Goods Act, Cap 421 of the Laws Ministry of Commerce Trade and industry -
of Zambia Internet search 
Zambia's Agricultural Policy 2004-2015 Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry 
Zambia's Trade Policy Ministry of Commerce trade and Industry 
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Zambia's draft legislation revised stock diseases Department of Veterinary and Livestock 
act Development 
Zambia's trade policy review (WTO) 9 Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry 
documents (also available using internet search) 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response Ministry of Health 
protocol WHO-AFRO 
International Health Regulations 2005 Ministry of Health 
WHO pandemic preparedness guidelines Ministry of Health 
Zambia Poultry Sector Study Risk Mapping Department of Veterinary and Livestock 
Activity - ILRI EDRS-AIA Project . Development 2009 
Early detection, reporting and surveillance -
Avian Influenza in Africa Consultation report 
Fund request to support prevention and control of Department of Veterinary and Livestock 
avian and human influenza in Zambia Development 
COMESA trade protocol Internet search 
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Appendix IV: Information sheet 
London School of Hygiene a Tropical Medicine 
Kennedy Mwacalimba 
Department of Public Health and Policy 
Health Policy Unit 
Keppel Street 
London WC1 E 7HT 
Interview Con .. nt Form 
Protect ntle: Trade, Animal Health and Public Health policy coherence: Developing ...... 
trade and avian and human Influenza prevention and control police. In z.mblll 
I agree to be Interviewed for the purposes of the research study named above. 
The purpose and nature of the interview has been explained to me. 
I agree/do not agree that the Interview may be electronically recorded (chooM one). 
Any questions that I asked about the purpose and nature of the InteMew and ....arch have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
Choose a). b) or c): 
I agree that my name may be used for the purposes of the research only and not for publcatlon. 
OR 
I understand that the student may wish to pursue publication at • later date and ffrf name may be 
used. OR 
I do not wish my name to be used or cited, or my identity otherwtee dllcloeed, In the .....arch. 
Name of Interviewee, ______________ _ 
Signature of Intervlewee, _____________ _ 
Oate, ________ _ 
I have explained the project and the Implications of being Interviewed to the Intervtewee and I 
believe that the consent Is informed and that he/she understands the implications of participation. 
Name of Interviewer _______________ _ 
Signature of Intervlewer ______________ _ 
Oate, _______ _ 
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Appendix V: Information Sheet 
Participant Information Sheet 
Project Title: Trade, Animal Health and Public Health policy coherence: Developing coherent 
trade and avian and human Influenza prevention and control policies In Zambia 
Researcher 
Kennedy Mwacalimba, Research Degree Student 
The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
Department of Public Health and Policy 
Health Policy Unit 
Keppel Street 
London WC1 E 7HT 
This is a PhD study. The aim of this research to assess the extent to which the trade, public health 
and animal health policies conceming avian and human influenza (AHI) prevention and control and 
agricultural trade are coherent in Zambia and determine whether or not the existing level of policy 
coherence influences the risk of trade-related H5N1 introduction in the country. Policy coherence is 
the level of consistency/cooperation in policy positions, statements and actions on trade and avian 
and human influenza policies by the sectors under study. The purpose of the study is to develop 
policy-relevant conclusions on the possible importance of policy coherence in the management of 
trade-related disease risk. Your cooperation in meeting this objective is vital. 
Participation 
You have been chosen because you are in a position to provide the information necessary to meet 
the objective of this work. Participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any time with 
no obligation to give reasons for withdrawal. The information collection period will be approximately 6 
months and will involve between 1 and 3 interviews lasting no more than an hour and a half each. 
Interviews will be conducted at your earliest convenience. 
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Risk 
There will be minimal risk involved as the study only aims to obtain the perspectives of the trade, 
health and agricu~ure institutions to determine the extent of agreement or disagreement in policy 
development and if this has any bearing on the risk of avian influenza introduction. Interview 
transcripts will be anonymized to protect identities of informants. 
Data collection 
The research will involve an in depth interview to discuss either avian and human influenza policy 
development or agricu~ural trade policy and how stakeholders are linked in the policy formulation 
process. The interview will be based on open-ended questions on the understanding of the avian 
influenza problem, its level of importance in each sector, perceptions of risk, resource dependencies, 
institutional resources for disease control and actions related to the two policies. If you are able to 
provide documents to substantiate the information provided after the interview, this will be 
appreciated, as this would help shed more light on this issue. Interview transcripts will be given to you 
to confirm that this was in fact what was said before any statements are used for analysis. Follow up 
interviews may be requested to clarify statements or provide additional information, if this is deemed 
necessary. Again, you are under no obligation to accept a follow up interview. 
Mhough unlikely, there might be minimal discomfort during these interviews as some questions may 
be considered politically sensitive. You have the option of deciding how the information you provide 
should be used, i.e. if you wish to speak anonymously, agree or disagree to be quoted, agree or 
disagree for the information you have provided to be used for analysis and agree or disagree for the 
information to be used in academic publications. No quotes or other resu~s arising from your 
participation in this study will be included in any reports, even anonymously, without your agreement. 
If you are harmed by taking part in this study, there are no special compensation arrangements. If 
you are harmed due to negligence, then you may have grounds for a legal action but may have to 
pay for it. 
Possible benefits of participation 
It is hoped that the process of information collection and exchange will aid in improving policy 
coherence and also provide some understanding of how the risks of avian influenza and other 
animal-human diseases may be mitigated through greater cooperation. Resu~s of the study will be 
provided to all participants. You will also be given copies of any publications made from this study or 
where publications can be found if individual copies cannot be provided. 
Ethics approval 
The study has been approved by the london School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and is 
seeking approval from Zambia Research Ethics Committee. Participants will be given a copy of the 
information sheet and a signed consent form to keep. 
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Appendix VI: Ethics Approval 
LONDON SCHOOL OF HYGIENE 
& TROPICAL MEDICINE 
ETHICS COMMITTEE 
APPROVAL FORM 
AppllCllUon number: M65 
Name of Princlpallnw.~ator Kannady Mwacallmba 
Department Public Health and Policy 
.. ,,,"" 
Head of 08Partment Profes.or An.,. Mills 
TItle: Trllde. Animal ..... Ith and Public Haalth policy coherence: 
DeveIopInfiI coherent trade and avian and human Influenza 
prevention and control pollcl_ in Zambia 
This spplicatlon is approwd by the Committee. 
Chair of the ethics Committee ..... . 
Date ........................................ '" ...... 27 May 2009 ...... "', ................................... . 
Approval Is dependent on local ethical approval having been ree.lVed. 
Any subsequent changes to the appllClltion must be submitted to the CommlUee 
v" an E2 amendment fOrm. 
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Ie:,p''''''', 'M.2/1 253{U(J.5 
n.v .16l12J1 ).'~JH REPUBLIC Of ZAMB1A 
1\'1) NTSTRY OF HEALTH 
II th ugusl,2[)09 
Dr Kenncdy Mwacalimba 
ni\'crsilY of Zambia 
School OrVe\{".rinary Scienccs 
LUSAKA 
Itt<:: REQUEST TO COLLECr DATA FOR IU:SJ<:ARCH PURPOSl<~S 
Reii:rcnce is m ad ' to the above subj ect matter in your leller dalcd 7'h August ' 009. 
Noe~E Ilflt!SP. 
p, U, tlCIX .,020 
LUSAKA 
'111C ,Vl inistry Dr Ilcalth (MOil) is committed h) ·;upporling puhlic hea lth research aimed at 
idenrifying gnp ' in (;xisting policiC's and programme:>, The MOll also welcomes r~s ar h 
findings thal otTer flx'ommendations of imerwnllons on how to improve the h alth status of lhe 
/..ambian p(~0rk . 
I therefor!.;. \'It'i lC \() grant you authority to coll'ct ini()rmfllion from n:l e unt II d CUrnCI1l'!. 
int'bml ation datascts. and through il1lerviews ,\ ith rclevam h cllth specialists on your research 
lopic. This mllst r.owcycr be done in ace, rd, ne(' 'with laid d(l \lVn ethical b'1lidclin c$ on 
conliilentilility of informlltion and use 1)1' research lindillgs. 
r ::Ilso no!' tlull YOll hayc not providcd m~ flit.; with copics 1)1' your rcscllr('h pl'tItocol lind 
questioDnnircs, pl~ase make these avai bblt" to tho: respective directorate for review berore 
con lucting any illlcrvicws and d::na collection in ord,'1 to taci liwte an onJerly procc s. 
Please liaise wilh I.he resp.:ctive di rcetomle ~1thi n ihe :-'1\011 for s uppurl during yllt11' data 
collc(;tion cxen.:Le. 
I look forward to receiving a 'opy OfYOllJ' ;-\:.'carch nndl!1g,~ as soon ll~ the), l) re available . 
L'J11 
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